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Chapter 1
Introduction
Promoting the stability of the financial system is considered to be a key objective by politi-
cians, policy makers and regulators to support worldwide economic development (e.g.,
ECB (2017), World Bank (2013)). Understanding that the portfolio choice of financial
intermediaries and sovereigns plays an important role resulted in various pieces of regu-
lation and guidelines with the aim to promote the stability of individual institutions and
the financial system as a whole (e.g. BIS (2010), IMF and World Bank (2014)). However,
the global financial crisis of 2007-2009 and the European sovereign debt crisis of 2010-
2012 demonstrated that it still eludes us how this objective can be achieved. The global
financial crisis demonstrated how quickly risks can spread across highly interconnected
financial institutions causing a global systemic crisis and worldwide economic downturn.
One important factor of these risk spillovers among financial institutions is commonality
in asset holdings (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny (1992, 2011), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)). In
addition, the European sovereign debt crisis highlighted that the health of financial insti-
tutions and sovereigns are intertwined and that sovereign instability can be an important
source of risk to the financial system (e.g., Laeven (forthcoming)). One important factor of
sovereign instability is the maturity structure of sovereign debt, which affects sovereigns’
exposure to rising funding costs and exclusions from financial markets.
This thesis studies the portfolio choice of financial institutions and sovereigns, and in-
vestigates its implications for financial stability. On the one hand, it investigates the
portfolios’ liability side of sovereigns by studying debt maturity as a key dimension of
governments’ debt portfolio structure. The focus is on strategic behavior in governments’
maturity choice and on the Eurozone, which provides an ideal environment as strategic
interactions among governments should be most pronounced in an integrated market. On
the other hand, this thesis investigates commonality in banks’ asset holdings as a key
dimension of banks’ asset choice. The focus is on banks’ corporate syndicated loan port-
folios in the U.S. market, which provides an ideal environment as corporate syndicated
loan portfolios are a sizable part of banks’ total assets.
Most of the literature on governments’ debt maturity choice explores the role of funding
costs and funding needs. Governments may trade-off long-term debt as a hedge against
1
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fluctuations in future funding costs, against higher repayment incentives associated with
short-term debt to ensure future funding (Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012)). More-
over, governments might prefer long-term debt to avoid rollover crises (Cole and Kehoe
(2000)). However, short-term debt is usually cheaper than long-term debt, particularly
during crises periods (Broner et al. (2013)). An alternative explanation is strategic behav-
ior. One of the leading theories for strategic maturity choice from the corporate debt liter-
ature emphasizes “gap-filling” behavior of market participants (Greenwood et al. (2010)).
According to this theory, governments would choose debt maturity to fill supply gaps
across maturities, which result from varying aggregate financing patterns of governments.
The thesis adds to this literature by broadening our understanding of governments’
debt maturity choice in general and investigating strategic behavior as a determinant of
maturity choice in particular. Thereby, it establishes gap-filling as a new channel of gov-
ernments’ maturity choice, and highlights its implications for the resilience of government
bond market liquidity. As empirical studies on governments’ maturity choice have so far
mainly focused on emerging economies and the U.S, this thesis also contributes by ex-
tending the literature to a setting where multiple governments issue debt in an integrated
market, such as the Eurozone.
A different strand of the literature has theoretically shown that higher interconnected-
ness of financial institutions through common exposures in times of crisis can increase sys-
temic risk through various forms of financial contagion (Allen et al. (2012a), Castiglionesi
and Navarro (2010), Ibragimov et al. (2011), Wagner (2010)). Channels affecting financial
contagion among financial institutions are, for example, direct linkages (Allen and Gale
(2000), Allen and Babus (2009), Gorton and Metrick (2012), Giglio (2016)), information
contagion (Chen (1999)), and commonality of asset holdings. As banks have similar ex-
posure to assets such as syndicated loans, a decline in asset prices can affect the banking
system, because of the direct exposure of banks to the same assets as well as fire sale
externalities (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny (1992, 2011), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)). Another
relevant strand of the literature investigates loan syndication. While syndicate structures
have been examined from different perspectives, only recently a few papers have emerged
on how banks interconnect in the syndicated loan market by studying the evolution of
syndicate structures (e.g. Sufi (2007), Cai (2010)). However, these studies are predomi-
nantly limited to the choice of participant lenders. Participants might be chosen in loan
syndicates based on their prior relationships with both the borrower and the lead arranger
(Sufi (2007)).
Linking to the literatures on financial institutions’ interconnectedness through common
exposures and the evolution of their interconnectedness through syndicated loan struc-
tures, this thesis aims at understanding the impact of banks interconnectedness through
common exposures on systemic risk, and how banks become interconnected. It develops a
novel measure of bank interconnectedness and offers new insights on the effects of banks’
interconnectedness on bank-level systemic risk. In addition, it extends the literature on
how banks become interconnected by investigating the role of similarity in lending ex-
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pertise on banks’ interconnectedness through corporate syndicated loan structures, and
studies the effects of syndicated loan structures on loan pricing. Finally, this thesis also
provides various policy implications.
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 investigates governments’ debt maturity
choice. Chapter 3 deals with the interconnectedness of banks through syndicated corporate
loan portfolios, and Chapter 4 studies how banks become interconnected.
1.1 Government debt maturity choice – strategic behavior
and liquidity implications1
Governments actively decide on the maturity structure of their debt portfolios by issuing
debt across maturities. While governments’ debt maturity affects creditor losses in debt
restructuring, long-term interest rates, debt sustainability levels, exposures to fluctuating
funding costs, and consequently governments’ vulnerability to crises (e.g., Kim (2015),
Beetsma et al. (2016), and Asonuma et al. (2017)), evidence on the determinants of debt
maturity choice is scarce. Also, established theories predominantly focus on explaining
government debt maturity choice through funding costs and funding needs (e.g., Cole
and Kehoe (2000), Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012), and Aguiar et al. (2016)). But
with large variations in the maturity structure of governments’ debt portfolios, it becomes
clear that these explanations might not fit all circumstances. An alternative explanation
is strategic behavior. One of the leading theories for strategic maturity choice from the
corporate debt literature emphasizes “gap-filling” behavior of market participants (Green-
wood et al. (2010)). According to this theory, governments would choose debt maturity
to fill supply gaps across maturities, which result from varying aggregate financing pat-
terns of governments. Since governments’ gap-filling would imply that governments act
as macro liquidity providers thereby adding significant risk absorption capacity to gov-
ernment bond markets, it would be an important channel strengthening the resilience of
government bond market liquidity.
This study therefore provides an important contribution to the literature by investi-
gating whether gap-filling is also an important determinant of maturity choice in the
government bond market. Also, it is to my knowledge the first study to systematically
analyze the determinants of governments’ debt maturity choice across Europe. To this
end, this chapter constructs a novel data set of Eurozone governments’ debt maturity
choice from 1999 to 2015. The data set not only covers maturity choices of individual
debt issues, but also various aggregate bond auction results, as well as data on matched
debt issuance announcements and debt auction results, which allows to disentangle de-
mand and supply effects. The main result shows that governments increase long-term
1This chapter is based on the paper “Gap-filling debt maturity choice”. The paper was presented at
the University of Mannheim, Deutsche Bundesbank, University of Zurich, Goethe University Frankfurt,
ZEW Mannheim, the German Debt Management Agency, the Muenster Banking Workshop 2016, and the
German Finance Association Meeting 2017 in Ulm.
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debt issues following periods of low aggregate Eurozone long-term debt issuance, and vice
versa. Also, consistent with investors’ preference for high quality and liquid government
bonds (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012)), higher rated governments engage
more pronounced in gap-filling. Further, consistent with a higher degree of flexibility to
adjust the maturity structure of their debt issues (Greenwood et al. (2010)), also less finan-
cially constrained governments undertake gap-filling more aggressively. At the same time,
governments’ gap-filling only occurred after the start of regulatory harmonization for in-
surers in the EU, which strengthened insurers’ preferred habitat for long-term government
Eurozone debt.
Analyzing the ECB’s largest liquidity provision in history (namely, the ECB’s three-year
LTRO in 2011-2012) allows me to disentangle demand and supply effects. Following the
ECB’s three-year LTRO, peripheral governments largely unexpectedly and temporarily
increased their short-term debt issuance (to accommodate peripheral banks demand for
“carry trades”), while core governments engaged in gap-filling of longer maturity Euro-
zone government debt. It turns out that governments’ strategic gap-filling behavior is a
response to maturity-specific investor demand, rather than coordination of debt supply
among governments. This result is also shown at the government debt auction-level, where
Germany deviated from pre-announced issuance plans to fill the gap of longer maturity
Eurozone government debt.
These temporary adjustments in the maturity structure of debt issuance following the
ECB’s three-year LTRO resulted in important financial implications for governments. The
average residual maturity of total outstanding debt of peripheral and core governments’
debt portfolios diverged, and did not converge thereafter. Correspondingly, these tem-
porary debt issuance adjustments permanently increased peripheral governments’ debt
rollover requirements, thereby destabilizing their debt portfolios. In contrast, core gov-
ernments’ increase of longer maturity debt permanently stabilized their debt portfolios.
For policy makers, governments’ strategic debt maturity choice behavior has important
liquidity implications. Governments’ gap-filling implies that governments act as macro-
liquidity providers across maturities, thereby providing significant risk absorption capacity
to government bond markets. Currently, there is a widespread concern about deteriorated
resilience in government bond market liquidity since the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009. In
contrast, governments’ gap-filling behavior strengthens the resilience of government bond
market liquidity. Consequently, changes to the financial architecture, such as the creation
of safe government assets or the setup of a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism in the
Eurozone, should be designed such that governments are able to continue providing this
risk absorption capacity.
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1.2 Banks’ interconnectedness through syndicated corpo-
rate loan portfolios – impact on bank-level systemic
risk2
The financial crisis of 2007-2009 demonstrated how large risk spillovers among financial
institutions caused a global systemic crisis and worldwide economic downturn. Contagion
among financial institutions results from different channels, such as direct linkages (Allen
and Gale (2000), Allen and Babus (2009), Gorton and Metrick (2012), Giglio (2016)),
information contagion (Chen (1999)), and commonality of asset holdings. As banks have
similar exposure to assets such as syndicated loans, a decline in asset prices can affect
the banking system, because of direct exposure of banks to the same assets as well as
fire sale externalities (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny (1992, 2011), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)).
Recent theoretical work has shown that higher interconnectedness through common ex-
posures at times of crisis can increase systemic risk through various forms of financial
contagion (Allen et al. (2012a), Castiglionesi and Navarro (2010), Ibragimov et al. (2011),
Wagner (2010)). Consequently, policy makers around the world initiated new efforts to
improve their measurement and monitoring of interconnectedness among banks, such as
interconnectedness resulting from common exposures to syndicated corporate loans. This
study amends the literature by developing a novel measure of interconnectedness among
banks and studying interconnectedness in the form of common exposures among financial
institutions examining banks’ exposure to large syndicated loans.
To measure commonality in banks’ syndicated loan portfolio, we develop a novel measure
of interconnectedness for which the key component is the similarity between two banks’
syndicated loan portfolios. The similarity is measured as the Euclidean distance between
two banks based on their exposures to specific borrower industries or regions. We then
aggregate the distance of one bank with all other banks to our bank-level interconnect-
edness measure, using different weights such as equal weights, size, and relationship. We
find that interconnectedness is driven mainly by bank diversification, less by bank size or
overall loan market size. The time-series evolution of our interconnectedness measure is
consistent with the interpretation of elevated systemic risk through contagion arising from
common exposures. Also, we aggregate our bank-level interconnectedness measure to a
market interconnectedness index. We find evidence that banks have greater overlap with
larger banks consistent with the literature on bank moral hazard and herding behavior
2This chapter is based on the paper “Syndication, interconnectedness, and systemic risk”, which is joint
work with Jian Cai from Washington University in St. Louis, Anthony Saunders at the Stern School of
Business at New York University, and Sascha Steffen from the Frankfurt School of Finance and Manage-
ment. The paper was presented at the 2012 AEA Annual Meeting, the 2012 EFA Annual Meeting, the
CESifo "The Banking Sector and The State" Conference, the 6th Swiss Winter Finance Conference on
Financial Intermediation, the 2014 Banque de France – ACPR – SoFiE conference on Systemic Risk and
Financial Regulation, the 2014 Concluding Conference of the Macro-prudential Research (MaRs) Network
of the European System of Central Banks, the Third BIS Research Network Meeting on Global Financial
Interconnectedness, and the 2016 AFA/AEA Annual Meeting, and at University of Muenster and Goethe
University Frankfurt. It has been published at the Journal of Financial Stability.
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(e.g. Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008)) and banks exploiting government guarantees (e.g.
Eisert and Eufinger (2017)).
In the final part of the paper, we relate our bank-level interconnectedness indexes to
different measures of systemic risk, such as SRISK, DIP, and CoVaR. Similar to approaches
used in stress tests that have been conducted in the U.S. and Europe since 2008, the
construction of these measures is to estimate losses in a systemic stress scenario and
determine a bank’s equity shortfall after accounting for these losses. These measures
capture asset price as well as funding liquidity risks associated with interconnectedness
using market data (Acharya et al. (2014)).
The main finding is a robust and significantly positive relation between our intercon-
nectedness measure and various systemic risk measures, but only during recession periods.
Consistent with the theoretical papers cited above, interconnectedness thus amplifies sys-
temic risk during recessions when asset commonality can cause various forms of contagion
such as fire-sales. Another way of interpreting this result is that interconnectedness of
banks – that builds up during normal times – is a useful tool to forecast cross-sectional
differences in banks’ contribution to systemic risk, if a severe crisis occurs. Overall, our
results highlight that institution-level risk reduction through diversification ignores the
negative externalities of an interconnected financial system.
For banks and regulators, our results have several important implications. First, market
based measures of systemic risk are informative during bad times, because they pick up
fundamental risks of banks precisely in a moment when banks are worried about their
counterparties’ exposures. Second, we provide an important link from balance sheet risk to
market-based risk measures, i.e. common exposures to large syndicated loans. Regulators
with more detailed data can extend our analyses investigating and monitoring specific
industry overlap, common exposures to leveraged loans or, for example, exchange rate
risks that might be hidden in these loans. Third, an institution-oriented approach to
assessing and limiting systemic risk exposure is insufficient as the narrative of the recent
financial crises suggests. Fourth, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), which
was created in the U.S. following the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform after the 2008-2009
financial crisis, has the mandate to monitor and address the overall risks to financial
stability. We propose using interconnectedness through large corporate loans as part of
FSOC’s systemic risk oversight and monitoring system.
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1.3 How do banks become interconnected? Evolution of
syndicated loan structures and effects on loan pricing3
Over the last two decades, banks have become increasingly interconnected and the recent
global financial crisis highlighted the vulnerabilities of a highly interconnected financial
system. One source of interconnectedness among banks has been corporations growing
funding needs, both in size and complexity. The banking industry, however, is competitive
by nature. As a result, banks face a fundamental question: Whom should they collaborate
with while competing with the rest? If banks differentiate competitors by how close they
are in terms of their lending expertise, the question translates into the following: Should
banks collaborate with distant or close competitors? This chapter seeks to investigate this
question by relating banks’ lending expertise to the organizational form of loan syndicates
and analyzes the effects on loan pricing.
While syndicate structures have been examined from different perspectives, such as in-
formation asymmetry (e.g., Lee and Mullineaux (2004)), this line of research has usually
taken the organizational form of syndicates as given. Only recently the evolution of the
organizational form of loan syndicates has been studied (e.g., Sufi (2007)), but predomi-
nantly investigates syndicate member choice. This study is the first to examine syndicate
structures from the perspective of similarity in lending expertise among syndicate lenders,
and studies syndicate formation more broadly than previous studies. In particular, we
investigate motives for banks to interconnect themselves with close competitors – that is,
forming close syndicates with high similarity in banks’ lending expertise. On the one hand,
lenders with higher similarity in lending expertise might have lower production costs to
produce borrower-specific information (Boot (2000)). On the other hand, informational
monopolies of close syndicates might enable lenders to “hold-up” the borrower (Sharpe
(1990), Rajan (1992)). In addition, this “hold-up” might be particularly pronounced dur-
ing periods of low market concentration, where the scope for price collusion in markets
with syndicates increases (Hatfield et al. (2017)).
This study measures the similarity in lending expertise among banks in a syndicate, by
extending our distance measure between two banks from Chapter 3 to the syndicated loan
level. Our object of study is the U.S. syndicated loan market. Analyzing syndicate forma-
tion, the results show that besides for very distant loans, closer syndicates are associated
with smaller and more concentrated syndicates. Also, lead arrangers are more likely to
choose very close lenders into more senior roles (co-leads and co-agents) of the syndicate,
and also participant lenders choice becomes more likely with smaller distance. Further,
lead arrangers allocate higher loan shares to lenders with smaller distance across all loan
3This chapter is based on the paper “Loan syndication structures and price collusion”, which is joint
work with Jian Cai from Washington University in St. Louis, Anthony Saunders at the Stern School of
Business at New York University, and Sascha Steffen from the Frankfurt School of Finance and Man-
agement. The paper was presented at the University of Mannheim, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland,
University of Missouri-St. Louis, University of Muenster, Goethe University Frankfurt, Washington Uni-
versity in St. Louis, ZEW Mannheim, the Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, and 2017 Arne
Ryde Conference on Financial Intermediation.
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roles. Analyzing retained loan share of lead arrangers across loans with different degrees
of information asymmetries shows that lead arrangers do not retain higher loan shares in
close syndicates with higher information asymmetries. This finding is consistent with the
conjecture of improved screening and monitoring of close syndicates, and might indicate
that lead arrangers do not have to signal credit quality, or mitigate moral hazard by re-
taining larger loan shares when syndicate lenders possess similar very lending expertise.
These results thus suggests that similarity in banks’ lending expertise is an important
determinant in the evolution of syndicated loan structures.
In addition to these effects on loan syndication structures, similarity in lending expertise
among banks might also affect loan pricing as discussed above. Analyzing the net effect
of improved screening and price collusion reveals that closer lender distance resulted in
cheaper loan pricing until 2009, while it increased loan pricing since 2010. Disentangling
these two opposite effects suggests that lenders in close syndicates passed on lower pro-
duction costs from improved screening and monitoring to the borrower across the entire
sample period. At the same time, close syndicates only engaged in price collusion since
2010. Consistent with our conjecture above, we finally show that low market concentration
fosters price collusion, and close syndicates only engage in price collusion during periods
of low market concentration.
For policy makers, these results highlight an important mechanism of how banks become
interconnected in the financial system. Also, banks interconnectedness through syndicated
corporate loans matters, as it increases banks systemic risks during recessions as shown
in Chapter 3. Understanding the underlying economic mechanisms leading to higher
interconnectedness among banks is important to design financial regulation that trade-off
the benefits and risks of an interconnected financial system.
Chapter 2
Government debt maturity choice
– strategic behavior and liquidity
implications
2.1 Introduction
Governments actively decide on their debt maturity structure by issuing debt across ma-
turities. The maturity structure of government debt portfolios is important as it affects
creditor losses in debt restructurings, long-term interest rates, exposure to fluctuating
funding costs, debt sustainability levels, and consequently governments’ vulnerability to
crises (e.g., Kim (2015), Beetsma et al. (2016), and Asonuma et al. (2017)). There are
a number of established theories of government debt maturity choice, but these theories
predominantly focus on funding costs and funding needs (e.g., Cole and Kehoe (2000),
Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012), and Aguiar et al. (2016)). An alternative explana-
tion is strategic behavior. One of the leading theories for strategic maturity choice from the
corporate debt literature emphasizes “gap-filling” behavior of market participants (Green-
wood et al. (2010), hereafter GHS (2010)). According to this theory, governments would
choose debt maturity to fill supply gaps across maturities, which result from varying aggre-
gate financing patterns of governments.1 However, gap-filling has so far only been studied
for corporates (GHS (2010), Badoer and James (2016), and Foley-Fisher et al. (2016)).
Governments’ gap-filling would nevertheless be of particular importance, because govern-
ments acting as macro liquidity providers would add significant risk absorption capacity
to government bond markets.
In this paper, I investigate whether gap-filling is also an important determinant of ma-
turity choice in the government bond market. I use the Eurozone as a unique laboratory,
1According to the gap-filling theory, governments have a preference for a specific diversification of their
debt maturity. However, aggregated supply changes combined with investors’ preference for long-term
debt and arbitrageurs’ limited availability of capital can lead to a relative price change between short-
and long-term debt. To reduce expected funding costs, governments are willing to adjust their supply of
long-term debt.
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as multiple governments share the same institutional setup, but separately choose debt
maturity. After analyzing gap-filling over the full sample period, I address possible en-
dogeneity concerns in an event study by exploiting changes in peripheral governments’
maturity choice (induced by peripheral banks’ “carry trades”) following the ECB’s three-
year LTRO in 2011-2012.2 In this setup, I examine three related questions: First, do
governments engage in gap-filling maturity choice? Second, how does governments’ gap-
filling vary over time? And third, for which types of governments is gap-filling more
pronounced?
I hypothesize that gap-filling maturity choice also occurs in the government bond mar-
ket, because investors prefer the high quality and liquidity of government bonds (Krishna-
murthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012), hereafter KVJ (2012)). Rather than substituting
government debt with corporate debt within a country (as in GHS (2010)), investors seem
to prefer substituting government debt across countries. In the Eurozone, investors can
easily substitute government debt across multiple countries for the following four reasons:
(1) a common currency is shared across governments, (2) monetary policy is centralized
across governments, (3) credit quality is similar across multiple governments, and (4) fi-
nancial regulation is largely identical across governments. In addition, financial regulation
and central bank open market operations grant government debt preferential treatment–
thereby further incentivizing investors to purchase government debt. Most importantly,
financial regulation grants reduced (up to zero) capital charges and no large exposure lim-
its to government debt. And the ECB classifies government debt as first category collateral
in its open market operations, independent of their actual liquidity. Finally, substitution
with corporate debt is much more restricted in Europe compared to the U.S., because
European corporations fund themselves mainly through bank debt rather than bond debt.
Importantly, gap-filling should be most pronounced for governments’ long-term (greater
than 10 years) bond issues, because of higher duration risk capital for arbitrageurs (Ba-
doer and James (2016)). As price volatility rises with a bonds maturity due to higher
discounting of future cash flows, regulatory capital requirements usually increase with
maturity. Moreover, a large class of investors with long-term liabilities, such as life in-
surance companies and pension funds, prefers purchasing long-term government debt as
maturity matching is most effective to reduce capital requirements and comply with fi-
nancial regulation.
In the cross-section, gap-filling should be more pronounced for less financially con-
strained and higher rated governments. Less financially constrained governments might
engage more aggressively in gap-filling, due to their higher flexibility to adjust the maturity
structure of their debt issues (GHS (2010)). Higher rated governments might undertake
gap-filling more aggressively, as investors prefer the high quality of government bond se-
curities (KVJ (2012)).
2“Carry trades” constitute of purchasing high-yielding (peripheral) government bonds funded by cheap
ECB funding, and depositing these (peripheral) government bonds as collateral at the ECB (see, for
example, Acharya and Steffen (2015)).
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To empirically analyze governments’ gap-filling, I construct a new panel data set of
9,098 individual debt issues of 15 Eurozone governments between 1999 and 2015 from
Bloomberg. To my knowledge, I am the first to compile such a large data set of European
government debt issues. For the event study, I also collect data on individual bond auctions
and hand-collect data on debt issuance announcements for a smaller set of governments
around the ECB’s three-year LTRO in 2011-2012. This granular issuance- and auction-
level data allows me to precisely observe governments’ debt maturity choice. Importantly,
it also allows me to split debt issues in multiple maturity buckets as in Badoer and James
(2016) and analyze gap-filling purely on a flow basis–that is using fluctuations in the flow of
aggregate Eurozone government long-term debt issues to explain the flow of an individual
government’s debt issues across maturities.3 In comparison, previous gap-filling studies use
the stock of long-term U.S. government debt to explain the flow or the stock of long-term
U.S. corporate debt. As a result of strict budget rules for governments in the Eurozone,
total debt issuance amounts within a period are fixed by governments’ maturing debt and
budget deficits. Compared to corporates that can also adjust total debt issuance amounts,
Eurozone governments are restricted to adjusting the debt issues’ maturity composition
only.
My government bond data shows that deal characteristics of government debt issues
are very similar across countries. In addition, governments frequently issue debt across
maturities, enabling governments to easily shift debt issuance amounts across the maturity
spectrum. Overall, total issuance amounts are predominantly short-term (up to one year,
on average 50.5%), and long-term (greater than ten years, on average 18.7%). Finally, and
important for analyzing gap-filling, there is substantial variation in aggregate Eurozone
government long-term debt issuance over time.
In a first step, I examine whether governments engage in gap-filling. Consistent with
gap-filling, I find that governments significantly increase long-term debt issues (and sig-
nificantly reduce short-term debt issues) following periods of low aggregate Eurozone
long-term government debt issuance, and vice versa. Governments perform gap-filling
by shifting almost euro-for-euro between short-term and long-term debt issues, leaving
medium-term maturity buckets largely unaffected. Controlling for government-level sea-
sonality in debt issuance across all maturity buckets shows that gap-filling is a temporary
deviation from established debt issuance pattern.
In a second step, I investigate the variation of governments’ gap-filling over time. Ac-
cording to the gap-filling theory, gap-filling only occurs under partially segmented markets
and limits to arbitrage. Partial segmentation might have increased as a result of harmo-
nizing EU insurance regulation (Solvency II), as it strengthened insurer’s incentives for
maturity matching. Limits to arbitrage might have become more relevant since the last
two financial crises and subsequent increases in financial regulation. Consistent with the
gap-filling theory, I only find governments’ gap-filling behavior after the start of harmo-
nizing EU insurance regulation in late 2009.
3My results are also robust to controlling for the stock of outstanding long-term debt.
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In a third step, I examine the cross-section of governments’ gap-filling. As discussed
above, gap-filling might be more pronounced for less financially constrained and higher
rated governments. I find evidence consistent with these two cross-sectional predictions. In
particular, when I sequentially group governments across different dimensions of financial
constraints, I find significantly larger gap-filling for governments with lower indebtedness,
smaller size, lower financing needs, lower budget deficits, and higher future economic
growth.
The main concern with my gap-filling results is that governments might have coordi-
nated their debt supply, instead of responding to investor’s maturity-specific demand. To
address this endogeneity concern, I exploit peripheral governments increase in shorter ma-
turity debt issuance to accommodate banks demand for “carry trades” following the ECB’s
three-year LTRO in 2011-2012. These adjustments effectively resulted in a largely unex-
pected temporary negative credit supply shock of longer maturity Eurozone government
debt. Consistent with gap-filling, I find that core governments responded by temporarily
increasing longer maturity debt issues by 16.5%-points to fill the supply gap. Measures of
excess demand in governments’ longer maturity bond auctions, and changes in the slope
of governments’ yield curve are consistent with core governments responding to investor
demand. In robustness checks, I also provide evidence that the gap-filling result is (1) not
driven by confounding events during the Eurozone crisis; (2) not driven by restricted ma-
turity choices of peripheral governments; (3) not driven by investor demand for safe assets;
and (4) constitutes a deviation from governments’ pre-announced issuance patterns.
These temporary adjustments in the maturity structure of debt issuances following the
ECB’s three-year LTRO resulted in significant financial implications. In aggregate, the
average residual maturity of total outstanding debt of peripheral and core governments
diverged by 0.6 years in the LTRO-period, and did not converge thereafter. Further, pe-
ripheral governments’ debt rollover requirements until 2016 increased by 51.4bn EUR (or
3.3% of GDP) for Italy and 49.1bn EUR (or 4.7% of GDP) for Spain. In contrast, fund-
ing cost reduced by just 0.07% of GDP for Italy (with a budget deficit of 2.9% of GDP)
and 0.05% of GDP for Spain (with a budget deficit of 10.4% of GDP) compared to not
adjusting their debt maturity structure in response to the ECB’s three-year LTRO. Con-
sequently, peripheral governments exploited banks “carry trade” demand as a temporary
relief on debt rollover, despite its negative implications for future debt rollover amounts.
In contrast, core governments’ gap-filling of long-term debt permanently reduced debt
rollover requirements by 74.2bn EUR (or 1.1% core governments GDP). In sum, these
maturity adjustments permanently stabilized core governments’ debt portfolios, while it
permanently destabilized peripheral governments’ debt portfolios.
My analysis contributes to three strands of the literature. First, my paper contributes
to the literature on segmented bond markets across maturities (e.g. Vayanos and Vila
(2009), Greenwood and Vayanos (2014)) and the interaction of debt maturity choices
between corporates and the government (for example, GHS (2010), Badoer and James
(2016), and Foley-Fisher et al. (2016)). This literature shows that segmented bond markets
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across maturities can arise from investors’ preferred habitat for specific maturities, which
induces corporates to strategically fill maturity-specific supply gaps of government debt.
In contrast, my paper is the first to investigate gap-filling also in the government bond
market. In addition, I study gap-filling outside the U.S., and also analyze the cross-section
of governments’ gap-filling.
Second, my paper adds to the literature studying the determinants of governments’
debt maturity choice (for example, Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012), Broner et al.
(2013), and Bai et al. (2015)).4 In summary, these empirical papers typically concentrate
on the effect individual country-specific credit market conditions, such as the spread,
and investigate debt maturity choice in emerging economies. In contrast, I focus on
interactions in governments’ maturity choice across multiple governments. In addition,
my study is the first to systematically analyze the determinants of governments’ debt
maturity choice across Europe and carefully controls for a variety of country-level credit
market and macroeconomic conditions.
Third, my paper also contributes to the recent literature on the effects of unconventional
monetary policies on government bond markets (for example, Joyce and Tong (2012), Eser
and Schwaab (2016), and Krishnamurthy et al. (2017)). These papers predominantly in-
vestigate the effect on bond prices and CDS spreads, ignoring the effect on bond quantities.
My paper is the first to investigate the effects of an unconventional monetary policy on
bond quantities. In addition, my paper shows that adjustments on bond quantities of
directly affected governments can induce strategic interactions of other governments.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the institutional setting. Section 3
describes the data and presents summary statistics. Section 4 empirically investigates
gap-filling in the government bond market. Section 5 addresses endogeneity concerns in
an event study using the ECB’s three-year LTRO. Section 6 concludes and draws some
policy implications.
2.2 Institutional setting
2.2.1 Government debt management
The task of governments’ borrowing and debt management is performed by government
debt management offices (DMOs). Despite a strong interdependence of debt management
with the remaining fiscal policy and monetary policy, DMOs in the Eurozone are separated
from other parts of fiscal policy and operate independently from monetary policy. Guided
by a micro portfolio approach of debt management, DMOs main objective constitutes a
classical Markov problem: to reduce government’s financing costs over a medium to long
4Other papers explore the optimal maturity structure of entire debt portfolios and their implications
on optimal taxation and insurance against fiscal shocks, among others, Barro (1979), Lucas and Stokey
(1983), Angeletos (2002), Buera and Nicolini (2004), and Debortoli et al. (2017).
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horizon, while limiting fiscal risks (that are fluctuating funding costs, and rollover risks).5
A key element to achieve this objective is debt maturity.
This objective, however, inherits a trade-off on debt maturity. Due to the monetary
premium for short-term government debt, funding costs for shorter maturities are usually
cheaper than for longer maturities. Yet, as shorter maturity debt has to be refinanced
more frequently than longer maturity debt, higher total annual issuance amounts increase
governments’ exposure to fluctuating funding costs and rollover risk. As a result of this
trade-off, governments usually diversify their debt maturity structure and issue debt with
both shorter and longer maturities.6
In addition, DMOs additionally aim to achieve resilient secondary market liquidity for
main benchmark maturities (for example, one, three, five, or ten year bonds). To ensure
deep secondary markets, regular debt issues in each benchmark maturity are required,
which might potentially conflict with the maturity trade-off of its main objective. Specif-
ically, once credit market conditions change, governments might be slow to adjust the
maturity of debt issues to ensure deep secondary market liquidity.
The DMOs’ debt maturity decisions are operationalized in their funding strategy. Therein,
government’s total borrowing requirements (comprised of debt redemptions and primary
surplus/deficit) are exogenous to the DMO, as they are a result of past debt issuance de-
cisions and current financing needs decided by the remaining fiscal policy. Consequently,
the DMO decides on the allocation of this fixed amount across the maturity spectrum.
To ensure predictability of debt issues and sufficient demand by investors at each auction,
DMOs in the Eurozone announce information of their funding strategy in advance. A
general overview is provided at the annual level, where the DMO announces its predicted
annual funding requirements, maturity(-range) specific auction dates, and partially the in-
tended aggregated annual issuance amount of money market (up to one year maturity) and
capital market (above one year maturity) debt issues. In contrast to emerging market debt
issuances where auction dates are dependent on credit market conditions, for Eurozone
governments the date of government bond auctions is therefore exogenous to credit market
conditions around the auction date. Despite pre-determined auction dates (and for some
DMOs also indications on the respective maturity), regular debt issues across the matu-
rity spectrum and variations in issue amounts allow DMOs to maintain a high degree of
freedom on their overall maturity choice at this stage. Usually at a quarterly level, DMOs
determine auction- or issuance-level specific targets on debt issuance amounts, which to a
large degree determine governments’ debt maturity choice. While, DMOs officially keep
the option to adjust their funding strategy depending on market conditions and funding
5See the “Revised Guidelines for Public Debt Management” by the IMF and the World Bank from
2014: https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2014/040114.pdf
6DMOs can also alter this trade-off by entering into interest rate swaps. However, issuing long-term
debt and entering into interest rate swaps to pay lower short-term yields increases the volatility of debt
servicing costs. In the Eurozone, DMOs’ outstanding interest rate swaps are at most small, and over time
DMOs partially even inter into offsetting interest rate swap positions. Also, there is anecdotal evidence that
increases in interest rate expenditures resulting from interest rate swaps are more difficult to communicate
to the Ministry of Finance.
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requirements. Historically however, debt issues have rarely been canceled and realized
debt issues are often similar as planned. Consequently, DMOs in the Eurozone determine
their debt maturity choice largely at a quarterly level.
2.2.2 Investor demand for government debt
As government bonds are a large part of bond market in general, various investors demand
government debt. In the primary market, each government restricts the number of banks
(so-called primary dealers) that are allowed to bid in government bond auctions. These
banks, however, usually receive orders from other investors so that also other investors
have indirect access to debt issues in the primary market. Additionally, all investors can
buy and sell government bonds in secondary markets.
Since the aftermath of the global financial crisis in 2007-2009, new regulatory reforms
further stipulated banks, and insurance companies to purchase government bonds. For
banks, new liquidity regulation under Basel III (the liquidity coverage ratio, and net stable
funding ratio) requires banks to hold government bonds as liquidity reserves. Further,
as high quality government bonds possess minimal credit risk and high liquidity, banks
usually use it as collateral for short-term borrowing. And despite evidence on its credit
risk from the European sovereign debt crisis, government bonds continue to hold zero-
risk weight in banks regulatory capital calculations and government debt is exempt from
concentration limits. For European insurers, the new Solvency II regulation also exempts
government bonds from credit and concentration risk under the standard formula in the
solvency capital requirements (SCR) calculation.7 In addition, Solvency II particularly
incentivizes insurers to purchase government debt with specific maturities. Specifically,
assets that perfectly match the maturity of liabilities are exempt from interest rate risks in
the computation of insurers’ capital requirements. Given that longer maturity liabilities
pose particularly high interest rate risk due to their high discounting effect, insurers are
particularly incentivized to purchase long-term government debt. This is particularly
the case for life insurance companies, where interest rate risk resulting from maturity
mismatches of assets and liabilities are often the largest component of capital requirements.
The transition to the low yield environment further reinforced these incentives. Lower
yields increase asset values as future bond payments are discounted less, so that capital
charges for asset holdings - that are usually proportional to assets values - correspondingly
increase. As lower yields also increase the present value of long-term liabilities and widen
existing duration mismatches between assets and liabilities, falling long-term interest rates
even induce insurance companies to increase purchases of long-term government bonds at
rising prices (Domanski et al. (2017)).
These regulatory reforms incentivize large classes of investors to buy governments bonds,
so that aggregated demand for government debt might have become more inelastic. More-
over, inelastic demand might have been particularly developed for longer maturity gov-
7Nevertheless, SCR computed by internal models have to account for sovereign risk.
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ernment bonds, given insurers changed incentives to match the maturity of long-term
liabilities to reduce regulatory capital requirements. An increase in the average duration
of outstanding government debt in Europe from six to seven years between 2008 and 2016
provides indicative evidence for increased demand for long-term European government
debt.8
2.3 Data and descriptive statistics
2.3.1 Data
To analyze interactions in governments’ maturity choice, I collect data on government’s
individual bond issuances between January 1999 and September 2015 for 15 Eurozone gov-
ernments: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain.9 The starting year of
the sample differs across governments, and depends on the date when governments joined
the Eurozone.10 Data on individual government bond issuances into the primary market
are collected from Bloomberg, and contains information on the usual characteristics of
government bond issuances. I exclude from my analysis bond issuances that are tied to
specific infrastructure projects, that are issued by fully owned public corporations owned
by the central government (for example, energy companies, nationalized banks, trans-
portation companies) and government investment funds, and that are obtained as part of
ESM financial assistance programs.11 I exclude these bond issuances, because the matu-
rity choice is likely to be aligned with the time horizon of specific investment or financing
decisions, and/or the maturity choice was likely determined to a large degree outside the
scope of the central government.
I restrict my sample to central government debt issuances, because strategic maturity
choices most likely occur at the highest level of government for two reasons. First, as
central government debt in the Eurozone is usually the majority of total government debt,
DMOs at the central level consequently issue most of the total governments’ debt. Second,
strategic maturity choices might be more pronounced at the central level compared to
multiple local governments. For example, at the local level debt issues might be more
inclined to match maturities of investment projects, and maturity choice might be less
sophisticated than at the center. In addition, focusing on central government debt in a
multi-country setting ensures cross-country comparability (see De Broeck and Guscina
(2011)). Despite limiting my analysis to central government debt, the maturity structure
8See “The bond market is transformed: fewer vigilantes; more forced buyers” in the Economist on Oct
22nd, 2016.
9These are all current Eurozone governments besides Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Luxembourg,
which all have zero or very low levels of central government debt and consequently only sporadically issue
central government bonds. Also, Latvia (2014) and Lithuania (2015) only joined the Eurozone at the end
of the sample period.
10The following governments joined the Eurozone after their inception in 1999: Greece (2001), Cyprus
(2008), Malta (2008), Slovenia (2007), and Slovakia (2009).
11Correspondingly, I exclude periods, in which governments did not have access to financial markets.
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remains however very similar than those reported for total government debt in the ECB’s
Statistical Data Warehouse (SDW).
My focus on Eurozone governments stems from their unique institutional setup that
allows me to investigate gap-filling in the government bond market. The Eurozone cur-
rently consists of 19 governments, which predominantly issue debt denominated in euro
and are close substitutes in the Eurozone government bond market. Many countries are
of high credit quality, and government bond markets are very liquid; two major bond
characteristics preferred by investors (KVJ (2012)). In addition and as discussed above,
financial regulation provides investors with different incentives to purchase government
debt rather than substituting with (high quality) corporate debt. Also, the ECB classi-
fies government debt as first category collateral in its open market operations, and only
accepts euro-denominated government debt as collateral. Correspondingly, the start of
my sample period is motivated by the start of the Eurozone, which abolished national
currencies of Eurozone governments and thus increased the substitutability of Eurozone
government debt.
To address endogeneity concerns in the event study, I also collect data on individual
debt auction results and government’s debt issuance announcements for a smaller set of
governments around the ECB’s three-year LTRO in 2011-2012. Specifically, I collect data
on individual debt auction results for France, Germany, Italy, and Spain and hand-collect
data on debt issuance announcements for Germany and Italy between 2010 and 2014.
Also, I expand the bond issuance database by central government bonds issued prior to
1999 and maturing in 2012 or thereafter for computing outstanding debt maturity profiles.
My government bond data base is complemented by government-level data on macroeco-
nomic conditions from Datastream and Bloomberg at quarterly, or yearly frequency. These
variables are the government’s debt/GDP ratio, the total change in the debt/GDP ratio in
the previous four quarters, total real GDP growth during the previous four quarters, the
countries consumer price inflation (CPI) during the prior year, a recession dummy com-
puted based on two subsequent quarters of negative GDP growth, and a non-investment
grade rating dummy based on S&P’s long-term local currency government rating. In ad-
dition, I complement the dataset with data on credit market conditions from Bloomberg
at the quarterly, or daily frequency. These credit market condition measures are the term
structure measured as the yield differential between 10-year and 6-month government
debt, the yield level as measured by the governments’ 6-month yield, and the yield spread
of 10-year government debt securities to 10-year German bunds. For the cross-sectional
analysis, I also collect data on a countries size as measured by its GDP, and governments’
budget deficit at quarterly, respectively yearly frequency. To examine gap-filling behavior,
my measure for the supply of aggregated Eurozone long-term government debt is the log of
the aggregated deal amounts (converted to euro) of Eurozone government debt issuances
with maturities above ten years (hereafter AMT10).
The benefits of the AMT10 measure is that it precisely captures the new supply of long-
term Eurozone government debt to investors. As discussed above, long-term government
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debt is more likely to be held to maturity by investors, so that new supply of long-term
Eurozone government debt substantially influences the availability of long-term Eurozone
government debt in the market. Investors - such as life insurance companies that aim to
invest new premiums from customers in government bonds to match long-term liabilities -
create demand for new long-term Eurozone government debt. Further, the supply of new
government long-term debt issues varies substantially over time (see Figure 2.1), which is
contained in the AMT10 measure. A potential drawback of the AMT10 measure is that
it does not reflect the total supply of outstanding Eurozone long-term government debt.
Nevertheless, total supply of Eurozone long-term government debt is relatively stable over
time and variations predominantly arise due to new Eurozone government long-term debt
issuances. To address this concern in the empirical analysis below, I include country-year
fixed effects in robustness specifications to control for the changing level of government-
level outstanding long-term debt over time (the results continue to hold).
2.3.2 Descriptive statistics
The main data set contains 9,098 government debt issuances from Bloomberg between Jan-
uary 1999 and September 2015. Table I shows summary statistics of deal characteristics,
issuer characteristics, market characteristics, and the number of individual governments
across five maturity buckets. The maturity buckets reflect major issuance maturities of
government securities and are similar than those used by Broner et al. (2013). Panel A of
Table 2.1 highlights that long-term (above 10 years) debt issues comprise only 677 debt
issues (or 7.44% of total debt issues), however the mean issuance amount is four times
larger than short-term (up to one year) debt issues. In addition, consistent with the mone-
tary premium for short-term government debt, Eurozone governments predominantly issue
short-term (6,406 debt issues, or 70.41% of total debt issues). Also as described above,
deal characteristics are generally very similar across Eurozone governments. For exam-
ple, 87% of total long-term debt issues are denominated in euro and about 95% of total
long-term issues are not puttable or callable (and thus repay at final maturity).
Panel B of Table 2.1 shows issuer characteristics. Consistent with Eurozone govern-
ments being unable to dilute nominal debt with higher inflation as monetary policy in the
Eurozone is not set at individual governments national level (but centrally at the ECB),
mean inflation is about 1.8% for both short-term and long-term debt issues. Consistent
with mitigation of rollover risk and hedging motives, medium-term and long-term debt
issues tend to be more pronounced for higher indebted governments. Moreover, as shown
in Panel C of Table 2.1 displaying market characteristics, medium-term to long-term debt
issues increase with a higher term structure of the yield curve. For example, the mean
term premium is about 30bp higher for long-term debt issues compared to short-term debt
issues. In contrast, theory predicts that a higher term premium should lead to reduced
long-term debt issues in order to save interest expenditures, and this behavior is docu-
mented for example by Broner et al. (2013) for governments in emerging markets. Overall,
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these summary statistics suggest that while issuer characteristics appear to influence gov-
ernments’ maturity choice in line with theoretical predictions, the term structure might
affect governments’ maturity choice opposite to theoretical predictions.
To further investigate debt issuance behavior at the government-level, Panel A of Ta-
ble 2.2 displays the frequencies of government debt issues across maturity buckets at the
government-level. Consistent with the aggregated results discussed above, all governments
issue the largest number of bonds in the short-term segment, but higher indebted govern-
ments such as Belgium, Greece and Portugal issue a relatively larger number of long-term
bonds compared to lower indebted governments such as Finland and the Netherlands.
Further, governments regularly issue debt as indicated by the high number of individual
debt issues across governments. The median (mean) annual number of debt issues is 28
(46). To condense the maturity choice of governments at a quarterly frequency in line with
governments’ interval of maturity choice, I compute quarterly government-level shares of
debt issues for each maturity bucket. This aggregation also accounts for variations in
deal amounts across multiple debt issues within a quarter. On average, governments issue
twelve bonds per quarter, but usually do not issue debt in each maturity bucket every
quarter. Panel B of Table 2.2 reports the results of 3,645 government-quarter-maturity
bucket observations, of which 2,014 are comprised of at least one debt issue (and 1,631
without any debt issue). On average, 50.54% of the total issuance amount is short-term.
Also, and consistent with the larger deal amounts for long-term debt, 18.65% of the total
debt issuance amount across all governments is on long-term debt issues (compared to
7.44% of the total number of long-term debt issues). Moreover, long-term debt issuances
are clustered. On average, long-term debt issues occur only every second quarter, but once
governments issue long-term debt, one fourth of issuance quarters contain more than half
of the total quarterly debt issuance amount. In sum, long-term debt issues are a substan-
tial part of governments’ total debt issuances and vary substantially across governments
and within governments over time.
2.4 Empirical analysis
2.4.1 Gap-filling debt maturity choice
In this section, I empirically test for gap-filling in the government bond market. Accord-
ing to gap-filling, governments’ debt issues would fill supply gaps across maturities, which
result from varying aggregate government funding patterns. As argued above, gap-filling
should be more pronounced for governments long-term (greater than ten years) debt is-
sues, because of higher duration risk capital for arbitrageurs and higher inelastic demand
from life insurance and pension companies. The gap-filling hypothesis is therefore that
governments increase their issuance of long-term debt following periods of low aggregate
Eurozone government long-term debt issuance.
To test the gap-filling hypothesis, I investigate the determinants of governments’ debt
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issuance across different maturity buckets. Specifically, I estimate Tobit models with the
following latent variable regression
ShareIssuei,m,t =α+ β1 ·AMT10t−1 + β2 · TermStructure10y6mi,t−1
β3 · Y ield6mt−1 + β4 · SpreadToGermany10yi,t−1
+ γ ·Xi,t−1 + ei,m,t ∀m ∈M, (2.1)
where ShareIssuei,m,t is the share of debt issues of government i in quarter t in maturity
segmentm, which can be one of the five maturity buckets introduced above (with maturity
ranges of (0,1] year, (1,3] years, (3,5] years, (5,10] years, and (10,...) years). The Tobit
models take into account that the dependent variable is bounded between zero and one,
and jointly estimates governments’ decision to issue in a specific maturity segment as well
as the issuance share. The key independent variable of interest is AMT10t−1, which is the
log of the aggregated Eurozone governments’ long-term debt issue amount in the previous
quarter. Consistent with the gap-filling hypothesis and governments’ time interval of matu-
rity choice, AMT10 is lagged by one period and therefore predetermined in period t, which
suppresses contemporaneous issuance adjustments. Other country-specific credit market
conditions are the slope of the government yield curve (TermStructure10y6mi,t−1), the
level of government short-term yields (Y ield6mi,t−1), and the long-term credit spread to
Germany (SpreadToGermany10yi,t−1), which are all lagged by one period consistent to
governments’ time interval of maturity choice. Further, Xi,t−1 contains a set of lagged
country-level macroeconomic variables affecting governments’ current maturity choice,
such as the level of indebtedness, and the change in indebtedness over the previous four
quarters. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust and clustered at the country-level.
Table 2.3 presents the set of Tobit model regression results. As shown, supply changes
in aggregated Eurozone long-term debt affect governments’ maturity choice non-linearly.
Consistent with gap-filling, the coefficient estimate for AMT10 on long-term debt issues is
negative and statistically significant at the 1%-level (see column (5)). Also, the coefficient
for AMT10 on short-term debt issues is positive and statistically significant at the 1%-level
(see column (1)), and both coefficient estimates of AMT10 are very similar in absolute
magnitude. The coefficient estimate of AMT10 on debt issues in the remaining three
maturity buckets is mostly close to zero and not statistically significant, besides for debt
issues with (3,5] year maturities at the 10%-level. Consequently, governments engage in
gap-filling by increasing long-term debt issues following periods of low aggregate Eurozone
government debt, and vice versa.
Turning to other credit market conditions, I find that governments increase debt issues
in the three intermediate maturity buckets during periods of a high term structure, while
short-term debt issues are reduced (see columns (2)-(4)). This finding stays in contrast to
theoretical models in which governments increase short-term issues in times of high term
premia, when hedging fluctuating interest rates with long-term debt becomes more expen-
sive (see for example Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012)). An alternative explanation
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being consistent with my finding is that higher term premia stipulate increased investor
demand for medium-term government debt, and governments cater this demand. Further,
and consistent with only relative prices between short-term and long-term debt affecting
governments maturity trade-off, the level of governments short-term yields does not affect
short-term and long-term debt issues. Further, higher 10-year credit risk compared to
Germany reduces governments’ long-term debt issuance (see column (5)). This finding is
consistent with investors reducing long-term funding to governments, when their credit
quality deteriorates relative to Germany.
Also, the effects of macroeconomic conditions are broadly in line with theory. Consistent
with theories of mitigating rollover risk, debt issues in the two maturity buckets greater
than five years increase with the level of indebtedness (see columns (4) and (5)). Similarly,
long-term debt issues increase (and short-term debt issues decrease) following positive
changes in the level of governments’ indebtedness. Conversely, deleveraging governments
reduce long-term and increase short-term issuances, which is consistent with theories of
incentivizing quicker paths to lower government debt levels (Aguiar et al. (2016)). In
sum, I find strong evidence for governments’ gap-filling and the effects of both credit mar-
ket conditions and macroeconomic conditions are predominantly in line with theoretical
predictions.
One concern of this gap-filling result might be that the dependent variable captures
only the absolute share of debt issues, rather than temporary deviations. To alleviate
this concern, I estimate OLS models of governments’ debt issues across my five matu-
rity buckets with different fixed effects.12 For brevity, I only discuss the results here,
but report the results for short-term and long-term debt issues in Table A. A.2.3 in the
Appendix. In the different regression specifications, I sequentially include year, quarter,
country-quarter, and country-year fixed effects to control for unobserved (country-level)
time-invariant effects such as country-level specific issuance pattern, or (country-level) de-
mand trends over time. Consistent with the Tobit model results, governments’ gap-filling
behavior continues to hold under all OLS model specifications. Specifically, the coefficient
estimates of the AMT10 variable for long-term debt issues are negative, very similar in
magnitude across all specifications, and also statistically significant at least at the 5%-level
across all specifications (see Panel (b)). This gap-filling effect is also economically highly
significant. A decrease from the 75th-percentile to the 25th-percentile of the AMT10 vari-
able increases the share of governments’ long-term debt issuance by between 5.04%-points
to 6.55%-points across all specifications, which compares to a mean quarterly share of
long-term debt issuance of 18.65%-points. Also consistent with the Tobit models results,
governments’ gap-filling results in a shift between long-term and short-term debt issues.
The coefficient estimates on AMT10 for short-term debt issues are positive, similar in ab-
solute economic magnitude than for long-term issues, and statistically significant at least
at the 1%-level (besides for the most saturated specification being at the 5%-level) (see
12Even though the setup would continue to justify non-linear regression models, the incidental parameters
problem in the Tobit model (see, e.g. Greene (2004)) justifies a linear model to include several fixed effects.
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Panel (a)). In addition, as country-year fixed effects control for the stock of country-level
long-term debt, my gap-filling result based on the flow of new debt issues can also be
interpreted to hold for the stock of Eurozone government long-term debt. Overall, these
results show the robustness of the gap-filling result and imply that governments’ gap-filling
constitutes a deviation from established debt issuance pattern.
2.4.2 Time-variation of gap-filling
In the previous subsection, I showed that governments engage in gap-filling debt maturity
choice. Next, I analyze variations in governments’ gap-filling over time. The theoret-
ical gap-filling result from GHS (2010) builds on two key ingredients for governments’
gap-filling: (1) partially segmented bond markets, and (2) limits to arbitrage. Partial
segmentation of bond markets across maturities might have significantly increased since
the start of harmonizing EU insurance regulation (Solvency II) on November 25, 2009,
which reinforced insurers’ incentive to match the maturity of its liabilities with govern-
ment bonds. These matching incentives particularly affected life insurance companies’
preferred habitat for long-term government debt, as matching the maturity of long-term
liabilities is most efficient to reduce regulatory capital requirements. With insurance com-
panies being the largest group of institutional investors in Europe with almost EUR 10
trillion of assets under management in 2014 according to Insurance Europe, these changed
incentives might have significantly increased the segmentation of Eurozone government
bond markets across maturities. In addition, limits to arbitrage might have increased over
the same period as a result of banks reduced capitalizations due to the global financial
crisis and Eurozone crisis, and tighter financial regulation in response to these crises.
To investigate possible variations in gap-filling over time, I use the start of harmonizing
EU insurance regulation (Solvency II) as a cut-off to split the sample periods in two
subperiods. Specifically, the first subperiod covers 1999 to 2009, and the second subperiod
covers 2010 to 2015. Consistent with the gap-filling theory, I hypothesize that governments’
gap-filling did not occur during the first subperiod with lower inelastic demand for long-
term government debt and lower limits to arbitrage. Further, I conjecture that gap-
filling occurred during the second subperiod with higher inelastic demand for long-term
government debt and higher limits to arbitrage.
Table 2.4 provides estimates of Tobit models for short-term (up to one year) and long-
term (greater than ten years) government debt issues for each subperiod. As hypothesized
and shown in column (2), gap-filling did not occur during the first subperiod from 1999-
2009. The coefficient estimate for AMT10 on long-term debt issues is close to zero and
statistically insignificant.13 Instead, governments reduced long-term debt issuance, when
the level of short-term funding costs increased. That is, the coefficient estimate for the six-
month government yield is negative and statistically significant at the 5%-level. However,
and as hypothesized, governments engaged in gap-filling during the second subperiod from
13I also do not find governments’ gap-filling in the subperiod from 2007:q2-2009:q4 covering lower capi-
talization of banks during the Global financial crisis.
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2010-2015. The coefficient estimate for AMT10 on long-term debt issues is negative, almost
double the magnitude compared to results across the entire sample period, and statistically
significant at the 1%-level (see column (3)). In addition, the coefficient estimate of AMT10
on short-term debt issues is positive and statistically significant at the 1%-level (and the
non-reported coefficient estimates of AMT10 for the three intermediate maturity ranges are
close to zero and statistically insignificant).14 Consequently, governments engage in gap-
filling by shifting between long-term and short-term debt issuances, leaving intermediate
maturity debt issues unchanged. In contrast to the first subperiod, long-term debt issuance
is not affected by changes in the level of short-term yields. Instead, and consistent with
catering investor demands, governments increase the issuance of long-term debt, when the
term premium is high. Overall, these results show that gap-filling occurred only since 2010
and appears to be driven insurers inelastic demand for long-term government debt.
One concern might be that the gap-filling result in the 2010-2015 subperiod is driven by
interactions in maturity choice between peripheral and core governments, for example as a
result of peripheral governments reduced access to long-term funding during the Eurozone
crisis. I counter this concern in two steps. First, I test governments’ gap-filling behavior
separate for core and peripheral governments over the entire 2010 to 2015 subperiod.
Second, I estimate gap-filling across all governments after the Eurozone crisis (with a
sample period from 2012:q4 to 2015:q3). For brevity, I discuss the results here and refer
to Tables A.A.2.4 and A.A.2.5 in the Appendix. First, and similar to results for the 2010-
2015 subperiod, both core and peripheral governments engaged in gap-filling behavior in
the 2010 to 2015 period. The estimated coefficients on AMT10 for long-term debt issues
are negative, very similar in magnitude between peripheral and core governments, and
statistically significant at the 1%-level. Second, the gap-filling result also holds for the
time-period after the Eurozone crisis. The coefficient estimate on AMT10 for long-term
debt issues is negative, has very similar magnitude as in the other specifications and is
statistically significant at the 1%-level. Overall, these results confirm the robustness of
governments’ gap-filling debt maturity choice in the 2010-2015 subperiod.
2.4.3 Cross-section of gap-filling
In the previous two sub-sections, I showed that governments engage in gap-filling, but
only during the 2010-2015 subperiod. Next, I analyze for which types of governments gap-
filling is more pronounced. As discussed above, gap-filling should be more pronounced
for less financially constrained and higher rated governments. Less financially constrained
governments might engage more aggressively in gap-filling, as they have higher flexibility to
adjust the maturity structure of their debt issues (GHS (2010)). Higher rated governments
might undertake gap-filling more aggressively, as investors prefer the high credit quality
of government bond securities (KVJ (2012)).
To investigate cross-sectional variations, I estimate Tobit models of governments’ long-
14These and all the following results are robust to excluding time periods affected by the introduction
of the ECB’s QE program in early 2015.
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term debt issues across different subsamples of governments in the 2010-2015 subperiod.
Governments’ financial constraints are captured along five dimensions: indebtedness, size,
funding needs, budget deficit, and future economic growth. Governments’ credit quality is
measured by its S&P’s long-term local currency rating. Sample splits are defined as equal
or above median within the same quarter (or year) in the panel of Eurozone governments,
except for funding needs being defined within a government over time as specified in
Ongena et al. (2016) and budget deficits are split above and below 3% corresponding to
budget deficit limit in the Maastricht Criteria.
Table 2.5 shows estimates of Tobit models for long-term debt issues for subsamples
of governments sequentially split across their indebtedness, size, funding needs, budget
deficit, future economic growth, and rating. Consistent with theoretical predictions, I find
that less financially constrained governments engage more aggressively in gap-filling. That
is, governments’ gap-filling is more pronounced when indebtedness is low, country size is
small, funding needs are low, budget deficits are below the Maastricht criteria, and future
economic growth is high (see columns (1), (3), (5), (7), and (9)). All coefficient estimates
on AMT10 are negative, economically significant, and about three to four times (one half
to one third higher than) the magnitude for more financially constrained governments
across indebtedness and size (funding needs, budget deficit, and economic growth). These
coefficient estimates on AMT10 are also statistically significant at the 1%-level, expect
for funding needs at the 5%-level. Additionally, while less pronounced, gap-filling is still
an important determinant of higher financially constrained governments’ maturity choice.
The coefficient estimate on AMT10 is negative, and statistically significant at least at the
5%-level for the subsamples of financially higher constraint governments (see columns (2),
(4), (6), (8), and (10)). Consequently, less financially constrained governments possess a
higher flexibility to issue their debt and possess a higher degree of freedom to structure
their maturity profile of their outstanding debt.
Finally, and also consistent with theory, I find more pronounced gap-filling for higher
rated governments. In the subsample of higher rated governments the coefficient estimate
of AMT10 on long-term debt issues is negative, about one and a half times the magnitude
for lower rated governments, and statistically significant at the 1%-level (see column (11)).
The coefficient estimate on AMT10 on long-term debt issues for lower rated governments
is also negative, and statistically significant at the 5%-level (see column (12)). Overall, I
find that gap-filling is more pronounced for less financially constrained, and higher rated
governments.
2.5 Event Study
Even though my government debt issuance data enables me to precisely capture govern-
ments’ maturity choice that is consistent with gap-filling behavior, endogeneity problems
from unobserved coordination of governments’ debt maturity choice across countries re-
main. Specifically, individual governments might want to avoid concentrated maturity
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profiles of aggregated Eurozone government debt to mitigate rollover risk and limited ac-
cess to capital market in case of a systematic shock to Eurozone governments (similar to
Choi et al. (forthcoming)). Under this alternative explanation, changes in governments’
debt maturity choice would be the result of coordinated supply, rather than a response to
investor’s maturity-specific demand. To address this concern, I exploit changes in periph-
eral governments’ maturity choice (induced by peripheral banks’ “carry trades”) following
the ECB’s three-year long-term refinancing operations (LTRO) in 2011-2012 as a large,
and largely unexpected negative credit supply shock of long-term government debt possibly
affecting core governments maturity choice.
As discussed in detail below and illustrated in Figure 2, the ECB aimed to support
bank lending and market liquidity when providing its largest liquidity provision ever to
mostly weakly capitalized, peripheral banks. Peripheral banks used the ECB’s liquidity
to gamble for resurrection by entering into “carry trades” that matched the maturity of
the ECB’s three-year liquidity – that is, purchasing short-term peripheral government
debt and depositing it as collateral at the ECB. As a response, peripheral governments
increased short-term debt issuance to accommodate banks temporary collateral demand to
mitigate their rollover risk during the Eurozone crisis. Given unchanged total debt issuance
amounts, peripheral governments’ adjustments in maturity choice induced a temporary
negative credit supply shock of long-term Eurozone government debt. The corresponding
gap-filling hypothesis is that core governments temporarily increased their issuance of
longer maturity debt to fill this supply gap.
A concern might be that the ECB launched its large-scale liquidity provision to Eu-
rozone banks to ease refinancing risks for peripheral governments during the escalation
of the Eurozone crisis (in particular for non-EFSF/ESM program countries Italy, and
Spain). However, Article 123 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(TFEU) prohibits the ECB from monetary financing of governments. In addition, even
if the ECB might have intended that its large-scale liquidity provision improves periph-
eral governments refinancing conditions, the intervention is likely to be exogenous to core
governments’ maturity choices. Further, while financial market participants might have
expected that the ECB lengthens its LTRO maturity compared to previous LTROs, the
ECB’s choice of granting liquidity for three years was still to a large degree incidental,
and exogenous to core governments maturity choices. Consequently, the ECB’s three-year
LTRO constitutes a suitable event to investigate core governments’ gap-filling behavior.
2.5.1 The ECB’s three-year long-term refinancing operations
As a response to funding pressures of European banks caused by their exposure to risky
Eurozone sovereign debt in the second half of 2011, the ECB announced on December
8, 2011 two unpreceded loans to banks in its three-year long-term refinancing operations
(LTRO).15 These three-year LTROs were an addition to the ECB’s existing lending to
15The official ECB goal was to add “additional enhanced credit support mea-
sures to support bank lending and liquidity in the euro area money market.” See
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banks under its main refinancing operations (MRO). The three-year LTRO’s conditions
were equivalent to the ECB’s MROs, except for granting liquidity for three years.16 Specif-
ically, the ECB’s LTRO liquidity was granted unconditional to bank lending, the lending
interest rates was floating at the MRO rate (tied to ECB policy rate), collateral and haircut
conditions were more favorable than in the private markets, and lending was full allotment
(no borrowing quantity limits for banks). These loan conditions were identical across all
banks. As the ECB introduced full allotment in its MROs only in October 2008, uptake of
the ECB’s new three-year loans reduced banks uncertainty about potential future amount
limits on the ECB MROs. In addition, both three-year loans included repayment options
after one year, so that banks had flexibility about the duration of their ECB funding.17
Following the LTRO announcement, the ECB conducted two three-year LTRO allot-
ments on December 21, 2011 (LTRO1), and on February 29, 2012 (LTRO2). Under
LTRO1 523 banks borrowed EUR 489.2bn and under LTRO2 800 banks borrowed EUR
529.5bn. Banks were allowed to substitute new liquidity with existing ECB borrowing
facilities (MROs, 3-month LTROs, 12-month LTRO18) so that in the week of LTRO1 the
net increase in borrowing was EUR 210.0bn and in the week of LTRO2 the net increase
in borrowing was EUR 310.6bn.19 Yet, despite banks partial substitution of LTRO liquid-
ity with existing ECB borrowing, the two LTRO loans significantly eased banks funding
pressure and considerably reduced the uncertainty of banks funding due to the lengthened
maturity. Consistent with the ECB’s three-year LTRO being more favorable for weakly
capitalized banks (see Drechsler et al. (2016)), banks in peripheral countries picked up
more than two thirds of the total LTRO1 and LTRO2 loans.
2.5.2 Banks maturity-specific demand for government debt
The large-scale liquidity provision under the ECB’s three-year LTRO allowed undercap-
italized peripheral banks to gamble for resurrection by engaging in “carry trades” (e.g.
Acharya and Steffen (2015)).20 “Carry trades” constitute of purchasing high-yielding pe-
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2011/html/pr111208_1.en.html
16The MRO loan maturity is one week. Another type of prior ECB loans are LTRO loans with three
month maturity.
17Banks aggregate repayments from January 25, 2013 to June 27, 2013 added up to 205.8bn EUR
(101.7bn EUR) for the first (second) three-year LTRO, which is consistent to a substantial part of banks
“carry trades” being conducted with short-term (up to one year) peripheral government debt issues. These
debt issues accounted for the largest share of peripheral governments’ debt issuance adjustments following
the ECB’s three-year LTRO as discussed in subsection 5.3 below. For details on LTRO repayments see
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/mb201307_focus04.en.pdf?33a710426a010fe7968e0adb8a0128
39
18The ECB allotted 3-month LTROs in April 2010, May 2010, and August 2011, and a 12-month LTRO
in October 2011. Banks were allowed to switch liquidity from the 12-month LTRO with the three-year
LTRO1 liquidity and shifted EUR 45.7bn.
19See https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/pdf/mb201203en_box3.pdf?08c66bbcc045b15e9ae0e703851827
4d
20Peripheral banks’ exposure to its domestic sovereign debt during the Eurozone crisis also increased
due to “moral suasion” (see for example Ongena et al. (2016), and Altavilla et al. (2017)). However, the
“moral suasion” channel - in comparison to the “carry trade” channel - is independent from the maturity
structure of government bond purchases by banks.
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ripheral government debt funded by cheap ECB funding, and depositing these peripheral
government debt as collateral at the ECB. Purchasing bonds for “carry trades” with matu-
rities of up to three years were particularly attractive to banks, as these matched the ECB
funding maturity and consequently reduced banks liquidity and market risk (Crosignani
et al. (2017)). While the yield spread on the “carry trades” was identical across all banks,
incentives to engage in “carry trades” were very different between weakly capitalized banks
in peripheral Eurozone countries and well-capitalized banks in core Eurozone countries.
For weakly capitalized banks in peripheral Eurozone countries these “carry trades” were
particularly attractive, as under-capitalized banks did not bear the entire downside risk of
the trade due to the limited liability of equity. In addition, peripheral banks purchases of
domestic peripheral government debt increased sovereign-bank linkages and consequently
raised the likelihood of domestic bailouts of the banking system (Farhi and Tirole (forth-
coming)). Consequently, “carry trades” allowed weakly capitalized peripheral banks to
gamble for resurrection. In contrast, well-capitalized banks in core Eurozone countries
were fully exposed to the downside risk of “carry trades” and their exposure to peripheral
government debt did not affect their domestic bailout probability.
Table 2.6 reports country-level holdings of banks peripheral government debt holdings
before and after the inception of the ECB’s three-year LTRO. Changes in banks’ pe-
ripheral government debt holdings between December 2011 and June 2012 are consistent
with the above described asymmetric incentives for under-capitalized peripheral and well-
capitalized core banks. Specifically, banks in peripheral Eurozone countries increased their
holdings of GIIPS (Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain) government debt (see also
Crosignani et al. (2017)), while banks in core Eurozone countries reduced their holdings
of GIIPS government debt. Also, increases by banks in peripheral countries are larger by
a factor of six compared to decreases of banks in core countries, indicating that Eurozone
banks in aggregate increased their demand for peripheral government debt. Consistent
with peripheral banks “carry trades” demand, banks in peripheral Eurozone countries
particularly increased their holdings of GIIPS government debt up to three years, while
banks in core Eurozone countries reduced GIIPS government debt holdings similarly across
maturities.
Further, changes in the slope of peripheral governments’ yield curves following the an-
nouncement of the ECB’s three-year LTRO are also consistent with a sharp increase in
demand for shorter maturity peripheral government debt (see Figure 2.3, Panel A). The
term premium – that is the difference between the 10-year yield and the 1-year yield –
increased between the announcement of the ECB’s three-year LTRO on December 8, 2011
and the second allotment on February 29, 2012 by 320bps for Italy, and 274bps for Spain,
mainly resulting from reductions of the 1-year yield. Overall, both changes in banks hold-
ings of peripheral government debt and changes in the slope of peripheral government
yield curves following the announcement of the ECB’s three-year LTRO indicate a large,
and sudden increase in demand for short-term peripheral government debt.
In contrast, relative demand changes across maturities for Eurozone core governments
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rotated oppositely after the announcement of the ECB’s three-year LTRO – indicating a
sudden increase in the demand for longer maturity core government debt. Specifically, the
term premia for core governments decreased between December 8, 2011 and February 29,
2012 – for example by 28bps for Germany, and 18bps for France – and continued to decline
until the ECB president Draghi’s “whatever it takes speech” on July 26, 2012 to a total of
72bps for Germany, and 57bps for France (see Figure 2.3, Panel B). In addition, rotating
demand across maturities for core government debt is also observed in core governments’
debt auctions. Excess demand (measured in the bid-to-cover ratio) in government debt
auctions decreased for shorter maturities and increased for longer maturities for Germany
and France during the LTRO-period (see Figure 2.4). In sum, after the announcement of
the ECB’s three-year LTRO demand for longer maturity core government debt increased
significantly.
2.5.3 Governments’ supply response
Next, I examine governments’ response in their maturity choice of debt issues to the these
changes in investor’s maturity-specific demand for peripheral and core Eurozone govern-
ment debt following the announcement of the ECB’s three-year LTRO. As I will show
below, peripheral governments accommodated peripheral banks “carry trade” demand for
shorter debt maturities by reducing the supply of long-term debt. The corresponding gap-
filling hypothesis is that core governments responded to this negative credit supply shock
of long-term Eurozone government debt by filling the gap of longer maturity government
debt.
In a first step, I analyze aggregate changes in the maturity structure of peripheral and
core governments’ debt issues in response to the ECB’s three-year LTRO. Therefore, I
compute the average maturity of all debt issues for both peripheral and core governments
over time by weighting individual debt maturities by their notional issuance amount de-
nominated in euro. Figure 2.5 shows that the average maturity of debt issues of peripheral
and core governments shows a parallel trend before and after the LTRO-period, with core
governments issuing debt with slightly shorter debt maturity compared to peripheral gov-
ernments. However, during the LTRO-period the average maturity of debt issues diverged
between peripheral and core governments. Consistent with peripheral governments accom-
modating peripheral banks demand for “carry trades”, peripheral governments reduced
their maturity of debt issues by 0.8 years to 2.6 years in the LTRO-period. Consistent
with core governments’ gap-filling of longer maturity government debt, core governments
increased their average maturity of debt issues by 2.2 years to 5.1 years in the LTRO-
period.
This rotation of peripheral and core governments’ maturity structure of debt issues is
also observed when analyzing the fraction of debt issues with maturities above three years
over time (see Figure A. A.2.1 in the Appendix). Further and consistent my gap-filling
results above, core governments decreased short-term (up to one year) debt issues to fill
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the gap of longer maturity government debt (see Figure A.A.2.2 in the Appendix).
In a second step, I investigate peripheral and core governments’ maturity choices follow-
ing the ECB’s three-year LTRO in a regression setting. The baseline form of the regression
I estimate is as follows:
ShareIssuei,m,t =β1 · Peripherali · LTROt + β2 · Corei · LTROt
+ γ ·Xi,m,t + ei,m,t ∀m ∈M (2.2)
The dependent variable ShareIssuei,m,t is the share of debt issues of government i in
quarter t and maturity segment m, which can either be up to three years or greater than
three years. These two maturity buckets are aligned according to the maturity of the
ECB’s three-year LTRO to reflect banks incentive to mitigate liquidity risk. The two
key interaction terms in the regression are (Peripherali · LTROt) and (Corei · LTROt).
Peripherali is an indicator variable equal to one if government i is a peripheral govern-
ment, and Corei is an indicator variable equal to one if government i is a core government.
LTROt is an indicator variable equal to one if quarter t falls into the LTRO-period from
2012:q1 to 2012:q3. To ensure that peripheral governments’ maturity choices are not af-
fected by exclusion from capital markets and ongoing ESM-programs, I restrict peripheral
governments to Italy and Spain. Core governments are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France,
Germany, and the Netherlands, and the sample period is 2010:q1 to 2014:q3.21 I further
sequentially include different fixed effects, such as country, country-maturity, country-
quarter, and maturity-quarter fixed effects. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust
and clustered at the government level.
Table 2.7 reports the regression results. In all specifications, I find economically and
at the 1%-level statistically significant coefficient estimates for changes of peripheral and
core governments’ maturity choices during the LTRO-period. That is, consistent with
accommodating peripheral banks “carry trade” demand, peripheral governments increased
their share of debt issues up to three years by 19.9%-points in the LTRO-period (the
average share of debt issues up to three years is 52.3% outside the LTRO-period) (see
column (1)). Correspondingly, peripheral governments’ share of debt issues with maturities
greater than three years reduced by 19.9% (see column (2)). Consistent with gap-filling,
core governments increased their share of debt issues above three years by 14.5%-points
in the LTRO-period (see column (2)). These maturity adjustments by core governments
are equivalent to an increase of 44.8%, when compared to the mean share of debt issues
greater than three years of 32.4%-points outside the LTRO-period. These regression results
are also robust to sequentially including two-way fixed effects of country, maturity, and
quarter.22 Overall, this event study shows that core governments’ gap-filling of longer
21This sample period is aligned to the gap-filling subperiod 2.4.2, but excludes periods affected by the
introduction of the ECB’s Q.E. program. The results shown below are robust to extending the sample
period until 2015:q3.
22The results are also robust to analyzing governments’ debt maturity choice at a monthly, or yearly
frequency, and aggregating debt issues at the government-level in the pre-LTRO- and LTRO-period as
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maturity debt is a response to investor’s maturity-specific demand for government debt.
2.5.4 Financial implications of governments’ supply response
The results above indicate that both peripheral and core Eurozone governments signifi-
cantly altered their maturity structure of debt issues following the ECB’s three-year LTRO.
In this sub-section, I investigate the financial implications of these temporary maturity
adjustments. Specifically, I focus government debt managers’ primary maturity trade-off
between funding needs and funding costs.
Figure 2.6 reveals that peripheral and core governments’ temporary maturity adjust-
ments following the ECB’s three-year LTRO lead to a permanent effect on their overall
debt maturity structures. The average residual maturity of total outstanding debt in-
creased from 7.1 to 7.3 years across core governments and decreased from 6.8 to 6.4 years
across peripheral governments from December 31, 2011 to September 30, 2012, while the
average residual maturities show a parallel trend both before and after the LTRO-period.
These maturity adjustments resulted in core governments’ debt portfolios becoming less
fragile due to lower future rollover requirements, while peripheral governments’ debt port-
folios became more fragile due to higher future rollover requirements.
To illustrate the effects on individual governments’ debt rollover requirements, I next
plot each government’s debt maturity profile as at December 31, 2012. Therein, I highlight
changes resulting from the introduction of the ECB’s three-year LTRO. To compute the
counterfactual – the debt maturity profile without the ECB’s three-year LTRO effect –,
I take a government’s debt maturity profile as at December 31, 2011, and rescale the
amount of debt issues in the LTRO-period to the maturity-bucket specific average share
of debt issues from 2010 and 2011. The difference between the actual and counterfactual
debt maturity profile is highlighted as the ECB’s three-year LTRO effect.
Consistent with changes to the average residual maturity of total outstanding debt, I
find that debt maturity profiles of peripheral governments shifted towards shorter matu-
rities. In contrast, debt maturity profiles of core governments shifted towards long-term
maturities. As shown in Figure 2.7, total debt rollover requirements until 2016 increased
by 51.4bn EUR (or 3.3% of 2012 GDP) for Italy and 49.1bn EUR (4.7% of 2012 GDP) for
Spain due to the ECB’s three-year LTRO effect. Correspondingly, debt rollover require-
ments particularly for long-term debt (maturing after 2021) significantly reduced for Italy
(30.1bn EUR) and Spain (50.0bn EUR). As shorter maturity debt is usually rolled over
into debt with similar maturities, peripheral governments’ debt rollover requirements are
likely to increase also beyond 2016.
Consistent with gap-filling, debt maturity profiles of core governments’ show that their
increased debt issuance with maturities after 2021 filled the gap left by peripheral gov-
ernments. In total, core governments increased their outstanding debt maturing after
2021 by 74.2bn EUR (or 1.1% of aggregated core governments 2012 GDP). Consequently,
suggested by Bertrand et al. (2004).
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core government’s gap-filling was almost euro-for-euro, replacing 93% (74.2bn EUR out
of 80.1bn EUR) of the reduced long-term debt issuance by peripheral governments. Con-
sistent with the gap-filling results across the longer time period above, core governments
mainly reduced short-term debt issues maturing in 2013 by -52.6bn EUR (or -0.84% of
aggregated core governments 2012 GDP).
Consistent with the cross-sectional results above, gap-filling was more pronounced for
less financially constrained and higher rated governments. Finland as a AAA-rated, small,
and lowly indebted country engaged most aggressively in gap-filling, increasing long-term
debt issues maturing after 2021 by 4.2% of GDP. Austria as a AA+-rated, small, and
then similarly indebted country as France and Germany increased long-term debt issues
maturing after 2021 by 3.1% of GDP (compared to 0.8% of France (AA+-rated), and 0.9%
of Germany (AAA-rated)). In sum, core governments’ gap-filling lead to a permanent
prolongation of their debt maturity profiles and consequently reduced future debt rollover
requirements – particularly for less financially constrained and higher rated governments.
Finally, I investigate the effect of governments’ adjusted debt maturity structure on
governments funding costs. As yield curves were upward sloping in the LTRO-period (see
Figure 2.3), peripheral governments might have significantly reduced their funding costs by
increasing their issuance of shorter debt maturities. In contrast, core governments might
have only possessed the ability to fill the gap of long-term bonds due to their capacity to
pay higher funding costs.
Based on the same assumptions as for computing a governments’ debt maturity profile
without the ECB’s three-year LTRO effect above, I also compute the resulting changes
in governments’ funding costs due to their maturity adjustments in the LTRO-period.
My analysis reveals that core governments’ gap-filling increased their funding costs by
just 0.1bn EUR to 0.4bn EUR in 2012 (or between 0.01% to 0.12% of a core govern-
ment’s GDP), which compares to an average core government budget deficit of 2.9%.
Consequently, core governments permanently lengthened their debt maturity profiles and
reduced future debt rollover requirements at relatively low additional costs. Peripheral
governments shift to shorter debt maturities reduced the funding costs for Italy and Spain
by 1.1bn EUR (or 0.07% of GDP) and 0.5bn EUR (0.05% of GDP) in 2012, respectively.
These funding costs reductions are also very small when compared to the Italy’s and
Spain’s 2012 budget deficits of 2.9% and 10.4% of GDP, respectively. In sum, this evidence
on changes in funding needs and funding costs is consistent with peripheral governments’
main motive to adjust their debt maturity structure following the ECB’s three-year LTRO
being a temporary relief on debt rollover during the Eurozone crisis, despite its negative
implications for future debt rollover requirements.
2.5.5 Robustness
Placebo test: ECB’s first targeted long-term refinancing operation
A major concern of employing the ECB’s three-year LTRO in 2011-2012 as an event study
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to investigate governments’ gap-filling behavior might be confounding events during the
Eurozone crisis. To alleviate this concern, I perform a placebo test based on another
large-scale ECB liquidity provision dated after the Eurozone crisis. Specifically, I exploit
the introduction of the ECB’s first target long-term refinancing operations (TLTRO1)
announced on June 5, 2014. The TLTRO1 intervention was very similar to the three-year
LTRO, besides making liquidity provisions to banks conditional to bank lending.23 This
conditionality consequently also prohibited banks to use ECB liquidity for “carry trades”,
which induced peripheral governments to accommodate demand for shorter maturity pe-
ripheral government debt and subsequently led to core governments gap-filling following
the ECB’s three-year LTRO in 2011-2012. Another important difference is that in 2014
peripheral banks had a much higher level of capitalization, so that they would have been
fully exposed to the downside risk of the “carry trades” compared limited downside risk
following the three-year LTRO in 2011-2012. In addition, in 2014 peripheral sovereigns
were more resilient compared to 2011-2012 so that increased bank-sovereign linkages would
not have affected banks domestic bailout probability. In sum, the conditions that induced
peripheral banks to engage in “carry trades” in 2011-2012 were largely eliminated by mid-
2014. Consequently, I hypothesize that (peripheral) banks did not alter their demand for
shorter maturity peripheral government debt following the inception of the TLTRO1 so
that both peripherla and core Eurozone governments’ maturity choices remained unaf-
fected by the introduction of the TLTRO1.
Liquidity provisions under the ECB’s TLTRO1 were allotted on eight allotments dates
between September 24, 2014 to June 29, 2016, with the majority of the liquidity injection
(384.1bn EUR out of 432.0bn EUR, or 88.9%) being allotted in the first four allotments
until June 24, 2015.24 All liquidity provisions matured on September 26, 2018 so that
the loan maturity for the first four allotments amounted to four, or slighly below four
years. Correspondingly, I use four years as the maturity cut-off between shorter and
longer maturity debt and 2014:q4 to 2015:q3 as the TLTRO1-period (and a sample period
from 2010:q1 to 2015:q3) for the placebo test.
Table 2.8 reports estimation results and shows that following the inception of the ECB’s
TLTRO1 program both peripheral and core governments maturity choice remained un-
changed. Specifically, the magnitude of the estimated coefficients on the TLTRO1-period
are close to zero and statistically insignificant for both peripheral and core governments’
shorter and longer maturity debt issues (see columns (1), and (2)). These results also con-
tinue to hold when controlling for two-way fixed effects of country, maturity, and quarter.
Correspondingly, liquidity allotments under the ECB’s TLTRO1 did not affect peripheral
and core governments maturity choices. Overall, this placebo test provides evidence that
the ECB’s three-year LTRO in 2011-2012 led to peripheral banks “carry trades”, which re-
sulted in peripheral governments accommodating their demand for shorter maturity debt
and core governments to fill the gap of longer maturity debt.
23See https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2014/html/pr140605_2.en.html
24See https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omo/html/index.en.html
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Restricted maturity choices for peripheral governments?
Another possible concern might be that investors restricted peripheral governments access
to the longer maturity bond market by reducing their demand. Consequently, investors
might have instead directly demanded core governments’ longer maturity debt, rather
than core governments filling the gap of longer maturity Eurozone government bonds.
Different pieces of evidence reject this concern. First, my analysis is restricted to Italy
and Spain as peripheral governments, which had continuous access to the (longer maturity)
bond market throughout the Eurozone crisis (compared to Greece, Ireland, and Portugal,
which were partially excluded from financial markets). Second, during the LTRO-period,
Italy and Spain issued on average 27.6% of their debt above three years every quarter,
indicating that a substantial share of debt was refinanced with longer maturities. Third,
excess demand for Italian and Spanish longer maturity bond auctions during the LTRO-
period increased compared to the pre-LTRO period - indicating that investor’s demand
for long-term peripheral government debt remained unserved (see Figure 2.8). In sum,
this evidence indicates that in the LTRO-period Italian and Spanish longer maturity debt
issues were not restricted by investors.
Demand for safe assets
Another possible concern might be that investors demanded safe Eurozone government
long-term assets during the acceleration of the Eurozone crisis. Consequently, investors
might have predominantly demanded long-term government debt of Germany - rather than
across all core governments - due to its relative safety, size and liquidity (He et al. (2016a),
and He et al. (2016b)). Then, Germany’s provision of safe long-term assets – rather than
core governments’ gap-filling – would have led to increased provision of long-term debt by
core governments.
Different pieces of evidence reject this concern. First, investors increased their demand
for longer maturity government debt similarly across all core governments, rather than
exclusively for Germany. Yield curves for all core governments continuously flattened af-
ter the announcement of the ECB’s three-year LTRO (see Figure 2.3), and increases in
excess demand in longer maturity debt auctions were similar in France compared to Ger-
many (see Figure 2.4). Second, all core governments – rather than exclusively Germany –
increased their issuance of long-term debt in the LTRO-period (see Figute 2.7). Relative
increases in the provision of long-term debt were even larger for Austria and Finland com-
pared to Germany. These graphical observations are also confirmed in regression analyses,
when estimating core governments gap-filling in the LTRO-period excluding Germany (see
Table A. A.2.6 in the Appendix). The estimated regression coefficients for core govern-
ments increase in longer maturity debt issuance in the LTRO-period is almost identical in
magnitude compared to the regression specification including Germany and statistically
significant at the 5%-level. Overall, different pieces of evidence reject that demand for
safe asset as the underlying channel for core governments increased provision of long-term
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government debt in the LTRO-period.
Deviations from debt issuance announcements
A final concern might be that observed changes in the maturity structure of debt issues
following the three-year LTRO might have been the result of intended supply adjustments,
rather than government’s response to changes in investors’ maturity-specific demand. To
alleviate this concern, I analyze deviations between governments’ announced and realized
debt auctions. Based on expected demand by investors, governments publicly announce
their planned future debt auctions. Nevertheless, governments also publicly communicate
that they maintain the flexibility to deviate from their debt issuance announcements, if
refinancing requirements or market conditions change. Consequently, deviations between
governments’ announced and realized debt auctions following the three-year LTRO identify
supply adjustments caused by unexpected changes in investors’ maturity-specific demand.
To compute deviations between governments’ announced and realized debt auctions,
I hand-collect data on debt auction announcements from Italy and Germany between
2010:Q1 and 2014:Q3. Representing both peripheral and core Eurozone governments,
both countries frequently issue debt across the maturity spectrum and publicly provide
detailed debt auction announcements around the ECB’s three-year LTRO.25 To obtain a
matched data set of announced and realized debt auctions, I map announced debt auctions
(via ISIN, auction date, and maturity date) to the corresponding realized debt auction.
Then, I compute auction-level measures that relate realized debt auction amounts to an-
nounced amounts. Specifically, I compute the realized debt auction amount relative to the
announced debt issues’ minimum final outstanding amount for Italy, and relative to the
announced debt auction target amount for Germany. Supply changes caused by investors
changed maturity-specific demand are then identified based on realized debt auctions dur-
ing the LTRO-period that were announced prior to the inception of the three-year LTRO.
Consistent to the findings above, I hypothesize that Italy reduced issuance amounts of
longer maturity debt auctions during the LTRO-period, while Germany increased issuance
amounts of longer maturity debt auctions to fill the gap.
Table 2.9 provides evidence that peripheral governments catered investors’ “carry trade”
demand for shorter term maturities following the ECB’s three-year LTRO and core gov-
ernments filling the gap of longer maturity government debt. Italy reduced the amount
of each longer maturity debt auctions by on average 11.07% (or EUR 1,220mn) of the
announced minimum final outstanding debt issuance amount in the LTRO-period (col-
umn (2)). With a mean longer maturity debt auction amount of EUR 2,912mn, this
adjustment is economically highly significant, and also statistically significant at the 1%-
level. (The issuance amount of shorter maturity debt auctions also reduced, but fewer
than for longer maturity debt auctions, while at the same time their frequency increased.)
Further, Germany filled the gap of longer maturity Eurozone government debt by devi-
25Italy announces minimum final outstanding amounts of individual debt issues that are comprised of
multiple debt auctions, while Germany announces target amounts of each individual debt auction.
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ating from its debt issuance announcements. Specifically, Germany increased the amount
of each longer maturity debt auction by on average 7.71% (or EUR 356mn) of the an-
nounced target amount in the LTRO-period (column (4)). With a mean longer maturity
debt auction amount of EUR 3,710mn, his adjustment is economically highly significant,
and also statistically significant at the 1%-level. Also, increases in debt auction amounts
compared to pre-announced target amounts occurred exclusively for longer maturity bond
auctions in the LTRO-period. Overall, these results investigating governments’ deviations
between announced and realized debt auctions are consistent to my previous findings and
strengthen the identification of governments’ gap-filling behavior.
2.6 Conclusion and policy implications
In this paper, I investigate whether gap-filling is also an important determinant of ma-
turity choice in the government bond market. Consistent with gap-filling, I find that
governments increase long-term debt issues following periods of low aggregate Eurozone
government long-term debt issuance, and vice versa. This gap-filling behavior is more pro-
nounced for (1) less financially constrained and (2) higher rated governments. I address
endogeneity concerns in an event study using the ECB’s three-year LTRO, and show that
core governments filled supply gaps of longer maturity debt resulting from peripheral gov-
ernments accommodating peripheral banks short-term debt demand for “carry trades”.
These maturity adjustments permanently stabilized core governments’ debt portfolios,
while it permanently increased the fragility of peripheral governments’ debt portfolios.
My empirical findings have two important policy implications. First, Eurozone gov-
ernments act as macro-liquidity providers across maturities, thereby providing significant
risk absorption capacity to government bond markets. There is a widespread concern
about deteriorated resilience in government bond market liquidity since the global finan-
cial crisis.26 In contrast, governments’ gap-filling behavior strengthens the resilience of
government bond market liquidity. As ensuring market liquidity is important for the
stability of the financial system and the transmission of monetary policy, governments’
gap-filling might ultimately contribute to facilitating investments and economic growth in
the real economy. Consequently, changes to the financial architecture, such as the creation
of a safe government asset and the setup of a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism in
the Eurozone, should be designed such that governments continue to be able to provide
this risk absorption capacity.
Second, the gap-filling result from my event study of the ECB’s three-year LTRO pro-
vides evidence for the interaction of unconventional monetary and fiscal policy. Specifi-
cally, ECB’s large-scale liquidity provision to banks led Eurozone governments to adjust
their maturity choices, which heterogeneously affected the stability of core and peripheral
governments’ debt portfolios. Consequently, being aware of governments’ strategic debt
26See, for example, BIS (2016), ESRB (2016), and the testimony of the Federal Reserve System by
Governor Jerome Powell (2016).
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issuance responses to central banks’ interventions in government bond markets might help
to avoid unintended consequences of central bank interventions. Currently, these consider-
ations appear of particular relevance for the discussion on the size and purpose of central
banks asset holdings,27 as well as central banks decisions on reducing their asset holdings,
or tapering quantitative easing programs.
GHS (2010): Greenwood et al. (2010), KVJ (2010): Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012)
27For example, Greenwood et al. (2016) suggest that the Fed should permanently use its balance sheet to
provide ample supply of government-provided short-term, safe instruments to improve financial stability.
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2.7 Figures
Figure 2.1: Aggregated Eurozone Government Long-Term Debt Issue Amounts
This figure shows the aggregated debt issuance amounts of long-term debt issues by Eurozone governments
from 1999:q1 to 2015:q3. Long-term debt issues have maturities greater than ten years. Foreign currency
debt issuance amounts have been converted to euro.
Figure 1: Eurozone Government Long-Term Debt Issues
This figure shows the aggregated debt issuance amounts of long-term debt issues by Eurozone
governments from 1999:q1 to 2015:q3. Foreign currency debt issuance amounts have been converted
to euro.
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Figure 2.2: ECB’s 3-Year LTRO as Negative Credit Supply Shock of Long-Term Debt
This figure illustrates the channels though which the ECB’s three-year LTRO induced a negative credit
supply shock to long-term Eurozone government debt.
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Figure 2.3: Changes in Government Yield Curves after the ECB’s 3-Year LTRO
This figure shows snapshots from sovereign yields of peripheral and core governments at four points in
time: December 8, 2011 (the announcement day of ECB’s three-year LTRO), December 21, 2011 and
February 29, 2012 (the two allotment days of the ECB’s three-year LTRO), and July 26, 2012 (the day of
ECB president Draghi’s “whatever it takes” speech). The yield curves show yields of different maturities,
ranging from three months to 10 years. Panel A shows the yields for peripheral countries, and Panel B for
core countries. Yield data is obtained from Bloomberg.
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Panel B: Core Governments
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Figure 2.4: Excess Demand for Core Government Bonds Around ECB’s 3-Year LTRO
This figure shows six-month moving averages of selected core governments bid-to-cover ratios of govern-
ments debt auctions of different maturities. The bid-to-cover ratio of an individual debt auction is computed
as the aggregated bid amount over the total issuance amount. Selected core governments are France and
Germany. Shorter maturity debt auctions have maturities of 0.5 years, and 1 year. Longer maturity debt
auctions have maturities of 5 years, and 10 years. The grey shaded area depicts the LTRO-period from
2012:q1 to 2012:q3.
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Figure 2.5: Avg. Maturity of Government Debt Issues Around ECB’s 3-Year LTRO
This figure depicts the average maturity of debt issues by government groups around the ECB’s three-year
LTRO over time. The sample of governments is split into peripheral and core governments. The average
maturity is computed as the mean of debt issues across all governments of the respective group. The grey
shaded area depicts the LTRO-period from 2012:q1 to 2012:q3.
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Figure 2.6: Avg. Residual Maturity of Outstanding Debt Around ECB’s 3-Year LTRO
This figure shows the average residual maturity of outstanding debt around the ECB’s three-year LTRO
between December 31, 2010 and September 30, 2014. The sample of governments is split into peripheral
and core Eurozone governments. The average residual maturity of outstanding debt is computed based on
the residual maturity of all outstanding government bonds of a government group at a time, weighted by
the bonds notional amount. The grey shaded area depicts the LTRO-period (2012:q1-2012:q3).
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Figure 2.7: Debt Maturity Profiles and the ECB’s 3-Year LTRO Effect
This figure shows the debt maturity profiles of Eurozone governments as at December 31, 2012. The
changes resulting governments adjusted maturity choices following the introduction of the ECB’s three-
year LTRO are highlighted in black. To compute the counterfactual – that is the debt maturity profile
without the ECB’s three-year LTRO effect –, I take a government’s debt maturity profile as at December
31, 2011, and rescale the amount of bond issues in the LTRO-period to the maturity-bucket specific average
from the years 2010 and 2011.The difference between the actual and counterfactual debt maturity profile
is highlighted as the ECB’s three-year LTRO effect. Panel A shows peripheral governments, and Panel B
shows core governments.
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Figure 2.8: Excess Demand for Peripheral Gov. Bonds Around ECB’s 3-Year LTRO
This figure shows six-month moving averages of two peripheral governments bid-to-cover ratios of govern-
ments longer maturity debt auctions. The bid-to-cover ratio of an individual debt auction is computed as
the aggregated bid amount over the total issuance amount. The two peripheral governments are Italy and
Spain. Bid-to-cover ratios of longer maturity debt auctions for maturities of 5 and 10 years are shown.
The grey shaded area depicts the LTRO-period from 2012:q1 to 2012:q3.
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2.8 Tables
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics by Maturity of Issue, 1999-2015
This table reports issuance-level summary statistics across the five different maturity buckets. The sample consists of all central government debt issuances by 15
Eurozone governments between 1999:q1 (or their year of joining the Eurozone) and 2015:q3 and is obtained from Bloomberg. Panel A reports summary statistics
of individual debt issues. Panel B displays summary statistics of the issuing government at the time of issuance. Panel C reports credit market conditions of the
government at the time of issuance.
(0,1] Years (1,3] Years (3,5] Years (5,10] Years (10,...) Years
Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N
Panel A: Deal Characteristics
Years to Final Maturity 0.428 0.256 6,406 1.802 1.914 754 4.121 4.441 533 7.067 6.995 728 16.361 11.455 677
Deal Amount 2.052 0.192 6,406 4.985 2.284 754 3.695 0.728 533 4.359 0.240 728 8.194 2.480 677
Euro Denomination Dummy 0.688 1.000 6,406 0.786 1.000 754 0.636 1.000 533 0.777 1.000 728 0.873 1.000 677
Zero/Fixed Coupon Dummy 0.944 1.000 6,406 0.786 1.000 754 0.707 1.000 533 0.647 1.000 728 0.705 1.000 677
Not Inflation Linked Dummy 1.000 1.000 6,406 1.000 1.000 754 0.979 1.000 533 0.897 1.000 728 0.925 1.000 677
Repayment at Maturity Dummy 0.983 1.000 6,406 0.979 1.000 754 0.977 1.000 533 0.949 1.000 728 0.948 1.000 677
Panel B: Issuer Characteristics
Non-IG Rating Dummy 0.017 0.000 6,341 0.004 0.000 747 0.002 0.000 533 0.011 0.000 723 0.007 0.000 667
Recession Dummy 0.122 0.000 6,406 0.155 0.000 754 0.182 0.000 533 0.115 0.000 728 0.093 0.000 677
Total GDP 4Q Growth -0.002 -0.060 6,406 -0.342 -0.081 754 -1.066 -0.907 533 -0.323 -0.275 728 -0.067 -0.181 677
Inflation 1.875 1.868 6,406 2.251 2.239 754 2.136 2.230 533 1.914 1.953 728 1.795 1.932 677
Debt/GDP Ratio 0.548 0.524 6,406 0.530 0.471 754 0.554 0.498 533 0.565 0.524 728 0.611 0.587 677
Total Debt/GDP 4Q Change 0.030 0.024 6,389 0.027 0.017 753 0.041 0.031 532 0.030 0.023 727 0.028 0.022 675
Panel C: Market Characteristics
AMT10 4.207 4.286 6,333 4.154 4.233 733 4.208 4.286 526 4.207 4.333 718 4.138 4.245 653
Termstructure 10y-6m 1.595 1.655 5,625 1.738 1.740 725 2.103 2.088 501 1.898 1.951 665 1.895 1.951 592
Yield 6m 2.613 2.744 5,625 2.793 3.010 725 2.226 2.133 501 2.404 2.143 665 2.067 2.138 592
Spread to Germany 10y 0.395 0.209 5,625 0.677 0.264 725 0.783 0.277 501 0.551 0.207 665 0.590 0.248 592
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Table 2.2: Maturities by Government, 1999-2015
This table reports the distribution of debt issues by government and across maturity buckets. Panel A
presents the frequencies of individual debt issues across 15 Eurozone governments between 1999:q1 (or
their year of joining the Eurozone) and 2015:q3, which are obtained from Bloomberg. Panel B displays
the mean quarterly share of debt issues across governments, which is computed based on the aggregation
of individual debt issues’ deal amounts within a government-quarter.
(0,1] Years (1,3] Years (3,5] Years (5,10] Years (10,...) Years Total
Panel A: Frequencies of Individual Debt Issues
Austria 2,573 50 32 62 59 2,776
Belgium 227 29 56 102 76 490
Cyprus 115 5 9 9 2 140
Finland 368 41 40 25 15 489
France 1,186 67 47 168 105 1,573
Germany 249 67 12 46 46 420
Greece 93 3 18 22 34 170
Ireland 25 1 3 5 11 45
Italy 492 154 84 84 127 941
Malta 581 3 14 42 57 697
Netherlands 212 14 14 12 25 277
Portugal 43 13 5 9 19 89
Slovakia 12 2 5 13 12 44
Slovenia 119 7 7 9 8 150
Spain 111 298 187 120 81 797
Total 6,406 754 533 728 677 9,098
Panel B: Share of Debt Issues (quarterly, in percent)
Austria 60.13 5.07 2.99 12.13 19.68 100.00
Belgium 66.34 8.07 1.97 6.35 17.28 100.00
Cyprus 67.87 5.75 19.44 6.43 0.51 100.00
Finland 56.09 5.61 10.03 12.83 15.45 100.00
France 67.00 4.96 3.47 7.90 16.68 100.00
Germany 30.97 26.53 3.39 18.26 20.86 100.00
Greece 31.88 2.91 16.09 19.91 29.21 100.00
Ireland 29.07 5.56 5.31 17.72 42.35 100.00
Italy 45.39 19.55 9.58 10.65 14.82 100.00
Malta 58.14 0.70 3.75 13.50 23.91 100.00
Netherlands 71.44 6.49 5.60 6.88 9.59 100.00
Portugal 44.67 11.62 4.18 12.12 27.41 100.00
Slovakia 30.03 1.14 9.83 29.63 29.36 100.00
Slovenia 56.42 9.35 7.11 10.71 16.41 100.00
Spain 18.70 36.08 12.50 12.49 20.23 100.00
Total 50.54 11.87 6.96 11.99 18.65 100.00
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Table 2.3: Gap-Filling Government Debt Maturity Choice, 1999-2015
This table reports Tobit model regression results of governments share of debt issues across five maturity
segments, on lagged AMT10 and control variables. The data sample is based on governments individ-
ual debt issues from 1999:q1 to 2015:q3 and is obtained from Bloomberg. The dependent variable is a
governments’ share of debt issues in a maturity segments (0,1], (1,3], (3,5], (5,10], and (10,...) years in
a given quarter. The share of debt issues is computed as the aggregated issuance amount in the respec-
tive maturity segment over the total issue amount across maturity segments within a quarter. The Tobit
model accounts for the share of debt issues being bounded between zero and one. AMT10 is the log of
the aggregated amount of long-term (above 10 years) Eurozone government debt issues. Robust standard
errors are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
level respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(0,1] Y (1,3] Y (3,5] Y (5,10] Y (10,...) Y
model
L.AMT10 0.096∗∗∗ -0.024 -0.038∗ -0.005 -0.085∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.026)
L.Termstructure 10y-6m -0.060∗∗ 0.051∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗ 0.033
(0.028) (0.027) (0.023) (0.023) (0.031)
L.Yield 6m 0.007 0.057∗∗∗ 0.007 0.002 -0.015
(0.017) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.019)
L.Spread to Germany 10y 0.013 -0.013 -0.027 -0.002 -0.061∗∗
(0.026) (0.025) (0.018) (0.025) (0.027)
L.Non-IG Rating Dummy 0.095 -0.098 -1.564 -2.021 0.096
(0.215) (0.250) (.) (.) (0.280)
Recession Dummy 0.061 0.027 -0.016 -0.086∗ -0.032
(0.056) (0.047) (0.043) (0.049) (0.067)
Total Real GDP Q4 Growth -0.000 -0.006 -0.012∗ 0.009 0.005
(0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.012)
L.Inflation -0.049∗∗∗ 0.012 0.028∗∗ 0.027∗∗ -0.007
(0.017) (0.015) (0.012) (0.014) (0.020)
L.Debt to GDP Ratio 0.147 -0.022 0.068 0.170∗∗ 0.209∗∗
(0.094) (0.084) (0.065) (0.072) (0.099)
Total Debt to GDP Q4 Change -0.868∗∗∗ -0.338 0.307 0.181 0.623∗
(0.294) (0.284) (0.240) (0.252) (0.346)
Constant 0.242∗ -0.143 -0.150 -0.236∗∗ 0.255∗
(0.141) (0.128) (0.117) (0.116) (0.155)
sigma
Constant 0.416∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 0.326∗∗∗ 0.429∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.018) (0.022) (0.016) (0.019)
Onservations 625 625 625 625 625
Pseudo R2 0.0435 0.0402 0.0738 0.0492 0.0314
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Table 2.4: Time-Variation of Governments’ Gap-Filling
This table reports Tobit model regression results of governments share of short-term (up to one year)
and long-term (greater than ten years) debt issues across two subperiods, on lagged AMT10 and control
variables. The data sample is based on governments individual debt issues from 1999:q1 to 2015:q3 and
is obtained from Bloomberg. The two subperiods span from 1999:q1-2009:q4, and 2010:q1-2015:q3. The
dependent variable is a governments’ share of debt issues of (0,1] years, or (10,...) years of maturity in
a given quarter. The share of debt issues is computed as the aggregated issuance amount of debt issues
with maturities in the respective maturity range over the total issue amount across all maturities within
a quarter. The Tobit model accounts for the share of debt issues being bounded between zero and one.
AMT10 is the log of the aggregated amount of long-term (above 10 years) Eurozone government debt
issues. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.
1999-2009 2010-2015
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(0,1] Y (10,...) Y (0,1] Y (10,...) Y
model
L.AMT10 0.058∗ -0.032 0.129∗∗∗ -0.177∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.037) (0.038) (0.040)
L.Termstructure 10y-6m -0.051 -0.055 -0.064 0.143∗∗
(0.043) (0.053) (0.045) (0.060)
L.Yield 6m 0.051 -0.091∗∗ 0.082 -0.077
(0.035) (0.043) (0.050) (0.068)
L.Spread to Germany 10y 0.059 -0.130 -0.048 -0.040
(0.097) (0.111) (0.045) (0.052)
L.Non-IG Rating Dummy 0.240 -0.049
(0.222) (0.279)
Recession Dummy 0.085 -0.033 0.008 0.013
(0.073) (0.084) (0.108) (0.124)
Total Real GDP Q4 Growth -0.007 0.001 0.004 0.029
(0.012) (0.015) (0.018) (0.021)
L.Inflation -0.073∗∗∗ -0.004 -0.020 -0.001
(0.024) (0.025) (0.029) (0.038)
L.Debt to GDP Ratio 0.223∗ 0.148 0.126 0.248
(0.119) (0.130) (0.163) (0.160)
Total Debt to GDP Q4 Change -1.258∗∗∗ 0.933∗ -0.763 0.561
(0.392) (0.503) (0.465) (0.503)
Constant 0.247 0.438 0.134 0.347∗
(0.233) (0.279) (0.191) (0.196)
sigma
Constant 0.404∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗ 0.424∗∗∗ 0.408∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.020) (0.027) (0.036)
Observations 409 409 216 216
Pseudo R2 0.0566 0.0316 0.0687 0.1174
Table 2.5: Cross-Section of Governments’ Gap-Filling, 2010-2015
This table reports Tobit model regression results of governments share of long-term (above 10 years) debt issues across different subsamples, on lagged AMT10 and
control variables. The data sample is based on governments individual debt issues from 2010:q1 to 2015:q3 and is obtained from Bloomberg. The subsamples separate
governments across indebtedness, size, funding needs, budget deficit, economic growth, and rating. The dependent variable is a governments’ share of debt issues of
(10,...) years of maturity in a given quarter. The share of debt issues is computed as the aggregated issuance amount of debt issues with maturities above 10 years over
the total issue amount across all maturities within a quarter. The Tobit model accounts for the share of debt issues being bounded between zero and one. AMT10 is
the log of the aggregated amount of long-term (above 10 years) Eurozone government debt issues. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.
Indebtedness Size Funding needs Budget deficit Economic growth Rating
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
low high small large low high low high high low high low
L.AMT10 -0.365∗∗∗ -0.089∗∗ -0.280∗∗∗ -0.095∗∗∗ -0.155∗∗ -0.106∗∗ -0.229∗∗∗ -0.170∗∗∗ -0.208∗∗∗ -0.136∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗ -0.133∗∗
(0.097) (0.044) (0.086) (0.028) (0.074) (0.051) (0.070) (0.052) (0.051) (0.063) (0.053) (0.055)
L.Termstructure 10y-6m 0.276∗ 0.067 0.307∗ 0.083∗∗ -0.078 0.106 -0.011 0.217∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗ 0.057 0.120 0.146
(0.140) (0.059) (0.162) (0.035) (0.096) (0.080) (0.108) (0.076) (0.078) (0.081) (0.078) (0.103)
L.Yield 6m -0.115 -0.089 -0.459∗∗ 0.025 -0.170 -0.099 -0.034 -0.077 -0.212∗∗ 0.026 -0.054 -0.028
(0.173) (0.064) (0.183) (0.050) (0.131) (0.073) (0.123) (0.087) (0.092) (0.084) (0.091) (0.103)
L.Spread to Germany 10y -0.050 -0.003 -0.054 0.011 0.166 -0.047 0.040 -0.068 -0.037 -0.079 -0.011 -0.064
(0.116) (0.053) (0.120) (0.040) (0.127) (0.052) (0.110) (0.059) (0.059) (0.108) (0.075) (0.097)
Macroeconomic Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 106 110 106 110 109 107 79 137 124 92 155 61
Pseudo R2 0.1643 0.1159 0.1492 0.3225 0.1560 0.2130 0.1205 0.1609 0.2150 0.0871 0.1126 0.2311
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Table 2.6: Gov. Debt Holdings of Eurozone Banks Around ECB’s 3-Year LTRO
This table reports summary statistics of country-level government debt holdings for publicly listed banks
in the Eurozone from the European Banking Authority (EBA) reported in Acharya and Steffen (2015).
Panel A reports aggregate holdings in Irish, Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish government bonds of banks in
GIIPS countries (GIIPS: Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain) as of December 2011 and June 2012.
Panel B reports changes in GIIPS government bond holdings by banks across different countries between
December 2011 and June 2012 at the country level and by bond maturity (≤ 3 years, > 3 years). Changes
in GIIPS government bond holdings of banks in core countries are also aggregated across countries. Core
countries are Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands.
Panel A: Panel B:
GIIPS Sov. Bond Holdings Change GIIPS Sov. Bond Holdings
(in EUR million) (in EUR million)
Dec 2011 Jun 2012 ≤ 3 years > 3 years
Ireland 10,487 11,938 1,511 119
Italy 153,923 189,508 27,355 7,261
Portugal 15,467 20,544 3,215 36
Spain 115,594 127,847 7,446 5,268
Core N/A N/A -4,121 -4,731
Government debt maturity choice 51
Table 2.7: Gap-Filling by Core Governments at ECB’s 3-Year LTRO
This table reports the estimates of the change in governments’ debt maturity choices following the ECB’s
three-year LTRO announcement. The dependent variable in all specifications is the share of debt issues of
maturity (range) m of country i in quarter t. The LTRO-period spans from 2012:q1 to 2012:q3. The first
and second row test the changes in the share of short-term (≤ 3 years) and long-term (> 3 years) debt
issues separately for core and peripheral countries and include country fixed effects. The third row tests the
difference between the changes in the share of short-term (≤ 3 years) and long-term (> 3 years) debt issues
separately for core and peripheral countries and includes country-maturity and country-time fixed effects.
The fourth row tests the difference between core and peripheral countries difference between the changes in
the share of short-term (≤ 3 years) and long-term (> 3 years) debt issues and includes country-maturity,
country-time, and maturity-time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. *, **,
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.
ShareIssuei,short,t ShareIssuei,long,t ShareIssuei,m,t ShareIssuei,m,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Peripheral × LTRO 0.199∗∗∗ -0.199∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.030)
Core × LTRO -0.145∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ -0.145∗∗∗ -0.103∗∗
(0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.040)
Peripheral × Long × LTRO -0.397∗∗∗ -0.483∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.059)
Core × Long × LTRO 0.290∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗
(0.075) (0.079)
R-squared 0.227 0.227 0.344 0.434
Observations 151 151 302 302
Country FE Yes Yes
Country-Maturity FE Yes Yes
Country-Quarter FE Yes Yes
Maturity-Quarter FE Yes
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Table 2.8: Placebo Test: No Gap-Filling at ECB’s first Targeted LTRO
This table reports the estimates of the change in governments’ debt maturity choices following the ECB’s
first four-year targeted (T)LTRO announcement. The dependent variable in all specifications is the share
of debt issues of maturity (range) m of country i in quarter t. The TLTRO1-period spans from 2014:q4
to 2015:q3. The sample period end is extended by three quarters so that the entire sample perios spans
from 2010:q1 to 2015:q3. The first and second row test the changes in the share of short-term (≤ 4 years)
and long-term (> 4 years) debt issues separately for core and peripheral countries and include country
fixed effects. The third row tests the difference between the changes in the share of short-term (≤ 4 years)
and long-term (> 4 years) debt issues separately for core and peripheral countries and includes country-
maturity and country-time fixed effects. The fourth row tests the difference between core and peripheral
countries difference between the changes in the share of short-term (≤ 4 years) and long-term (> 4 years)
debt issues and includes country-maturity, country-time, and maturity-time fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered at the country level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
level respectively.
ShareIssuei,short,t ShareIssuei,long,t ShareIssuei,m,t ShareIssuei,m,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Peripheral × TLTRO1 -0.012 0.012 -0.012 -0.019
(0.052) (0.052) (0.051) (0.052)
Core × TLTRO1 0.067 -0.067 0.067 0.059
(0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037)
Peripheral × Long × TLTRO1 0.025 0.039
(0.101) (0.103)
Core × Long × TLTRO1 -0.134 -0.117
(0.074) (0.075)
R-squared 0.178 0.178 0.386 0.475
Observations 183 183 366 366
Country FE Yes Yes
Country-Maturity FE Yes Yes
Country-Quarter FE Yes Yes
Maturity-Quarter FE Yes
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Table 2.9: Deviations from Debt Issuance Announcements after ECB’s 3-Year LTRO
This table reports estimation results of linear regressions on issuance adjustments in government’s debt
auctions. Issuance adjustments are measured as the realized debt auction amount relative to the an-
nounced debt issues’ minimum final outstanding amount for Italy (columns (1) and (2)), and relative to
the announced debt auction target amount for Germany (columns (3) and (4)). Columns (1) and (3)
provide results for multivariate regressions without fixed effects. Columns (2) and (4) provide results for
multivariate regressions controlling for maturity segment, tranche, and quarter fixed effects. The relevant
variables are indicator variables indicating whether a debt auction was announced prior to the inception of
the ECB’s three-year LTRO and auctioned during the LTRO-period for short-term (up to three years) and
long-term (greater than three years) maturities. The bottom part of the table shows the hypothesis test
(H0: LTRO x Long-Term – LTRO x Short-Term = 0) and the hypothesis test’s p-value. Robust standard
errors are clustered at the maturity segment level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Italy: Germany:
Measuring Issuance Adjustments Measuring Issuance Adjustments
Relative to Announced Relative to Announced
Minimum Total Debt Issue Amounts Target Auction Amounts
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Realized over Realized over Realized over Realized over
Announced Announced Announced Announced
Amount Amount Amount Amount
LTRO x Long-Term -0.220∗∗∗ -0.111∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.022) (0.019) (0.020)
LTRO x Short-Term -0.048 -0.080∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.012
(0.025) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008)
Maturity Segment F.E. Yes Yes
Tranche F.E. Yes Yes
Quarter F.E. Yes Yes
Observations 222 222 304 304
Adj. R2 0.319 0.754 0.077 0.118
H0 -0.171∗∗ -0.030 0.072∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗
p-value 0.002 0.320 0.007 0.018
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2.9 Appendix
Figure A.2.1: Longer Maturity Debt Issues Around ECB’s 3-Year LTRO
This figure shows the fraction of longer maturity debt issues around the ECB’s three-year LTRO. Longer
maturity debt issues are debt issues with maturities of (3,...) years. The sample of governments is split into
peripheral and core Eurozone governments. Fractions are computed based on aggregated debt issuance
amounts across governments within a government group with debt maturities above three years over total
debt issuance amounts within the same group. Fractions are computed over the pre-LTRO- (2010:q1-
2011:q4), LTRO- (2012:q1-2012:q3), and post-LTRO-period (2012:q4-2014:q3), respectively.
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Figure A.2.2: Maturity Buckets of Debt Issues Around ECB’s 3-Year LTRO
This figure shows the fraction of debt issues across five maturity buckets around the ECB’s three-year
LTRO. Debt issues are split into maturities of (0,1] year, (1,3] years, (3,5] years, (5,10] years, and (10,...)
years. Panel A reports results for peripheral Eurozone governments, and Panel B for core Eurozone
governments. Fractions are computed based on aggregated debt issuance amounts across governments
within a government group with debt maturities in the respective maturity bucket over total debt issuance
amounts within the same group. Fractions are computed over the pre-LTRO- (2010:q1-2011:q4), LTRO-
(2012:q1-2012:q3), and post-LTRO-period (2012:q4-2014:q3), respectively.
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Table A.2.1: Description of Variables
The table describes all variables and their units of measurement. The variables are split
in deal characterstics, issuer characteristics, and market characteristics.
Variable Name Unit Description
Panel A: Deal Characteristics
Years to Final Maturity Years Years until final maturity of a debt issue.
Deal Amount EUR bn Notional issue amount in prices of 2010;
converted to EUR at the exchange rate of
the bond issue, if in non-EUR currency.
Euro Denomination Dummy Dummy Indicator variable; takes a value of one if
debt is issued in EUR currency.
Zero/Fixed Coupon Dummy Dummy Indicator variable; takes a value of one if
debt is issued as zero or fixed coupon bond.
Not Inflation Linked Dummy Dummy Indicator variable; takes a value of one if
debt issue is not an inflation-linked security.
Repayment at Maturity Dummy Dummy Indicator variable; takes a value of one if
debt issue repays at final maturity.
Panel B: Issuer Characteristics
Qtly. Share of Debt Issues (0,1]Y % Quarterly amount of debt issues with
maturities up to one year, over the total
quarterly amount of debt issues.
Qtly. Share of Debt Issues (1,3]Y % Quarterly amount of debt issues with
maturities greater than one year but not
exceeding three years of maturity, over the
total quarterly amount of debt issues.
Qtly. Share of Debt Issues (3,5]Y % Quarterly amount of debt issues with
maturities greater than three years but not
exceeding five years of maturity, over the
total quarterly amount of debt issues.
Qtly. Share of Debt Issues (5,10]Y % Quarterly amount of debt issues with
maturities greater than five years but not
exceeding ten years of maturity, over the
total quarterly amount of debt issues.
Qtly. Share of Debt Issues (10,...)Y % Quarterly amount of debt issues with
maturities greater than ten years, over the
total quarterly amount of debt issues.
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Table A.2.1: Description of Variables
(continued)
Panel B: Issuer Characteristics
Non-IG Rating Dummy Dummy Indicator variable; takes a value of one if the
government has a long-term local-currency
credit rating by S&P of BBB- or higher.
Recession Dummy Dummy Indicator variable; takes a value of one if the
governments last two consecutive quarters
had negative GDP growth.
Total GDP 4Q Growth % The Countries growth in real GDP during
the past four quarters.
Inflation % The Countries consumer price inflation
(CPI) during the prior twelve month.
Debt/GDP Ratio Ratio The countries total government debt over
GDP of the previous year.
Total Debt/GDP 4Q Change Ratio The total change in the governments’
debt/GDP ratio in the previous four
quarters.
Peripheral × LTRO Dummy Interaction term of indicator variable
“Peripheral” that takes a value of one if the
country is Italy or Spain; and the indicator
variable “LTRO” that takes a value of one if
the quarter is included in the ECB’s
LTRO-period from 2012:q1 to 2012:q3.
Core × LTRO Dummy Interaction term of indicator variable “Core”
that takes a value of one if the country is
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France,
Germany, the Netherlands; and the indicator
variable “LTRO”.
Peripheral × Long × LTRO Dummy Interaction term of indicator variable
“Peripheral”, “Long” that takes a value of
one for the share of debt issues with
maturities above three years, and “LTRO”.
Core × Long × LTRO Dummy Interaction term of indicator variable
“Core”, “Long” and “LTRO”.
Peripheral × TLTRO1 Dummy Interaction term of indicator variable
“Peripheral” and the indicator variable
“TLTRO1” that takes a value of one if the
quarter is included in the ECB’s TLTRO1
period from 2014:q4 to 2015:q3.
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Table A.2.1: Description of Variables
(continued)
Panel B: Issuer Characteristics
Core × TLTRO1 Dummy Interaction term of indicator variable “Core”
and the indicator variable “TLTRO1”.
Peripheral × Long × TLTRO1 Dummy Interaction term of indicator variable
“Peripheral”, “Long” and “TLTRO1”.
Core × Long × TLTRO1 Dummy Interaction term of indicator variable
“Core”, “Long” and “TLTRO1”.
Panel C: Market Characteristics
AMT10 Log
(EUR bn)
Natural logarithm of the sum of deal
amounts of Eurozone government debt issues
with maturities above ten years.
Termstructure 10y-6m % Difference between the percentage yields of
10-year and 6-month government securities.
Yield 6m % The percentage yield of 6-month government
securities.
Spread to Germany 10y % The Difference between the percentage
yields of 10-year government securities and
10-year German government securities.
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Table A.2.2: Government Debt Managers in the Eurozone
The table reports the debt managers of Eurozone governments in the sample. Information on debt managers
include the name, institutional position within the government, and website.
Country Debt Manager Institutional position Website
Austria Österreichische
Bundesfinanzagentur
Part of the Ministry
of Finance
www.oebfa.at/en
Belgium Agence Fédérale de la
Dette/Federaal Agentschap
van de Schuld
Part of the Federal Public
Service Finance
www.debtagency.be/en
Cyprus Public Debt Management
Office
Part of the Ministry
of Finance
www.mof.gov.cy/mof/
pdmo/pdmo.nsf/
index_en/index_en
Finland Valtiokonttori State Treasury responsible
to the Ministry of Finance
www.statetreasury.fi/
en-US
France Agence France Trésor Part of the Ministry of the
Economy and Finance
www.aft.gouv.fr/
Germany Bundesrepublik Deutschland -
Finanzagentur GmbH
Limited company with the
Federal Republic of
Germany, represented by
the Federal Ministry of
Finance, as sole
shareholder
www.deutsche-
finanzagentur.de/en
Greece Public Debt Management
Agency
Board of Directors is
appointed by the Minister
of Finance, Agency
responsible to the
Ministry of Finance
www.pdma.gr/en
Ireland National Treasury
Management Agency
Chairperson is appointed
by the Minister of
Finance, Agency
responsible to the
Ministry of Finance
www.ntma.ie
Italy Dipartimento del Tesoro Part of the Ministry of
Economy and Finance
www.dt.tesoro.it/en/
Malta Debt Management Directorate Part of the Treasury
Department
treasury.gov.mt/en
Netherlands Agentschap van de Generale
Thesaurie
Part of the Ministry
of Finance
english.dsta.nl
Portugal Agência de Gestão da
Tesouraria e da Dívida
Pública - IGCP, E.P.E.
Agency supervised by the
Finance Minister
www.igcp.pt/en
Slovakia Agentúry pre riadenie dlhu a
likvidity
Agency responsible to the
Ministry of Finance
www.ardal.sk/en
Slovenia Ministrstvo za finance Part of the Ministry
of Finance
www.mf.gov.si/en
Spain Tesoro Público Part of the Ministry of
Economy, Industry and
Competitiveness
www.tesoro.es/en
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Table A.2.3: Gap-Filling Government Debt Maturity Choice (OLS Models), 1999-2015
This table reports OLS model regression results of governments share of short-term and long-term debt
issues, on lagged AMT10 and control variables. The data sample is based on governments individual debt
issues from 1999:q1 to 2015:q3 and is obtained from Bloomberg. The dependent variable is a governments’
share of debt issues in the short-term maturity segments of (0,1] years, and the long-term maturity segments
of (10,...) years in a given quarter. The share of debt issues is computed as the aggregated issuance amount
in the respective maturity segment over the total issue amount across maturity segments within a quarter.
AMT10 is the log of the aggregated amount of long-term (above 10 years) Eurozone government debt
issues. Panel A reports results for short-term debt issues, and Panel B reports results for long-term debt
issues. Heteroscedasticity-robust and clustered standard errors at the government-level are reported in
parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.
(a) Short-Term Debt Issues
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(0,1] Y (0,1] Y (0,1] Y (0,1] Y (0,1] Y (0,1] Y
L.AMT10 0.078∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗
(0.023) (0.022) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.027)
L.Termstructure 10y-6m -0.036 -0.065 0.009 0.030 0.017 0.010
(0.033) (0.061) (0.055) (0.053) (0.056) (0.057)
L.Yield 6m 0.010 0.042 0.117∗ 0.088 0.080 0.087
(0.020) (0.064) (0.060) (0.052) (0.052) (0.053)
L.Spread to Germany 10y -0.007 -0.034 -0.107∗ -0.084 -0.078 -0.117
(0.030) (0.059) (0.055) (0.051) (0.049) (0.112)
Macroeconomic Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes
Country-Quarter FE Yes
Country-Year FE Yes
Observations 625 625 625 625 625 625
R2 0.0671 0.0989 0.1635 0.3925 0.4966 0.5557
(b) Long-Term Debt Issues
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(10,...) Y (10,...) Y (10,...) Y (10,...) Y (10,...) Y (10,...) Y
L.AMT10 -0.047∗∗ -0.054∗∗∗ -0.058∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗∗ -0.061∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.021)
L.Termstructure 10y-6m -0.002 0.061 0.011 0.004 0.022 -0.006
(0.013) (0.041) (0.038) (0.042) (0.045) (0.052)
L.Yield 6m -0.012 0.007 -0.042 -0.039 -0.035 -0.034
(0.009) (0.036) (0.030) (0.027) (0.028) (0.037)
L.Spread to Germany 10y -0.017 -0.037 0.012 -0.015 -0.018 -0.016
(0.016) (0.042) (0.038) (0.041) (0.043) (0.084)
Macroeconomic Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes
Country-Quarter FE Yes
Country-Year FE Yes
Observations 625 625 625 625 625 625
R2 0.0302 0.0655 0.1376 0.1718 0.3051 0.3288
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Table A.2.4: Gap-Filling by Government Group, 2010-2015
This table reports Tobit model regression results of governments share of debt issues across five maturity
segments for different government groups, on lagged AMT10 and control variables. The data sample is
based on governments individual debt issues from 2010:q1 to 2015:q3 and is obtained from Bloomberg.
The dependent variable is a governments’ share of debt issues in a maturity segments (0,1], (1,3], (3,5],
(5,10], and (10,...) years in a given quarter. The share of debt issues is computed as the aggregated
issuance amount in the respective maturity segment over the total issue amount across maturity segments
within a quarter. The Tobit model accounts for the share of debt issues being bounded between zero and
one. AMT10 is the log of the aggregated amount of long-term (above 10 years) Eurozone government
debt issues. Panel A reports results for peripheral governments, and Panel B reports results for core
governments. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.
(a) Peripheral Governments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(0,1] Y (1,3] Y (3,5] Y (5,10] Y (10,...) Y
L.AMT10 0.194∗∗∗ -0.043 0.041 -0.030 -0.198∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.043) (0.034) (0.047) (0.048)
L.Termstructure 10y-6m -0.061 0.079 0.037 -0.011 0.005
(0.091) (0.071) (0.053) (0.070) (0.075)
L.Yield 6m 0.064 0.072 -0.009 -0.075 -0.098
(0.075) (0.068) (0.055) (0.078) (0.086)
L.Spread to Germany 10y 0.034 -0.069 -0.046 0.039 -0.082
(0.068) (0.046) (0.044) (0.071) (0.064)
Macroeconomic Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 73 73 73 73 73
Pseudo R2 0.2772 0.2981 0.6184 0.2368 0.2803
(b) Core Governments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(0,1] Y (1,3] Y (3,5] Y (5,10] Y (10,...) Y
L.AMT10 0.091∗ 0.012 0.002 -0.001 -0.163∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.040) (0.052) (0.044) (0.058)
L.Termstructure 10y-6m -0.030 0.016 0.035 -0.010 0.223∗∗
(0.064) (0.065) (0.060) (0.056) (0.087)
L.Yield 6m 0.145 -0.067 0.060 0.014 -0.250∗∗
(0.117) (0.093) (0.094) (0.100) (0.117)
L.Spread to Germany 10y -0.077 -0.342∗∗ -0.030 0.063 0.098
(0.076) (0.152) (0.068) (0.079) (0.096)
Macroeconomic Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 143 143 143 143 143
Pseudo R2 0.0577 0.2189 0.0296 0.0657 0.1168
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Table A.2.5: Gap-Filling After the Eurozone Crisis, 2012:q4-2015:q3
This table reports Tobit model regression results of governments share of debt issues across five maturity
segments, on lagged AMT10 and control variables. The data sample is based on governments individual
debt issues following the Eurozone crisis (from 2012:q4 to 2015:q3) and is obtained from Bloomberg. The
dependent variable is a governments’ share of debt issues in a maturity segments (0,1], (1,3], (3,5], (5,10],
and (10,...) years in a given quarter. The share of debt issues is computed as the aggregated issuance
amount in the respective maturity segment over the total issue amount across maturity segments within
a quarter. The Tobit model accounts for the share of debt issues being bounded between zero and one.
AMT10 is the log of the aggregated amount of long-term (above 10 years) Eurozone government debt
issues. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(0,1] Y (1,3] Y (3,5] Y (5,10] Y (10,...) Y
model
L.AMT10 0.133∗∗∗ -0.013 -0.032 0.023 -0.170∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.039) (0.050) (0.046) (0.050)
L.Termstructure 10y-6m -0.012 -0.007 0.065 0.079 -0.006
(0.091) (0.071) (0.077) (0.085) (0.118)
L.Yield 6m 0.193 0.071 -0.058 -0.023 -0.410∗∗
(0.145) (0.130) (0.104) (0.144) (0.160)
L.Spread to Germany 10y -0.155 0.026 -0.008 0.038 0.172
(0.112) (0.098) (0.097) (0.110) (0.138)
L.Non-IG Rating Dummy 0.445∗ -0.147 -1.938 -2.547 -0.114
(0.243) (0.252) (.) (.) (0.310)
Recession Dummy 0.104 0.008 -0.028 -0.174 -0.006
(0.173) (0.077) (0.123) (0.117) (0.184)
Total Real GDP Q4 Growth 0.055 -0.014 -0.112∗∗∗ -0.021 0.029
(0.037) (0.023) (0.039) (0.036) (0.037)
L.Inflation 0.094 -0.046 -0.189∗∗∗ -0.022 0.040
(0.082) (0.051) (0.067) (0.084) (0.102)
L.Debt to GDP Ratio 0.510∗ 0.229 -0.129 -0.093 0.333
(0.275) (0.198) (0.212) (0.300) (0.290)
Total Debt to GDP Q4 Change -0.575 -0.416 0.405 -0.400 0.352
(0.782) (0.607) (0.822) (0.857) (0.935)
Constant -0.309 -0.206 0.127 -0.164 0.335
(0.286) (0.205) (0.266) (0.276) (0.310)
sigma
Constant 0.425∗∗∗ 0.309∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗ 0.373∗∗∗ 0.431∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.043) (0.053) (0.036) (0.055)
Observations 110 110 110 110 110
Pseudo R2 0.1028 0.1022 0.2174 0.1029 0.1400
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Table A.2.6: Gap-Filling by Core Gov. (excluding Germany) at ECB’s 3-Year LTRO
This table reports the estimates of the change in governments’ debt maturity choices following the ECB’s
three-year LTRO announcement, excluding Germany as core government. The dependent variable in all
specifications is the share of debt issues of maturity (range) m of country i in quarter t. The LTRO-period
spans from 2012:q1 to 2012:q3. The first and second row test the changes in the share of short-term (≤
3 years) and long-term (> 3 years) debt issues separately for core and peripheral countries and include
country fixed effects. The third row tests the difference between the changes in the share of short-term (≤
3 years) and long-term (> 3 years) debt issues separately for core and peripheral countries and includes
country-maturity and country-time fixed effects. The fourth row tests the difference between core and
peripheral countries difference between the changes in the share of short-term (≤ 3 years) and long-term
(> 3 years) debt issues and includes country-maturity, country-time, and maturity-time fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the country level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.
Dependent Variable ShareIssuei,short,t ShareIssuei,long,t ShareIssuei,m,t ShareIssuei,m,t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Peripheral × LTRO 0.199∗∗∗ -0.199∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.030)
Core × LTRO -0.150∗∗ 0.150∗∗ -0.150∗∗ -0.114∗∗
(0.046) (0.046) (0.045) (0.046)
Peripheral × Long × LTRO -0.397∗∗∗ -0.473∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.060)
Core × Long × LTRO 0.300∗∗ 0.227∗∗
(0.090) (0.093)
R-squared 0.233 0.233 0.353 0.447
Observations 132 132 264 264
Country FE Yes Yes
Country-Maturity FE Yes Yes
Country-Quarter FE Yes Yes
Maturity-Quarter FE Yes
Chapter 3
Banks’ interconnectedness
through syndicated corporate loan
portfolios – impact on bank-level
systemic risk
3.1 Introduction
The financial crisis of 2007-2009 demonstrated how large risk spillovers among financial
institutions caused a global systemic crisis and worldwide economic downturn. The col-
lapse of the interbank market at the beginning of the crisis suggests that direct linkages
between banks are an important channel of contagion across financial institutions (Allen
and Gale (2000); Allen and Babus (2009), Gorton and Metrick (2012); Giglio (2016)).
A second channel that explains how shocks propagate through financial systems is in-
formation contagion (Chen (1999)). A third important channel is commonality of asset
holdings. As banks have similar exposure to assets such as syndicated loans, a decline in
asset prices can affect the banking system because of direct exposure of banks to the same
assets as well as fire sale externalities (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny (1992, 2011); Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997)). Common exposures of banks are of first order importance as indicated by
Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke in his speech at the Conference on Bank Structure
and Competition in May 2010 in Chicago:1
1 Common exposures have played an important role in various historical crises: The Savings & Loans
crisis in the U.S. in the 1980s was caused by maturity mismatch of the asset and liability side of banks’
balance sheets and a shock to (i.e., increase of) interest rates (Ho and Saunders (1981)). The Asian
financial crisis in the 1990s was associated with exchange rate risks. The recent crises in Ireland and Spain
were associated with a decline in real estate prices. The 2007-2009 financial crisis involved a decline in
real estate prices as well as various forms of contagion magnifying the extent of the crisis (Hellwig (2014),
Hellwig (1995)).
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“We have initiated new efforts to better measure large institutions’ counterparty credit
risk and interconnectedness, sensitivity to market risk, and funding and liquidity expo-
sures. These efforts will help us focus not only on risks to individual firms, but also on
concentrations of risk that may arise through common exposures or sensitivity to common
shocks. For example, we are now collecting additional data in a manner that will allow for
the more timely and consistent measurement of individual bank and systemic exposures to
syndicated corporate loans.”
In this paper, we study interconnectedness in the form of common exposures among
financial institutions examining banks’ exposure to large syndicated loans. The syndicated
loan market provides an ideal laboratory to study interconnectedness of banks. It is the
most important funding source for non-financial firms (Sufi (2007)), and banks repeatedly
participate in syndicated loans arranged by one another. We know borrower and lender
identities and are thus able to track banks’ investments in this market to quantify common
risk exposures.
To measure commonality in banks’ syndicated loan portfolio, we develop a novel mea-
sure of interconnectedness for which the key component is the similarity between two
banks’ syndicated loan portfolios.2 The similarity is measured as the Euclidean distance
between two banks based on their exposures to specific borrower industries or regions
in the prior twelve months. We then aggregate the distance of one bank with all other
banks in each month and construct our bank-level interconnectedness measure using three
different weighting schemes: (1) equal weights for each bank, (2) size weights to account
for the fact that larger banks might contribute more to systemic risk, and (3) relationship
weights to capture prior contractual relationships between banks. Equal weights are used
a benchmark against which we evaluate the effect of size and relationships.
We document a high propensity of bank lenders to concentrate syndicate partners rather
than to diversify them, as lead arrangers are more likely to collaborate with banks with
similar corporate loan portfolios. We then investigate the determinants of interconnect-
edness both cross-sectionally and over time. While bank size explains only between 5%
and 16% of the variation in interconnectedness in the cross-section in univariate tests (de-
pending on the type of exposure and weighting scheme), we document that diversification
explains between 61% and 96% of this variation. Overall, our results suggest that bank
size is not a first order determinant of interconnectedness but highlights the importance of
banks’ diversification motive in understanding interconnectedness in the syndicated loan
market.
Recent theoretical work has shown that interconnectedness can increase systemic risk
through various forms of financial contagion because of common exposures in times of
crises (Allen et al. (2012a); Castiglionesi and Navarro (2010); Ibragimov et al. (2011);
2For example, Abbassi et al. (2017) apply our distance measure to German banks lending portfolios to
explain market-based risk measures.
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Wagner (2010)).3
The first channel relies on direct linkages between banks. Once a bank defaults it can
propagate stress to other creditor banks (Allen and Gale (2000)).4 A second important
channel is information contagion (Chen (1999)). If one bank is in distress, investors
reassess the risk of other institutions that they believe have similar exposures. Short-
term investors may decide not to roll over their investments if solvency risks are high but
engage in precautionary liquidity hoarding (Acharya and Skeie (2011)). A third channel is
commonality of asset holdings. Shocks can propagate through fire sales when banks need
to sell assets to reduce their leverage. (Shleifer and Vishny (1992, 2011)).5
The time-series evolution of our interconnectedness measure is consistent with interpre-
tation of elevated systemic risk through contagion arising from common exposures. We
aggregate the bank-level interconnectedness measure to a market interconnectedness index
in each month and document that the benchmark equally-weighted interconnectedness in-
dex is persistently lower compared to indexes using the size- and relationship-weighting
schemes. This is an important finding. For example, the size-weighted index is larger com-
pared to the equally-weighted one which suggests that banks have greater overlap with
larger banks consistent with the literature on bank moral hazard and herding behavior
(e.g. Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008))and banks exploiting government guarantees (e.g.
Eisert and Eufinger (2017)).
In the final part of the paper, we relate our interconnectedness indexes to different
measures of systemic risk. Similar to approaches used in stress tests that have been
conducted in the U.S. and Europe since 2008, the construction of these measures is to
estimate losses in a systemic stress scenario and determine a bank’s equity shortfall after
accounting for these losses. These measures capture asset price as well as funding liquidity
risks associated with interconnectedness using market data (Acharya et al. (2014)).
We employ three frequently used bank-level systemic risk measures: (1) systemic capital
shortfall (SRISK) (Acharya et al. (2017); Brownlees and Engle (2017)), (2) distressed
insurance premium (DIP) (Huang et al. (2009)), and (3) conditional value-at-risk (CoVaR)
(Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016)).6 All three concepts measure a co-movement of equity
or credit default swap (CDS) prices without the notion of causality, i.e. a bank can
contribute to systemic risk of the financial system because it initiates a contagious event
or because of its exposure to a common factor. Moreover, all measures are constructed to
estimate cross-sectional differences in systemic risk at a point in time.
3 Wagner (2010) shows that diversification increases systemic risk also in the absence of contagion.
While diversification reduces the risk of failure of an individual bank, it also increases the likelihood that
they default jointly. Moreover, banks can diversify not only in different industries and regions, but also in
different sectors (Acharya et al. (2006)) such as sovereign debt or household debt which we cannot do due
to data limitations.
4 Allen et al. (2009), Diebold and Yilmaz (2014), Gorton and Metrick (2012), Duffie (2014) and Giglio
(2016) provide further discussions.
5 Fire-sale amplifications are also discussed in, for example, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Brunnermeier
and Pedersen (2009), Allen et al. (2012a) and Greenwood et al. (2015).
6 Other market-based measures (e.g., based on stock return volatility) are developed in Diebold and
Yilmaz (2014), Diebold and Yilmaz (2015), Billio et al. (2012) and Hautsch et al. (2015).
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We find a positive and significant correlation between our interconnectedness measure
and SRIK, but only during recessions. A one standard deviation increase in interconnect-
edness increases SRISK by almost one-third relative to the average SRISK. Intuitively,
a large shock to the market amplifies the effect of interconnectedness if banks are more
vulnerable during recessions. Similarly, we find that interconnectedness increases DIP, but
also only during recessions. The economic magnitude is comparable, i.e. a one standard
deviation increase in interconnectedness increases DIP by about one-third. Bank size is
an important determinant of both SRISK and DIP.
We also find that interconnectedness is positively related to CoVaR during recessions.
In contrast to the effect of interconnectedness on SRISK, the effect is somewhat smaller.
A possible reason is that CoVaR measures the increase in systemic risk of the market when
an individual bank is in distress. During recessions, when the market is already weak, the
marginal impact of an increase in bank risk is small.
Overall, our bank level tests suggest a positive and significant correlation between our
interconnectedness measure and various systemic risk measures including SRISK, DIP,
and CoVaR.7 Controlling for bank and loan market size as well as various fixed effects we
show that, consistent with the theoretical papers cited above, interconnectedness amplifies
systemic risk during recessions when asset commonality can cause various forms of conta-
gion such as fire-sales.8 Another way of interpreting this result is that interconnectedness
of banks – that builds up during normal times - is a useful tool to forecast cross-sectional
differences in banks’ contribution to systemic risk if a severe crisis occurs. Various tests
suggest that our results are consistent across different systemic risk measures and model
specifications. Consequently, our results highlight that institution-level risk reduction
through diversification ignores the negative externalities of an interconnected financial
system.
While syndicated loan market exposures reflect, on average, only a percentage of banks’
balance sheets, large exposures are of systemic relevance for several reasons. First, the
syndicated loan market is extremely large with an annual issuance volume of more than
$1,000 billion in the U.S.; markets in Europe and Asia are large as well. As has been
documented earlier (e.g., Sufi (2007)), virtually all publicly listed firms use this market to
finance working capital and for other corporate or capital structure related purposes. Sec-
ond, individual loans are quite sizeable, too, with respect to a bank’s asset size and equity
capital.9 Moreover, banks are financed to some extent with short-term debt instruments
and therefore face the risk of bank runs. Additionally, banks’ behavior in the syndicated
7 We also show in an Online Appendix a positive and significant link between our interconnectedness
measure and the market based CATFIN measure developed by Allen et al. (2012b).
8In contrast, Sedunov (2016) proxies a bank’s interconnectedness with aggregate measures of loans and
derivative positions to other financial institutions – without distinguishing between recession and expansion
periods – and finds no effect of interconnectedness on bank-level systemic risk measures.
9 On average, the ratio of syndicated corporate loans originated during a 12-months period as a per-
centage of bank total assets is 9.6%. Other factors need to be considered as well: For example, suppose
that book equity is about 5% or less relative total assets, then syndicated loans on a bank’s balance sheet
is eventually twice a bank’s book equity.
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loan market can be used to estimate their systemic risk preferences (Gong and Wagner
(2016)). Banks want to be correlated with other institutions and interconnectedness in
the syndicated loan market can be used to measure these preferences that extend to other
asset classes of banks’ balance sheets.10
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 3.2, we describe the empirical methodology,
in particular, derive our measures of distance and interconnectedness, and discuss various
systemic risk measures as well as the related literature. Data are described in Section 3.3.
Sections 3.4 and 3.5 discuss our empirical results on interconnectedness in loan syndications
and the implications of such interconnectedness for systemic risk. Finally, we conclude in
Section 3.6 with some policy implications.
3.2 Empirical Methodolgy
In this section, we first develop our interconnectedness measure and then briefly describe
the different systemic risk measures used in our empirical tests. All variables are defined
in Table 3.1.
3.2.1 Measuring Interconnectedness
In this subsection, we describe how we measure distance between two banks based on lend-
ing specializations. We then explain how we construct our interconnectedness measure.
3.2.1.1 Distance between Two Banks
We analyze bank syndicated loan specialization related to U.S. borrower industry and
borrower geographic locations. Specifically, we use the 2-digit borrower’s SIC industry
code and the borrower’s U.S. state in which it has its headquarter to examine in which
area(s) each bank has heavily invested.11 Analyzing specializations along industries and
regions captures two key diversification dimensions of banks’ risk management.12 We
then compute the distance between two banks by quantifying the similarity of their loan
portfolios. The detailed construction of our distance measure is as follows.
10 While new syndicated loan origination declined during the 2007-2008 financial crisis in the US, the
total lending exposure on banks’ balance sheet increased substantially (Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010)).
Borrowers started to draw down credit lines that have been committed by banks during the period of
credit expansion. In fact, a large percentage of loans in the Dealscan sample are credit lines (Berg et al.
(2016)). In other words, the committed amounts of loans that have been originated before the recession
period are a good proxy for the portfolio of banks when they enter the recession. We do not differentiate
between credit lines and term loans when calculating our interconnectedness measure and our proxies thus
captures the drawn credit line exposures.
11We also examine lender specialization at different aggregation levels for borrower industry (SIC indus-
try division, 3-digit SIC industries, 4-digit SIC industries) and borrower geographic location (U.S. region,
3-digit zip code). We obtain very similar results.
12Note that U.S. borrower geographic location and industry are correlated. Certain industries tend
to concentrate in certain areas. For example, WY, WV, LA, OK, and TX have higher concentration in
mining, whereas WI, VT, OH, IN, OR, NC, and CT are more specialized in manufacturing. Consequently,
we expect borrower geographic location to generate results somewhat similar to those based on borrower
industry.
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For each month during the January 1989 to June 2011 period, we compute each lead
arranger’s total loan facility amount it originated during the prior 12 months, using
Dealscan’s loan origination data.13 There were approximately 70-125 active lead arrangers
each month in the U.S. syndicated loan market; as a result, we obtain 27,117 unique lead
arranger-months. We then compute portfolio weights for each lead arranger in each spe-
cialization category (2-digit borrower SIC industry, borrower headquarter U.S. state). Let
wi,j,t be the weight lead arranger i invests in specialization (e.g. industry) j within 12
months prior to month t. Note that for all pairs of i and t, ∑Jj=1wi,j,t = 1, where J is the
number of industries, or geographic locations the lender can be specialized in.
Next, we compute the distance between two banks as the Euclidean distance between
them in this J-dimension space:
Distancei,k,t =
1√
2
×
√√√√ J∑
j=1
(wi,j,t − wk,j,t)2, (3.1)
where Distancei,k,t is the distance between bank i and bank k in month t (i 6= k). The
distance measure is normalized to a scale of 0-1 with 0 reflecting no distance (complete
portfolio matching) and 1 reflecting full distance (i.e. no portfolio overlap). Appendix
A.3.2 provides an example on how distance between two banks is computed as specified in
(3.1). For illustrative purposes, we discuss the computation of our distance measures based
on borrower SIC industry for JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Citigroup. These
three banks were the top three lead arrangers as of January 2007 according to their portfo-
lios of syndicated loans originated during the prior twelve months (i.e. January-December
2006). Citigroup had a different loan portfolio from those held by either JPMorgan Chase
or Bank of America, investing more heavily in the manufacturing, transportation, com-
munications, electric, gas, sanitary, and services industries and less heavily in retail trade,
finance, insurance and real estate. As a result, the distance computed between Citigroup
and either JPMorgan Chase or Bank of America is greater than the distance between
JPMorgan Chase and Bank of America whose portfolios were more similar to each other.
We show the pairwise distance in Appendix A.3.3.
3.2.1.2 Bank-level Interconnectedness
To measure monthly interconnectedness at the bank-level, we first take the weighted av-
erage of the distance between a given lead arranger and all the other lead arrangers in the
syndicated loan market. As a smaller Euclidean distance means higher interconnectedness,
we then linearly transform the weighted average of distance into an interconnectedness
measure for the lead arranger. Our measure is normalized to a scale of 0-100 with 0 being
least interconnected and 100 being most interconnected.14 That is, a higher value indi-
13The loan amount is split equally over all lead arrangers for loans with multiple leads.
14We can also interpret an interconnectedness value of 0 as being not interconnected at all (i.e., having
a loan portfolio completely different from all the other lead arrangers’ portfolios) and 100 as being totally
interconnected (i.e., have a loan portfolio exactly same as all the other lead arrangers’ portfolios).
70 Chapter 3
cates a more interconnected bank. Specifically, the interconnectedness of bank i in month
t, Interconnectednessi,t, equals:
Interconnectednessi,t =
1−∑
k 6=i
xi,k,t ·Distancei,k,t
× 100, (3.2)
whereDistancei,k,t is the distance between bank i and bank k in month t as defined in (3.1),
and xi,k,t is the weight given to bank k in the computation of bank i’s interconnectedness.
We use three kinds of weighting schemes for xi,k,t We assign equal weights to all other
banks (“equal-weighted interconnectedness”). This is our baseline specification to sep-
arate the (incremental) effect of adjusting weights to capture two distinct bank charac-
teristics (size, and lending relationships). Specifically, we construct also a size weight of
loan holdings where larger banks may matter more for systemic risk (“size-weighted in-
terconnectedness”). The weights are computed based on the lagged total assets of bank
k relative to the sum of lagged total assets of all other banks in the syndicated loan
market. Finally, we construct a relationship-weighted measure of interconnectedness to
capture the importance of lending relationships among lead arrangers for the overlap of
bank’s syndicated loan portfolios (“relationship-weighted interconnectedness”). The idea
here is to capture implicit relationships in sharing loan syndication among closely related
(compared to distantly related) banks.15 Specifically, the weight is calculated based on
the number of collaborative relationships between bank i and bank k relative to the total
number of relationships bank i had with all banks in the syndicated loan market during
the prior twelve months.16 Appendix A.3.4 provides an illustrative example on how all
three different weights among banks are computed.
3.2.1.3 Market-aggregate Interconnectedness
We use our individual bank measures to construct monthly Interconnectedness Indexes
aggregating bank-level interconnectedness to the market level using a simple average.
As we have three weighting schemes on the bank level (equal-, size-, and relationship-
weighting), we obtain three monthly Interconnectedness Indexes.
Interconnectedness Indext =
∑
i
1
Nt
× Interconnectednessi,t, (3.3)
where Interconnectednessi,t is the interconnectedness of bank i in month t as defined in
(3.2) and Nt is the number of connected banks as of month t.17
15We also constructed a fourth weighting scheme using the actual U.S. dollar exposures of banks to the
same borrowers (“exposure-weighted interconnectedness”). Our main results of the paper do not change
under this fourth weighting scheme.
16A collaborative relationship is identified if bank k is bank i’s participant lender, co-lead, or lead
arranger.
17Instead of using a simple average, we could also use e.g. bank size to aggregate the bank-level inter-
connectedness to the market level. The results do not change and are not reported for brevity.
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3.2.2 Measuring Systemic Risk
To analyze the link between loan portfolio interconnectedness and systemic risk, we use
three bank-level systemic risk measures proposed in the recent literature: (i) SRISK,
(ii) DIP, and (iii) CoVaR. These measures are briefly described below.
3.2.2.1 SRISK
SRISK is a bank’s U.S.-Dollar capital shortfall if a systemic crisis occurs, which is defined
as a 40% decline in aggregate banking system equity over a 6-month period. This measure
is developed in Acharya et al. (2017) and Brownlees and Engle (2017). SRISK is defined
as
SRISK = E((k(D +MV )−MV ) | Crisis)
= kD − (1− k)(1− LRMES)MV, (3.4)
where D is the book value of debt which is assumed to be unchanged over the crisis
period, LRMES is long-run marginal expected shortfall that measures the co-movement
of a bank’s stock price with the stock market index when the overall market return falls
by 40% over the crisis period.18 LRMES×MV is then the expected loss in market value
of a bank over this 6-month window. k is the prudential capital ratio which is assumed
to be 8% for U.S. banks and 5.5% for European banks to account for differences between
US-GAAP and IFRS measures. SRISK thus combines both the firm’s projected market
value loss due to its sensitivity to market movements and its leverage. Naturally, SRISK
is larger for larger banks. To make sure our results are not driven solely by bank size, we
conduct various tests and carefully control for bank size in our tests.
3.2.2.2 DIP
We use the DIP as our second market-based measure of systemic risk (Huang et al. (2009)
Huang et al. (2012); Black et al. (2013)). The four main components of DIP are: (1) the
risk-neutral probability of default (PD), which is calculated from CDS prices using (2) loss
given default (LGD) estimates, which can vary over time, (3) asset correlations which are
measured using equity return correlations, and (4) the total liabilities of all banks.
Huang et al. (2009) construct a hypothetical portfolio of the total liabilities of all banks
and use Monte-Carlo simulations to estimate the risk neutral probability distribution of
credit losses for that portfolio. DIP is then a hypothetical insurance premium to cover
losses if total losses (L) (aggregated over all banks) exceeds a certain threshold of a banks’
total liabilities (Lmin). DIP can then be expressed as follows:
DIP = EQ(L | L > Lmin)
∂DIP
∂Li
= EQ(Li | L > Lmin) (3.5)
18V-Lab uses the S&P 500 for U.S. banks and the MSCI ACWI World ETF Index for European banks.
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DIP describes a conditional expectation of portfolio losses under extreme conditions.
It is thus similar to an expected shortfall concept, but is not defined using a percentile
distribution but rather by using an absolute loss threshold (Lmin). In that sense, it is also
similar to SRISK.19 Li is then the loss of an individual institution and determines the
marginal contribution of a bank to the systemic risk of the financial sector (∂DIP
∂Li
). While
we consistently refer to this measure as “DIP” throughout the paper, we operationalize it
using the loss of each individual bank in the regressions (i.e., Li).
3.2.2.3 CoVaR
Our third market-based measure of systemic risk is CoVaR (Adrian and Brunnermeier
(2016)). CoVaR is the value at risk (VaR) of the financial system conditional on one
institution being in distress and ∆CoV aR is the marginal contribution of that firm to
systemic risk. The VaR of each institution is measured using quantile regressions and the
authors use a 1% and 5% quantile to measure CoVaR:
Prob(L ≥ CoV aRq | Li ≥ V aRiq) = q, (3.6)
where L is the loss of the financial system, Li is the loss of institution i, and q is the VaR
quantile (for example, 1%). Thus, CoVaR measures spillovers from one institution to the
whole financial system. Importantly, CoVaR does not imply causality, i.e., it does not
imply that a firm in distress causes the systemic stress of the system, but rather suggests
that it could be both, a causal link and/or a common factor (in terms of asset or funding
commonality) that drives a bank’s systemic risk contribution.
CoVaR is not as sensitive to size or leverage as SRISK. Moreover, in contrast to SRISK,
CoVaR includes only the correlation with market return volatility, but not a bank’s return
volatility. Suppose that two banks have the same market return correlation, but bank
A has low volatility while bank B has high volatility. Both banks would have the same
CoVaR even though bank A is essentially of low risk.
3.2.2.4 Comparing the three bank-level systemic risk measures
We use the three different systemic risk measures above, as they capture different aspects
of systemic risk. SRISK captures the consequences for an individual bank resulting from
a 40% equity decline of the entire aggregated banking system. DIP (similar to SRISK)
captures the loss of an individual bank conditional on expectations of the aggregated bank-
ing sector being under extreme conditions. CoVaR analyzes the reverse. It captures the
VaR of the aggregated financial system resulting from an individual institution being in
19The major methodological difference between DIP, SRISK and CoVaR is that DIP is a risk-neutral
measure, while SRISK and CoVaR are statistical measures using physical distributions. From an economic
perspective, DIP is different compared to shortfall measures such as SRISK as the CDS spreads used to
calculate default risk measure the potential losses to debt holders assuming all equity is wiped out. One
can therefore also refer to DIP as a “bailout measure,” which is quite often the focus in policy discussions
of this measure.
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distress.
These differences might also affect the sensitivities of the systemic risk measures to in-
terconnectedness during both expansions and recessions. Interconnectedness might have a
larger impact on SRISK and DIP during recessions. During recessions, banks’ capital lev-
els and therefore loss absorbing capacities are lower. This is exactly when banks are most
vulnerable, so that higher interconnectedness may facilitate spillovers when the system as
a whole is shocked.
The sensitivity of the CoVaR measure is less obvious. In expansions, a large shock of
a single institution may lead to less severe spillovers to the whole financial system, but
might have a large impact to the sensitivity of VaR tail-risks as vulnerabilities of all other
banks rise. In recessions, spillovers should be larger, but given that the whole financial
system was just shocked by a common factor, the marginal impact on changes to the VaR
tail-risks might be lower. The effect of interconnectedness on CoVaR might thus be lower
relative to the other two systemic risk measures.
3.3 Data and Summary Statistics
In this section, we discuss our data sources and provide summary statistics.
3.3.1 Data Sources
We use two primary sources of data to analyze the interconnectedness of banks in loan
syndication and how such interconnectedness affects banks’ systemic risk: (i) syndicated
loan data and (ii) systemic risk data. Thomson Reuters LPC DealScan is the primary
database on syndicated loans with comprehensive coverage, especially for the U.S. market.
We use a sample of 90,578 syndicated loan facilities originated for U.S. firms between
January 1988 and June 2011 to construct our distance and interconnectedness measures.20
These loans present very similar characteristics as documented in the literature, e.g., Sufi
(2007) and Ivashina (2009). We also follow that literature identifying the lead arranger of
the syndicate.
We measure interconnectedness at the lead arranger (bank holding company) level for
different reasons. Lead arrangers establish the relationship with the borrowing firm and
decide on the syndication structure of the loan. In addition, lead arrangers take larger
shares in the syndicated loan due to information asymmetries between the lead arranger
and participants (Sufi (2007)).21
20We have an original sample of 91,715 syndicated loan facilities. However, we restrict ourselves to lead
arrangers that originated at least ten syndicated loans in the sample period to exclude lead arranger that
only randomly enter the syndicated loan market (these are usually very small banks that should matter
less for the interconnectedness of a bank and the banks’ systemic risk). In total, our sample consists of
223 lead arrangers. We receive very similar results, if we do not restrict the number of lead arrangers.
21Lead arrangers (usually one or two per syndicated loan) each hold, on average, a 30 percent share in
the syndicated loan, while participants hold, an average, 8 percent each. Dealscan has limited information
about the loan shares retained by banks at origination. The subsample with loan share information
comprises about 20 percent of the loan observations.
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We use lead banks, as they also actively participate. Lender arrangements in about seven
out of ten syndicated loans are reciprocal in the sense that lead arrangers also participate
in loans that are led by their participant lenders (Cai (2010)). Thus, lead arrangers are a
source of interconnectedness as they syndicate loans for others to be exposed to their loan
portfolio risk, and at the same time, they are exposed to other banks’ loan portfolio risk
as they participate. This is not the case for banks that are only participants (but never
lead arrangers). These participant banks are passively chosen by lead arrangers in loan
syndicates but do not actively increase interconnectedness with other large lenders in the
syndicated loan market.
Importantly, we show in this paper that lead arrangers work together with banks that
have similar portfolios measured by loan portfolio allocation as lead arrangers as well as
those they have previous relationship based on loan market collaboration. In other words,
their allocation as lead arrangers should be close to the portfolio allocation as participants.
Our sample of lead arrangers consists of U.S. institutions as well as large international
institutions that have significant syndicated loan exposure originated in the U.S. market.22
Moreover, 26 of 28 Globally Significant Financial Institutions (G-SIFIs) are included in
our sample.
Using lead bank data can thus be a good approximation for loan participation, in partic-
ular for loan participation arising from (systemically relevant) reciprocal relationships as
lead and participants. As alluded to above, these comprise the major part of syndicated
loan participants.
We obtain the SRISK data from NYU V-Lab’s Systemic Risk database and the DIP and
CoVaR data from the authors who proposed them as systemic risk measures. SRISK data
covers 132 global financial institutions and 16,258 bank-months ranging from January
2000 to December 2011. We are able to match them with 5,733 lead arranger-months
and 58 unique lead arrangers. The DIP data are weekly covering 57 unique European
financial institutions from January 2002 to January 2013. We aggregate weekly data into
monthly measures and obtain 5,235 bank-months with DIP measures. We are able to
construct a matched sample of 19 unique lead arrangers and 1,343 lead arranger-months
with our interconnectedness data. The CoVaR data are quarterly covering 1,194 public
U.S. financial institutions and 62,642 bank-quarters ranging from the first quarter of 1986
to the fourth quarter of 2010. We are able to match them with 1,716 lead arranger-quarters
and 38 unique lead arrangers.23 In our regressions, we use CoVaR data starting in the
first quarter of 2000 to ensure comparability across our three systemic risk measures when
computing the portfolio overlap.
22Non-U.S. financial institutions have large exposures to U.S. borrowers. For example, we document in
Appendix A.3.3, that five European banks are among the top ten lead arrangers in the U.S. syndicated loan
market as of January 2007. Overall, non-U.S. lead arrangers originated 17.4% of the total loan amount in
the U.S. syndicated loan market.
23The appendix contains a lists lead arrangers for which the various systemic risk measures are available.
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3.3.2 Summary Statistics
Table 3.2 reports summary statistics for the distance, interconnectedness, and systemic
risk measures described in Section 3.2 as well as lead arranger (bank) and market charac-
teristics. Distance is summarized for approximately 2,700,000 lead arranger pair-months
and interconnectedness of roughly 26,500 lead arranger-months across the two lender spe-
cialization categories and three interconnectedness weightings. Lender specialization can
be by industry and geographic location, while interconnectedness can be equal-, size-, and
relationship-weighted. By definition, distance must lie within the range of 0 to 1 and
interconnectedness within the range of 0 to 100. The standard deviations of these mea-
sures imply that there is sufficient variation for empirical tests. Further, the distribution
of our distance measures indicate a similar variation of lender specialization differences
across banks for both industry and geographic location. This similarity of variations in
industry and geographic location specializations carries over to the bank-level and mar-
ket aggregate interconnectedness measures. However, our different weighting schemes do
capture distinct differences in the interconnectedness of lead arrangers. The size-, and
relationship-weighted interconnectedness measures are on average much larger than the
baseline equally-weighted measure. Furthermore, lending relationships appear to matter
more for interconnectedness than size. This result holds for both the bank-level and the
market-aggregate interconnectedness measures.
Summary statistics of SRISK, DIP, and CoVaR are reported at the lead arranger level.
Our SRISK data consists of 5,733 matched lead arranger-months from U.S. and interna-
tional institutions heavily invested in the U.S. syndicated loan market, and the average
SRISK is $25.3 billion. Our DIP data consists of 1,343 matched lead arranger-months from
European banks heavily invested in the U.S. syndicated loan market, and the average DIP
is $20.4 billion converted into U.S. dollar-values based on the exchange rate at beginning
of year 2009. Our CoVaR data consists of 1,716 matched lead arranger-quarters from U.S.
institutions, with the 1% CoVaR equal to a decline of $15.8 billion in bank equity value on
average.24 All these measures show greater systemic risk for our sample of lead arrangers
than an “average” financial institution in the SRISK, DIP, and CoVaR data sets.25 The
SRISK measure and DIP measure have correlations close to 0.8 for the sample of lead
arrangers for which the data is available. The correlation between SRISK and CoVaR is
about 0.2.26
24The CoVaR data are all expressed in the form of losses, i.e., negative numbers. In our empirical
analyses, we multiply CoVaR with minus one so that a higher CoVaR implies higher systemic risk.
25For example, the SRISK of an average financial institution is $10.3 billion. An average public U.S.
financial institution in the 1% CoVaR data shows a decline of $0.785 billion, and an average European
financial institution in the DIP data shows a DIP of $10.9 billion.
26In our sample, the DIP and CoVaR measures do not overlap, as our CoVaR sample comprises U.S.
institutions, while our DIP sample includes European banks.
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3.4 Interconnectedness of Banks in Loan Markets
In this section, we first empirically examine how banks become interconnectedness in the
U.S. syndicated loan market. We then explore the determinants of interconnectedness and
analyze the trend of interconnectedness over time.
3.4.1 How Do Banks Become Interconnected?
To understand commonality of banks’ syndicated corporate loan portfolio, we first examine
how banks become interconnected in the syndicated loan market. In order to make our
data and computations manageable, we limit our interest to the top 100 lead arrangers
in each month that hold an aggregated share of at least 99.5% of the total market. We
estimate the following regression:
SyndicateMemberi,k,n,t = α+ β1 ·Distancei,k,t + β2 · LeadRelationshipi,k,t
+β3 ·Borrower Relationshipk,n + β4 ·Market Sharek,t
+LoanFacility′n + ei,k,n,t (3.7)
where the dependent variable SyndicateMemberi,k,n,t is an indicator variable that equals
one if lead arranger i chooses lender k as a member in loan syndicate n that is originated
in month t and zero otherwise. Distancei,k,t measures the distance between lead arranger
i and lender k based on their syndicated loan portfolios during the twelve months prior to
month t. As a proxy for bank-to-bank relationships, LeadRelationshipi,k,t is an indicator
variable for whether lead arranger i had syndicated any loans with lender k prior to
the current loan (no matter what roles the two lenders took). As a measure of bank-
firm relationships, Borrower Relationshipk,n is an indicator variable for whether lender
k arranged or participated in any syndicated loans that were made to the borrower prior
to loan syndicate n. By including LeadRelationshipi,k,t and Borrower Relationshipk,n
in the regression, we control for the effects of prior relationships between the two lenders
and prior relationships between the borrower and lender k on the construction of the
syndicate. Market Sharek,t is the market share of lender k as a lead arranger during the
twelve months prior to month t. We useMarket Sharek,t to proxy for lender k’s reputation
and market size or power. LoanFacilityn is a vector of loan facility fixed effects, which
are included to rule out any facility-specific effects. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity
robust and clustered at the lead arranger level. The resulting sample size is almost 11
million lender pairs.
The results are reported in Table 3.3. In all regressions, our distance measures show
negative coefficients that are significant at the 1% level. That is, the greater the portfolio
similarity between a lender and the lead arranger, the greater the likelihood that the lender
is chosen as a syndicate member. We also find that a lender’s prior relationships with either
the lead arranger or the borrower have significantly positive influence on the likelihood
of being chosen as a syndicate member. The effect is especially strong for prior lender-
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borrower relationships, which is consistent with the findings in Sufi (2007). Moreover,
lender k’s market share increases its likelihood of being included in the syndicate.
Overall, the results suggest that lead arrangers tend to work with banks that have more
similar corporate loan portfolios increasing the degree of bank interconnectedness over
time.
3.4.2 Determinants of Interconnectedness
To understand the determinants of interconnectedness, we examine the effect of three bank
characteristics, (i) total assets, (ii) diversification, and (ii) number of specializations and
loan market size. Total assets is a standard proxy for bank size; the other two variables
indicate the level of diversification and breadth of the bank’s syndicated loan portfolio.
While the variables diversification and number of specializations are related, there is a
subtle difference: diversification considers the individual syndicated loan amounts to de-
termine each specialization’s portfolio weight, whereas the number of specializations only
counts specializations independent from the loan amount.27
We first examine correlation between interconnectedness and each of the three variables.
Then, we estimate the following multiple regression model:
Interconnectednessi,t = α+β1 · Total Assetsi,t + β2 ·Market Sizet
+β3 ·Diversificationi,t + β4 ·Number of Specializationsi,t
+LeadArrangeri + ei,t (3.8)
where the dependent variable Interconnectednessi,t is the level of interconnectedness of
bank i in month t. Total Assetsi,t is bank i’s lagged total assets at the beginning of month
t; Market Sizet is the total issuance volume in the 12 months prior to loan origination
capturing a possible effect of syndicated loan market size on bank interconnectedness. For
example, more lending associated with a larger syndicated loan market might mechanically
increase interconnectedness because banks are no longer are available to avoid each other
in their lending specialization. Diversificationi,t is the diversification measure computed
as in equation (3.9) below:
Diversificationi,t =
1− J∑
j=1
(wi,j,t)2
× 100, (3.9)
where Diversificationi,t measures the diversification level of bank i in month t and, as in
(3.1), wi,j,t is the weight bank i invests in specialization j (e.g. industry) within 12 months
prior to month t.28 Number of Specializationsi,t is the number of specializations the bank
is engaged in as a lead arranger.29 LeadArrangeri is a vector of lead arranger (bank)
27The Pearson correlation between both measures is about 0.7.
28The notion behind the measure is that as a bank becomes more diversified,
∑J
j=1(wi,j,t)
2 becomes
smaller, so that the measure for diversification grows larger.
29Number of Specializationi,t varies by the type of specializations. For the specialization by borrower
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fixed effects. Fahlenbrach et al. (2012) report that bank business models and risk culture
are persistent and they might affect a bank’s decision to become more interconnected.
Standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust and clustered at the lead arranger level.
Table 3.4 reports the results for both specializations by borrower industry and bor-
rower geographic location using our three types of weightings. First, we show in Panel
A significantly positive Pearson correlation coefficients between interconnectedness and
total assets, market size in the syndicated loan market, diversification, and number of
specializations, all at the 1% level, indicating a positive association of these variables with
interconnectedness. The square of the Pearson correlation coefficient helps to assess the
explanatory power of these four variables for interconnectedness. We find that the size
variables, total assets and market size, have Pearson correlations ranging from 0.30 to 0.40
and 0.21 to 0.30, respectively. This corresponds to an explanatory power of these variables
for interconnectedness in an univariate setting of 9% to 16% and 4% to 10%, respectively.
In contrast, diversification and number of specializations have a Pearson correlation in the
range of 0.93 to 0.98 and 0.73 to 0.76, respectively. This corresponds to an explanatory
power of these variables for interconnectedness in an univariate setting of 86% to 96%
and 53% to 58%, respectively. In other words, banks with concentrated loan portfolios
are less interconnected relative to those with diversified portfolios. Overall, diversification
and number of specialization are relatively more important determinants of loan market
interconnectedness than bank size and market size.
We include next all variables in multivariate regressions and report the results in Table
3.4 Panel B. We continue to find positive effects of total assets, market size, diversification,
and number of specializations on interconnectedness.30 While the coefficients on diver-
sification, number of specializations and market size are all significant at the 1% level,
the coefficients on total assets are sometimes less or not significant in the aggregations by
industry specialization. Consistent with the correlation results, diversification is a main
driver of interconnectedness in all regressions.
3.4.3 Time Trends in Interconnectedness
We next investigate time-series properties of our interconnectedness measures across our
three weighting schemes (i.e. equal-, size-, and relationship-weighted) over the January
1989 to June 2011 period in Figures 3.1 to 3.3.31
At the market-aggregate level, size-, and relationship-weighted interconnectedness are
consistently greater than the baseline equal-weighted counterpart throughout our sample,
whereas relationship-weighted interconnectedness is consistently the largest (see Figure
industry, it is the number of 2-digit borrower SIC industries. For the specialization by borrower geographic
location, it is the number of U.S. states.
30The results are robust to regressions specifications without the Lead Fixed Effects, in which we include
dummy variables for commercial bank, and dummies for headquarter locations for Europe, as well as outside
U.S. and Europe to control for heterogeneity across lead arrangers.
31All figures are based on industry aggregation. Figures for regional aggregation are very similar but
remain unreported for brevity.
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3.1). Higher relationship-weighted interconnectedness indicates that banks tend to es-
tablish lending relationships with those banks that have similar asset allocations in their
syndicated loan portfolios. Higher size-weighted interconnectedness compared to equal-
weighted interconnectedness indicates that bank’s asset allocations is on average more
similar to larger banks compared to smaller banks. In addition, we observe a sharp
increase in the difference between the size-weighted interconnectedness and the equal-
weighted interconnectedness from the early 1990s until 2007 and again after the financial
crisis of 2008 and 2009 consistent with the interpretation that banks become too large and
too interconnected to fail during the financial crisis (Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008)).32
During the last two recession periods, in 2001 and 2008-2009, interconnectedness dropped
significantly, but rose again following both periods.33
At the bank-level, we observe that banks who are frequently lead arrangers in the loan
syndicated market (e.g. Bank of America) have consistently higher, and tend to have less
volatile, interconnectedness measures than banks who play a smaller role in this market
(e.g. Morgan Stanley), see Figure 3.2. Given their importance as lead arranger, large
lenders in the syndicated loan market, such as Bank of America, may not be able to spe-
cialize in certain industries or regions but originate loans across all regions and industries.
In contrast, Morgan Stanley, as a medium-size lead arranger in the syndicated loan mar-
ket, has more flexibility to structure its portfolio. This is demonstrated for example by
the sharp drops in Morgan Stanley’s interconnectedness following the last two recession
periods comparted to Bank of America.34
Importantly, the plots generally show a fair amount of stability from year to year with
our interconnectedness measure, particularly in periods of expansion.35 This is important
as the interconnectedness measure should be used by policy makers to assess the build-up
of systemic risk during normal times. Wide time-series variation in interconnectedness
during expansions would make the optimal policy more difficult to implement.
Figure 3.3 plots the equal-weighted and size-weighted interconnectedness measure for
Bank of America (Panel A) and Morgan Stanley (Panel B) as well the difference between
both time-series. Consistent with Figure 3.1, the plots show that size-weighted intercon-
nectedness measure is larger compared with the equal-weighted measure and this difference
32Consistent with this interpretation, cross-sectional analyses show that the fraction of banks with the
highest interconnectedness also increased prior to the financial crisis of 2008 to 2009.
33 Minoiu and Reyes (2013) find the same cyclicality when studying the interconnectedness of entire
banking systems across countries.
34For example, Morgan Stanley reduced the lending in the syndicated loan market during the recent crisis
and adjusted the asset allocation. It focused lending almost entirely to two industries, namely chemical
and allied products as well as electronic and other electronic equipment and components – out of mining,
construction, electric, gas and sanitary services, and engineering, accounting, research and management
services. Its geographical specializations primarily focused on Michigan, and also to California and New
Jersey – and out of New York and Texas.
35We also analyze the time-series correlation of the bank-level interconnectedness measures which sup-
ports the stability of our measure. For example, the time-series correlation among the top three U.S. lead
arrangers (JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Citigroup) averages 0.84, and the time-series correla-
tion among Credit Suisse and UBS is 0.82. In addition, the time-series correlations among U.S. banks and
among European banks tend to be higher than between U.S. banks and European banks.
80 Chapter 3
is even increasing, particularly for important originators such as Bank of America. I.e.
banks that play a larger or smaller role in the market tend to increase their syndicate
portfolio overlap particularly with large banks consistent with the moral hazard theories
mentioned above.
3.5 Interconnectedness and Systemic Risk
In this section, we investigate whether our bank-level interconnectedness measures increase
bank’s systemic risk (SRISK, DIP, and CoVaR) during recessions.
3.5.1 Bank-level Tests - Methodology
Interconnectedness in the syndicated loan market creates the potential for enhanced sys-
temic risk. Banks become more vulnerable to common shocks as exposure to similar assets
and banks can spread throughout the syndicate network to other banks.
To examine this, we match the bank-level systemic risk measures SRISK, CoVaR, and
DIP with the time-series of our bank-level interconnectedness measure. To test their
relationship, we first univariately examine the correlation between systemic risk and in-
terconnectedness. Table 3.5 shows that Pearson correlation coefficients between intercon-
nectedness and all three bank-level systemic risk measures (SRISK, DIP, and CoVaR) are
significantly positive at the 1% level.
In a second step, we add control variables in a multiple regression setting. The general
form of the regression we estimate is as follows:
SystemicRiski,t = α+β1 · (Interconnectednessi,t × Expansiont)
+β2 · (Interconnectednessi,t ×Recessiont) + β3 ·Recessiont
+β4 · Total Assetsi,t+β5 ·Market Sharei,t + β6 ·Market Sizet
+β7 · SystemicRiski,t−1 + LeadArranger′i + ei,t (3.10)
The dependent variable SystemicRiski,t is the systemic risk measure of bank i in month t,
which can be either SRISK, DIP or CoVaR. The key independent variable Interconnectednessi,t
is the level of interconnectedness of bank i in month t. To distinguish between the effect
of interconnectedness on systemic risk during periods of expansions and recessions, we in-
clude two interaction terms in the regression: (Interconnectednessi,t ×Expansiont) and
(Interconnectednessi,t ×Recessiont).
Recessiont (Expansiont) is an indicator variable equal to one if month t falls into re-
cessions (expansion) as measured by NBER recession dates.36 We control for bank size
(Total Assetsi,t), market power in loan syndication (Market Sharei,t) and market size of
the U.S. syndicated loan market (Market Sizet). A one-period lagged systemic risk mea-
36The NBER identifies three recession periods during our sample period: July 1990 – March 1991, March
2001 – November 2001, and December 2007 – June 2009.
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sure (SystemicRiski,t−1) is included on the right hand side of the regression to account for
serial correlation. We further include lead arranger (bank) fixed effects. Standard errors
are heteroscedasticity robust and clustered at the lead arranger level. To analyze whether
interconnectedness has a stronger effect on systemic risk during recessions compared to
expansions, we formally test the following hypothesis,
H0 : β2 − β1 = 0 (3.11)
3.5.2 Interconnectedness and SRISK
Table 3.6 reports the regression results for SRISK based on 57 unique lead arrangers37
with monthly data ranging from January 2000 to June 2011. In all specifications, we
find statistically and economically insignificant coefficients on the interaction term inter-
connectedness and expansion. That is, during periods of economic expansions, intercon-
nectedness neither elevates nor reduces SRISK. However, our empirical findings show that
all coefficients on the interaction term between interconnectedness and NBER recessions
are consistently positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. The effect is also
economically significant: i.e. an increase of one standard deviation in interconnectedness
during recessions leads to a total SRISK increase of $4.4 to $8.9 billion when the past
six to twelve month were in recession, which is approximately a 17% to 35% increase
from the mean SRISK. Formally testing the difference in the interaction terms between
interconnectedness and recession with interconnectedness and recession consistently shows
statistical significance at the 1% level.38 These results show that interconnectedness con-
tributes more positively to SRISK during recessions consistent with an amplifying effect
of interconnectedness on systemic risk during recessions as suggested by Bernanke (2010).
Our finding is also consistent with our prior as to the effect of interconnectedness on
SRISK when banks are vulnerable to recessions (see section 3.2.2.4).
The coefficients on a bank’s total assets are significantly positive indicating that larger
banks are more sensitive to systemic risk.39 The effect of market share as a lead arranger
in the syndicated loan market on SRISK is insignificant. The coefficient on market size is
marginally positive and significant. The one-month lagged SRISK has significantly positive
37Note that the number of lead arrangers slightly reduces from our matched SRISK and interconnected-
ness dataset described above, as the regression specification requires the total assets variable and a lagged
SRISK measure. The same applies to the CoVaR and DIP regressions.
38The results are robust to restricting the sample to positive SRISK, that is, when financial institutions
have a capital shortfall.
39These results are consistent with our earlier results describing the drivers of interconnectedness in
corporate loan markets. While bank size is an important factor, it is not a sufficient condition that
eventually explains cross-sectional variation in interconnectedness and eventually systemic risk. Recent
events provide a supporting narrative. For example, the default of the Portuguese lender Banco Espirito
Santo (a relatively small bank with assets worth EUR 81 billion) caused a global stock market decline in
July 2014. Similarly, the Swiss regulator declared the Raiffeisenbank Schweiz Genossenschaft, a bank with
assets of EUR 28 billion, “systemically important” in August 2014 because its products cannot be easily
replaced and are important for the Swiss economy. In other words, systemic importance of banks extends
beyond size, and it is crucial to monitor other factors such as interconnectedness of banks.
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coefficients consistently around 0.9 showing high persistence of SRISK over time.40
3.5.3 Interconnectedness and DIP
Table 3.7 reports OLS regression results for our systemic risk measure DIP using 19 unique
lead arrangers (European banks) with monthly data ranging from February 2002 to June
2011 using the same regressions specification (3.10) as above.
Similar to results for SRISK, we find that the coefficient of the interaction term of in-
terconnectedness and expansion is not statistically and economically significant. Further,
all coefficients of the interaction term of interconnectedness with NBER recessions are
significantly positive at the 1% level. Testing our H0-hypothesis shows that these two
interaction coefficients are significantly different at the 1% level, that is higher intercon-
nectedness increases DIP during recessions, but not during normal times. This effect is
also an economically significant as an increase of one standard deviation in interconnect-
edness during recessions is related to an increase of $7.3 to $11.1 billion in DIP when the
last six to twelve month were in recession, which represents a 36% to 54% increase from
the average DIP.
Table 3.7 also shows that a great amount of variation in DIP is explained by a bank size.
The effect of market size is statistically significant, but economically small. Consistent with
our SRISK results, market share is usually not statistically significant and DIP displays
high persistence (around 0.75) over time.
3.5.4 Interconnectedness and CoVaR
Table 3.8 reports the multiple regression results for 1% CoVaR based on 36 unique U.S.
lead arrangers with quarterly data ranging from the first quarter of 2000 until the fourth
quarter of 2010. The regressions have the same specifications as above.
Results consistently show small and insignificant coefficients on the interaction term of
interconnectedness and expansion for all specifications. The coefficients on the interac-
tion term of interconnectedness and recession are consistently positive and statistically
significant at the 5% or 10% level.41 Overall, these findings show a magnifying effect of
interconnectedness on CoVaR during recessions.42 The results are also highly significant
in economic terms: an increase of interconnectedness by one standard deviation during re-
cessions results in a total increase of $3.3-4.8 billion in 1% CoVaR when the last six month
were recession periods. Such increases are elevations of about 21%-30% from the average
1% CoVaR measures. The effect of interconnectedness on CoVaR during recessions is
smaller as compared to, e.g. SRISK or DIP. As described above, a possible interpretation
is that the marginal impact of an increase in individual bank risk on the market is smaller
40We also run tests using LRMES, which is a main component of SRISK and more of a measure of tail
risk, as the dependent variable. Our main results and conclusions do not change.
41While the difference between both interaction coefficients are large in magnitude, they are not statis-
tically significant (but almost at the 10% level) as our tests of the H0-hypothesis show.
42The results are robust to analyzing the 5% CoVaR instead of the 1% CoVaR.
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when the economy is already in a recession.
As mentioned in Section 3.2.2, CoVaR is defined such that it is not explicitly sensitive
to size. Consistently, we see insignificant coefficients on a bank’s total assets in the regres-
sion results for CoVaR, which include bank fixed effects. A bank’s market share in the
syndicated loan market has no measurable effect on CoVaR, either. Also the coefficient for
market size is marginal and not statistically significant. Persistence in CoVaR is indicated
by the highly significant and positive coefficients (around 0.5) on the one-quarter lagged
CoVaR.
3.5.5 Exposure versus Origination
Our distance and interconnectedness measures are constructed based on loan origination
during the prior 12 months. An alternative approach to calculate our interconnectedness
measure is to calculate the portfolio overlap between any two banks using originations in
the prior 48 months, which is the average maturity.
However, increasing the time-period over which we construct our interconnectedness
measure might not increase the precision of our estimates. First, we construct the measure
based on the mean/median maturity of syndicated loans but do not have information about
changes in the maturity after origination (e.g. early repayment). Second, we do not have
information related to changes in exposures after origination, for example, due to loan
sales or hedging of exposures that we cannot observe. Moreover, from our analysis of the
organizational structure in syndicated loans we know that financial institutions participate
in syndicated loans with other financial institutions that have similar syndicated loan
portfolios and thus repeatedly collaborate in syndications over time. Thus, we do not
expect that the approximation of the syndicated loan exposures using 48 months differ
substantially from our measure of syndicated loan origination.
As a robustness test, we construct our interconnectedness measure using the prior 48
month. We find that the correlation between this and the original measure using loan
originations over the prior 12 months is more than 80% using both industry and regional
aggregation. We then repeat all regressions for SRISK, DIP and CoVaR using the new
measure. The results are very similar. Thus, loan originations in the prior 12 months is a
good approximation of a bank’s portfolio decision over the prior 48 months.
3.6 Conclusions
Loan syndication increases the overlap of bank loan portfolios and makes them more
vulnerable to contagious effects. While banks seem to diversify by syndicating loans to
other banks, it increases systemic risk of the financial system because banks become more
similar to one another. To measure banks’ interconnectedness in the form of common
exposures, we develop a novel measure of loan market interconnectedness. Interconnect-
edness is driven mainly by bank diversification, less by bank size or overall loan market
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size. Using different market based measures of systemic risk, we find that interconnect-
edness is positively correlated with these systemic risk measures, and that such a positive
correlation mainly arises from an elevated effect of interconnectedness on systemic risk
during recessions.
Our results have several important implications for banks and regulators. First, market
based measures are informative during bad times because they pick up fundamental risks of
banks precisely in a moment when banks are worried about their counterparties’ exposures.
Second, we provide an important link from balance sheet risk to market-based risk mea-
sures, i.e. common exposures to large syndicated loans. This is important for regulators.
Knowing that common exposures to large corporate loans are an important contributor to
systemic risk helps regulators to monitor the build-up of risk in the system. We provide
a first step in the quantification of these exposures on the asset side of the balance sheet.
Regulators with more detailed data can extend our analyses investigating and monitoring
specific industry overlap, common exposures to leveraged loans or, for example, exchange
rate risks that might be hidden in these loans.43
Third, an institution-oriented approach to assessing and limiting systemic risk exposure
is insufficient as the narrative of the recent financial crises suggests. Banks do not inter-
nalize the risks they create for the financial system as a whole. The Bank of International
Settlement (BIS) published an updated methodology to identify “Global Systemically Im-
portant Financial Institutions” (G-SIFIs) in July 2013 (BIS, 2013). The indicators to
identify G-SIFIs comprise five factors: (1) bank size, (2) interconnectedness, (3) substi-
tutability of services, (4) complexity, and (5) cross-border activity, each with an equal
weight. While these factors include interconnectedness, its level is determined by a fixed
20% weight shared between aggregate liability and asset interconnectedness. We propose
an additional commonality measure using large corporate loans as an additional indicator
helping to identify G-SIFIS.
Fourth, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), which was created in the
U.S. following the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform after the 2008-2009 financial crisis,
has the mandate to monitor and address the overall risks to financial stability. It has the
authority to make recommendations as to stricter regulatory standards for the largest and
most interconnected institutions to their primary regulators. We propose using intercon-
nectedness through large corporate loans as part of FSOC’s systemic risk oversight and
monitoring system.
43The Thai financial crisis of 1997-1998 illustrates this. International banks made loans in U.S. dollar to
Thai banks and these, in turn, lent to Thai firms in U.S. dollar to eliminate the exchange rate risks. After
the devaluation of the Baht against the dollar, firms could not repay their U.S. dollar denominated debt
and the Thai banks started to default on foreign lenders. Before the crisis, the exposure to Thai banks was
identified as credit risk and the, at hindsight more important, (correlated) exposure to the Baht remained
hidden.
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3.7 Figures
Figure 3.1: Time Series of Market-Aggregate Interconnectedness, 1989-2011
This figure shows the time series of the monthly market-aggregate Interconnectedness from January 1989
to June 2011. Interconnectedness of a lead arranger is computed based on its distance from all the other
lead arrangers in specializations in the U.S. syndicated loan market. Lender specialization in this figure
is based on 2-digit borrower SIC industry. The market-aggregate Interconnectedness is an equal-weighted
average of all U.S. bank’s bank-level interconnectedness of all the lead arrangers. Three series of market-
aggregate interconnectedness are shown below, and they employ equal-, size-, and relationship-weights at
the lead arranger level, respectively. Grey shaded areas highlight NBER recession periods.
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Figure 3.2: Time Series of Bank-Level Interconnectedness (I), 1989-2011
This figure shows the time series of the monthly bank-level Interconnectedness from January 1989 to June
2011. Interconnectedness of a lead arranger is computed based on its distance from all the other lead
arrangers in specializations in the U.S. syndicated loan market. Lender specialization in this figure is
based on 2-digit borrower SIC industry. Interconnectedness of a lead arranger is based on equal-weighting
of distances to other lead arrangers. We select the time series for Bank of America and Morgan Stanley. The
time series for Morgan Stanley starts in end-1996, when Morgan Stanley became active in the syndicated
loan market. Grey shaded areas highlight NBER recession periods.
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Figure 3.3: Time Series of Bank-Level Interconnectedness (II), 1989-2011
This figure shows the time series of the monthly bank-level Interconnectedness from January 1989 to June
2011. Interconnectedness of a lead arranger is computed based on its distance from all the other lead
arrangers in specializations in the U.S. syndicated loan market. Lender specialization in this figure is
based on 2-digit borrower SIC industry. Interconnectedness of a lead arranger is based on equal- and
size-weighting of distances to other lead arrangers. We select the time series for Bank of America and
Morgan Stanley. The time series for Morgan Stanley starts in end-1996, when Morgan Stanley became
active in the syndicated loan market. The bars on the right hand side highlight the difference between the
size-weighted and the equal-weighted bank-level interconnectedness over time. Grey shaded areas highlight
NBER recession periods.
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3.8 Tables Table 3.1: Variable Definitions
This appendix lists the variables used in the empirical analysis and their definitions.
Variable Definition
Borrower Relationship An indicator variable for whether a potential lender has pre-
vious relationships with the borrower
CoVaR 1% contagion value-at-risk of a U.S. bank measured in billions
of U.S. dollars
DIP Distressed insurance premium of a European bank in billions
of euros
Distance Distance between two banks based on their syndicated loan
portfolios as lead arrangers
Diversification Diversification of a bank based on its syndicated loan portfo-
lio
Expansion An indicator variable for whether a month falls into an expan-
sion period, defined as a month not identified as a recession
by the NBER
Interconnectedness Bank-level interconnectedness
Interconnectedness Index Market-aggregate interconnectedness
Lead Arranger Fixed Effect Lead arranger (bank) fixed effect
Lead Relationship An indicator variable for whether a potential lender has pre-
vious relationships with the lead arranger
Loan Facility Fixed Effect Loan facility fixed effect
Market Share Market share of a bank in the U.S. syndicated loan market
based on the total loan amount the bank originated as a lead
arranger
Market Size The size of the U.S. syndicated loan market measured by the
total newly originated syndicated loan amount in billions of
U.S. dollars
Number of Specializations Number of specializations a bank is engaged in as a lead ar-
ranger
Recession An indicator variable for whether a month falls into recessions
as identified by the NBER
SRISK Systemic capital shortfall of a bank measured in billions of
U.S. dollars
Systemic Risk Any systemic risk measure
Syndicate Member An indicator variable for whether a potential lender is chosen
by the lead arranger to be a loan syndicate member
Total Assets Book value of a bank’s total assets in billions of U.S. dollars
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics of various distance, interconnectedness, and systemic risk measures as
well as lead arranger (bank) and market characteristics. Distance between two lead arrangers is measured
by their Euclidean distance as they are positioned in the Euclidean space based on their specializations in
the U.S. syndicated loan market. Interconnectedness of a lead arranger is computed based on its distance
from all the other lead arrangers in specializations with regard to 2-digit borrower SIC industry and
borrower U.S. state and can be equal-, size-, or relationship-weighted. Market-aggregate interconnectedness
is the equally weighted average of all U.S. bank’s bank-level interconnectedness for each month. Systemic
risk of a lead arranger is measured by SRISK, DIP, and CoVaR. We show below summary statistics of the
distance measures of 2,690,674 to 2,692,389 lead arranger pair-months, the bank-level interconnectedness
measures of 26,277 to 26,741 lead arranger-months, the market-aggregate interconnectedness measure of
270 month, the SRISK measures of 5,733 lead arranger-months, the DIP measure of 1,343 lead arranger-
months, and the CoVaR measures of 1,716 lead arranger-quarters. Lead arranger (bank) characteristics
are reported of 27,117 lead arranger-months, and market characteristics are reported of 27 months.
Definition N= Mean SD 10th 50th 90th
Distance Measures:
Distance in 2-digit Borrower SIC 2,692,389 0.630 0.222 0.320 0.664 0.898
Distance in Borrower State 2,690,674 0.634 0.229 0.313 0.672 0.917
Bank-Level Interconnectedness Measures:
Equal-weighted Interconnectedness:
Based on 2-digit Borrower SIC 26,741 36.1 14.0 16.1 37.8 54.0
Based on Borrower State 26,532 35.8 14.2 15.7 37.4 53.6
Size-weighted Interconnectedness:
Based on 2-digit Borrower SIC 26,741 42.9 16.2 20.6 44.1 64.2
Based on Borrower State 26,532 43.5 16.7 20.3 44.9 65.0
Relationship-weighted Interconnectedness:
Based on 2-digit Borrower SIC 26,483 46.7 17.2 23.0 48.0 69.1
Based on Borrower State 26,277 46.4 17.1 22.5 47.5 68.2
Market-Aggregate Interconnectedness Measures:
Equal-weighted Interconnectedness:
Based on 2-digit Borrower SIC 270 35.7 4.0 29.1 36.8 39.8
Based on Borrower State 270 35.3 4.7 28.3 35.8 41.1
Size-weighted Interconnectedness:
Based on 2-digit Borrower SIC 270 42.4 5.8 32.2 44.1 48.7
Based on Borrower State 270 43.0 6.4 32.8 43.9 50.8
Relationship-weighted Interconnectedness:
Based on 2-digit Borrower SIC 270 46.2 5.4 36.9 47.7 52.2
Based on Borrower State 270 45.9 5.6 36.8 46.4 52.8
Systemic Risk Measures:
Systemic Capital Shortfall (SRISK) ($bn) 5,733 25.33 47.08 -7.29 5.96 88.72
DIP (EURbn) 1,343 14.70 18.51 0.51 6.54 42.15
1% CoVaR ($bn) 1,073 -18.23 34.32 -60.79 -2.75 -0.38
CATFIN (%) 252 28.25 12.93 14.72 25.46 44.70
Lead Arranger Characteristics:
Total Assets ($bn) 17,341 310.48 475.56 10.02 118.02 844.97
Market Share as Lead Arranger (%) 27,117 1.00 3.24 0.00 0.08 1.80
# of Loans Arranged during 12 Months 27,117 47 129 1 8 107
$ of Loans Arranged during 12 Months ($bn) 27,117 9.08 35.90 0.04 0.55 15.72
Market Characteristics:
Market Size ($bn) 270 912.82 504.64 234.91 956.13 1,657.64
Herfindahl 270 11.56 2.58 8.60 11.10 15.37
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Table 3.3: Effect of Distance on Likelihood of Being Chosen As A Syndicate Member
This table reports coefficient estimates from regressions relating the likelihood of a potential lender (that
was among the top 100 lead arrangers in the previous twelve months) being chosen as a syndicate member
by the lead arranger to the distance between the potential lender and the lead arranger. The dependent
variable is an indicator variable for whether the potential lender is indeed a syndicate member. The
independent variable of interest is the distance between the potential lender and the lead arranger based
on their portfolios of syndicated loans originated during the previous twelve months. We use distance as an
independent variable based on lender specializations in borrower industry (2-digit borrower SIC industry)
and borrower region (U.S. state), respectively. Control variables include an indicator variable for whether
the potential lender has previous relationship with the lead arranger, an indicator variable for whether the
potential lender has previous relationship with the borrower, and the market share of the potential lender
as a lead arranger in the U.S. syndicated loan market during the previous twelve months. All regressions
include loan facility fixed effects. Robust standard errors allowing for clustering by lead arranger are in
parentheses. * indicates that the estimated coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10% level,
** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
Syndicate Member Indicator
Industry
Aggregation
Regional
Aggregation
Distance from Lead Arranger -0.059∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗
(0.0049) (0.0040)
Previous Relationship with Lead 0.020∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
(0.0020) (0.0018)
Previous Relationship with Borrower 0.533∗∗∗ 0.534∗∗∗
(0.0105) (0.0105)
Market Share as a Lead 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0006)
Loan Facility Fixed Effects Yes Yes
N = 10,887,311 10,887,313
Adjusted R2 0.3231 0.3227
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Table 3.4: Determinants of Interconnectedness
This table examines a number of bank characteristics as potential determinants of interconnectedness.
Interconnectedness of a lead arranger is computed based on its distance from all the other lead arrangers
in specializations with regard to 2-digit borrower SIC industry and borrower U.S. state and can be equal-,
size-, or relationship-weighted. Bank characteristics include total assets (in billions of U.S. dollars), market
size measured as syndicated loan originated during the previous twelve months in the U.S. syndicated loan
market (in billion U.S. dollar), diversification, and the number of specializations the bank is engaged in.
Panel A shows Pearson correlation coefficients between interconnectedness and bank characteristics, and
Panel B reports results from multivariate regressions with lead arranger fixed effects. Robust standard
errors allowing for clustering by lead arranger are in parentheses. * indicates that the estimated coefficient
is significantly different from zero at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
(a) Pearson Correlation
Industry Aggregation Regional Aggregation
Pearson
Correlation N=
equal-
weighted
size-
weighted
relationship-
weighted
equal-
weighted
size-
weighted
relationship-
weighted
Total
Assets
17,341 0.3014∗∗∗ 0.3402∗∗∗ 0.3263∗∗∗ 0.3782∗∗∗ 0.4001∗∗∗ 0.3871∗∗∗
Market
Size
26,532 0.2148∗∗∗ 0.2889∗∗∗ 0.2488∗∗∗ 0.2614∗∗∗ 0.3083∗∗∗ 0.2592∗∗∗
Diversification 26,532 0.9772∗∗∗ 0.9547∗∗∗ 0.945∗∗∗ 0.9642∗∗∗ 0.9415∗∗∗ 0.932∗∗∗
# of Spe-
cializations
26,532 0.729∗∗∗ 0.7345∗∗∗ 0.7361∗∗∗ 0.7599∗∗∗ 0.7591∗∗∗ 0.7602∗∗∗
(b) Multivariate Regressions
Industry Aggregation Regional Aggregation
Bank-level
Interconnectedness
equal-
weighted
size-
weighted
relationship-
weighted
equal-
weighted
size-
weighted
relationship-
weighted
Total Assets -0.000 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Market Size 0.002∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Diversification 0.362∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗ 0.412∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗∗ 0.382∗∗∗ 0.392∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006)
# of
Specializations
0.141∗∗∗
(0.011)
0.236∗∗∗
(0.013)
0.288∗∗∗
(0.017)
0.215∗∗∗
(0.020)
0.346∗∗∗
(0.028)
0.376∗∗∗
(0.029)
Lead Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N = 17,341 17,341 17,248 17,341 17,341 17,248
Adjusted R2 0.9723 0.9508 0.9524 0.9557 0.9293 0.9352
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Table 3.5: Correlation between Systemic Risk and Interconnectedness
This table reports Pearson correlation coefficient estimates between a financial institution’s systemic risk
and its interconnectedness in the U.S. syndicated loan market as well as the U.S. financial sector’s systemic
risk and U.S. bank’s market-aggregate interconnectedness in the U.S. syndicated loan market. Bank-level
systemic risk is measured by systemic capital shortfall (SRISK) in billions of U.S. dollars, the monthly
distress insurance premium (DIP) in billions of euros, and the opposite of 1% CoVaR in billions of U.S.
dollars. Interconnectedness of a lead arranger is computed based on its distance from all the other lead
arrangers in specializations with regard to 2-digit borrower SIC industry and borrower U.S. state and can
be equal-, size-, or relationship-weighted. * indicates that the estimated coefficient is significantly different
from zero at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
Industry Aggregation Regional Aggregation
Pearson
Correlation N=
equal-
weighted
size-
weighted
relationship-
weighted
equal-
weighted
size-
weighted
relationship-
weighted
SRISK 5,733 0.1391*** 0.1427*** 0.1396*** 0.2177*** 0.2109*** 0.2190***
DIP 1,343 0.2359*** 0.2470*** 0.2502*** 0.2406*** 0.2245*** 0.2496***
-1% CoVaR 1,073 0.4178*** 0.4246*** 0.4252*** 0.4502*** 0.4607*** 0.4594***
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Table 3.6: Interconnectedness and SRISK
This table reports coefficient estimates from regressions relating a financial institution’s SRISK to its
interconnectedness in the U.S. syndicated loan market. The dependent variable is systemic capital shortfall
(SRISK) in billions of U.S. dollars. The independent variable of interest is the interconnectedness of a lead
arranger, which is computed based on its distance from all the other lead arrangers in specializations with
regard to 2-digit borrower SIC industry and borrower U.S. state and can be equal-, size-, or relationship-
weighted. Recession is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a month falls into the recession periods identified
by NBER. Expansion is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a month falls not into the recession periods
identified by NBER. Interconnectedness x Expansion is the interaction term of Interconnectedness and
Expansion. Interconnectedness x Recession is the interaction term of Interconnectedness and Recession.
Control variables include the financial institution’s total assets, market share as a lead arranger in the
U.S. syndicated loan market during the previous twelve months, market size measured as syndicated
loan originated during the previous twelve months in the U.S. syndicated loan market (in billion U.S.
dollar), and one-month lagged SRISK. All regressions include lead arranger fixed effects. Robust standard
errors allowing for clustering by lead arranger are in parentheses. The bottom part of the table shows
the hypothesis test (H0: Interconnectedness x Recession – Interconnectedness x Expansion = 0 ) and the
hypothesis test’s p-value. * indicates that the estimated coefficient is significantly different from zero at
the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
Industry Aggregation Regional Aggregation
SRISK
equal-
weighted
size-
weighted
relationship-
weighted
equal-
weighted
size-
weighted
relationship-
weighted
Interconnectedness
x Expansion -0.006 -0.006 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.004
(0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012)
Interconnectedness
x Recession 0.061∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.018) (0.017)
Recession -1.287 -1.455∗ -1.260 -2.146∗∗∗ -2.343∗∗∗ -2.149∗∗∗
(0.784) (0.822) (0.840) (0.752) (0.812) (0.769)
Total Assets 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Market Share -0.022 -0.022 -0.026 -0.026 -0.024 -0.030
(0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.115) (0.115) (0.117)
Market Size 0.001∗ 0.001∗ 0.001∗ 0.001∗ 0.001∗ 0.001∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lagged SRISK 0.901∗∗∗ 0.901∗∗∗ 0.901∗∗∗ 0.898∗∗∗ 0.899∗∗∗ 0.898∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Lead Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N = 5,390 5,390 5,390 5,381 5,381 5,381
Adjusted R2 0.9581 0.9581 0.9581 0.9591 0.9591 0.9591
H0 0.067∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗
p-value 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Table 3.7: Interconnectedness and DIP
This table reports coefficient estimates from regressions relating a European financial institution’s DIP to
its interconnectedness in the U.S. syndicated loan market. The dependent variable is the monthly distress
insurance premium (DIP) in billions of euros. The independent variable of interest is the interconnect-
edness of a lead arranger, which is computed based on its distance from all the other lead arrangers in
specializations with regard to 2-digit borrower SIC industry and borrower U.S. state and can be equal-,
size-, or relationship-weighted. Recession is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a month falls into the reces-
sion periods identified by NBER. Expansion is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a month falls not into the
recession periods identified by NBER. Interconnectedness x Expansion is the interaction term of Intercon-
nectedness and Expansion. Interconnectedness x Recession is the interaction term of Interconnectedness
and Recession. Control variables include the financial institution’s total assets, market share as a lead
arranger in the U.S. syndicated loan market during the previous twelve months, market size measured
as syndicated loan originated during the previous twelve months in the U.S. syndicated loan market (in
billion U.S. dollar), and one-month lagged DIP. All regressions include lead arranger fixed effects. Robust
standard errors allowing for clustering by lead arranger are in parentheses. The bottom part of the table
shows the hypothesis test (H0: Interconnectedness x Recession – Interconnectedness x Expansion = 0 ) and
the hypothesis test’s p-value. * indicates that the estimated coefficient is significantly different from zero
at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
Industry Aggregation Regional Aggregation
DIP
equal-
weighted
size-
weighted
relationship-
weighted
equal-
weighted
size-
weighted
relationship-
weighted
Interconnectedness
x Expansion 0.002 0.023 0.012 -0.001 0.014 0.005
(0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017)
Interconnectedness
x Recession 0.130∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.036) (0.030) (0.033) (0.031) (0.026)
Recession -2.725∗∗ -2.629∗∗ -2.378∗∗ -2.778∗∗ -2.724∗∗ -2.303∗∗
(1.083) (1.157) (1.047) (1.069) (1.159) (1.012)
Total Assets 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Market Share 1.302 1.325∗ 1.282 1.155 1.125 1.139
(0.751) (0.755) (0.750) (0.732) (0.738) (0.728)
Market Size -0.001∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.001∗∗ -0.001∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lagged DIP 0.744∗∗∗ 0.743∗∗∗ 0.745∗∗∗ 0.747∗∗∗ 0.748∗∗∗ 0.748∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Lead Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N = 1,325 1,325 1,325 1,316 1,316 1,316
Adjusted R2 0.8291 0.8292 0.8289 0.8288 0.8288 0.8286
H0 0.128∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗
p-value 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.005
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Table 3.8: Interconnectedness and CoVaR
This table reports coefficient estimates from regressions relating a U.S. financial institution’s CoVaR to
its interconnectedness in the U.S. syndicated loan market. The dependent variable is the opposite of 1%
CoVaR in billions of U.S. dollars. The independent variable of interest is the interconnectedness of a lead
arranger, which is computed based on its distance from all the other lead arrangers in specializations with
regard to 2-digit borrower SIC industry and borrower U.S. state and can be equal-, size-, or relationship-
weighted. Recession is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a month falls into the recession periods identified
by NBER. Expansion is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a month falls not into the recession periods
identified by NBER. Interconnectedness x Expansion is the interaction term of Interconnectedness and
Expansion. Interconnectedness x Recession is the interaction term of Interconnectedness and Recession.
Control variables include the financial institution’s total assets, market share as a lead arranger in the
U.S. syndicated loan market during the previous twelve months, market size measured as syndicated
loan originated during the previous twelve months in the U.S. syndicated loan market (in billion U.S.
dollar), and one-quarter lagged CoVaR. All regressions include lead arranger fixed effects. Robust standard
errors allowing for clustering by lead arranger are in parentheses. The bottom part of the table shows
the hypothesis test (H0: Interconnectedness x Recession – Interconnectedness x Expansion = 0 ) and the
hypothesis test’s p-value. * indicates that the estimated coefficient is significantly different from zero at
the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
Industry Aggregation Regional Aggregation
-1% CoVaR
equal-
weighted
size-
weighted
relationship-
weighted
equal-
weighted
size-
weighted
relationship-
weighted
Interconnectedness
x Expansion 0.008 0.001 0.012 0.022 0.020 0.021
(0.027) (0.021) (0.020) (0.026) (0.023) (0.024)
Interconnectedness
x Recession 0.123∗ 0.098∗ 0.099∗ 0.152∗ 0.141∗∗ 0.125∗
(0.067) (0.057) (0.057) (0.081) (0.069) (0.064)
Recession -2.810 -2.923 -2.877 -3.320 -4.052 -3.556
(2.209) (2.303) (2.289) (2.437) (2.741) (2.601)
Total Assets -0.010 -0.010 -0.010∗ -0.010∗ -0.010∗ -0.010∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Market Share -0.496 -0.494 -0.506 -0.505 -0.498 -0.513
(0.701) (0.701) (0.703) (0.704) (0.701) (0.703)
Market Size 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Lagged CoVaR 0.519∗∗∗ 0.519∗∗∗ 0.519∗∗∗ 0.516∗∗∗ 0.514∗∗∗ 0.516∗∗∗
(0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082)
Lead Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N = 1,035 1,035 1,035 1,029 1,029 1,029
Adjusted R2 0.3177 0.3176 0.3175 0.3191 0.3195 0.3188
H0 0.114 0.097 0.088 0.130 0.122 0.105
p-value 0.148 0.151 0.152 0.134 0.114 0.135
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3.9 Appendix
Appendix A.3.1: The U.S. Syndicated Loan Market, 1988-2011
This appendix shows the size of the U.S. syndicated loan market by year from 1988 to 2011. Market size is
measured by the total newly originated syndicated loan amount during the year in billions of U.S. dollars.
Note that data for the year of 2011 is linearly projected based on the originated amount through June of
that year.
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Appendix A.3.2: Examples of Computing Distance between Lead Arrangers
This appendix shows how distance is computed by examples. Distance between two lead arrangers is
measured by their Euclidean distance as they are positioned in the Euclidean space based on their special-
izations in the U.S. syndicated loan market. Lender specialization in this appendix is based on borrower
SIC industry division. We show below the computation of such distance among JPMorgan Chase (JPM),
Bank of America (BAC), and Citigroup (C), which were the top three lead arrangers as of January 2007
based on their portfolios of syndicated loans originated during the previous twelve months. Note that
distance is the key component for computing interconnectedness – the smaller the distance between two
lead arrangers, the more interconnected they are.
SIC Industry Division
(2-digit SIC Industries) JPM (1st) BAC (2nd) C (3rd) (JPM − BAC)2 (JPM − C)2 (BAC − C)2
Agriculture, Forestry &
Fishing (01-09) 0.03% 0.17% 0.00% 0.00000198 0.00000008 0.00000287
Mining (10-14) 5.10% 3.75% 4.77% 0.00018203 0.00001054 0.00010498
Construction (15-17) 2.34% 6.35% 0.31% 0.00160872 0.00041275 0.00365121
Manufacturing (20-39) 28.69% 23.35% 35.30% 0.00284811 0.00437535 0.01428362
Transportation,
Communications,
Electric, Gas & Sanitary 12.30% 12.02% 20.12% 0.00000753 0.00612126 0.00655812
Services (40-49)
Wholesale Trade (50-51) 2.46% 3.82% 0.90% 0.00018570 0.00024177 0.00085125
Retail Trade (52-59) 6.81% 7.36% 2.83% 0.00003013 0.00159001 0.00205790
Finance, Insurance &
Real Estate (60-67) 29.18% 30.71% 18.48% 0.00023371 0.01145803 0.01496453
Services (70-89) 13.09% 12.44% 17.18% 0.00004280 0.00166749 0.00224458
Public Administration
(91-97) 0.00% 0.02% 0.11% 0.00000005 0.00000120 0.00000076
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 0.00514075 0.02587848 0.04471983
Distance: 0.07169905 0.16086790 0.21147063
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Appendix A.3.3: Distance among Top Ten Lead Arrangers
This appendix shows distance between any two top ten lead arrangers as of January 2007 based on their
portfolios of syndicated loans originated during the previous twelve months. Distance between two lead
arrangers is measured by their Euclidean distance as they are positioned in the Euclidean space based on
their specializations in the U.S. syndicated loan market. Lender specialization in this appendix is based
on borrower SIC industry division. The top ten lead arrangers as of January 2007 were: JPMorgan Chase
(JPM), Bank of America (BAC), Citigroup (C), Wachovia Bank (WB), Credit Suisse (CSGN), Deutsche
Bank (DB), Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), Goldman Sachs (GS), Barclays (BARC), and UBS (UBSN).
Note that distance is the key component for computing interconnectedness – the smaller the distance
between two lead arrangers, the more interconnected they are.
JPM BAC C WB CSGN DB RBS GS BARC UBSN
JPM -
BAC 0.07 -
C 0.16 0.21 -
WB 0.23 0.21 0.24 -
CSGN 0.34 0.35 0.28 0.32 -
DB 0.17 0.19 0.14 0.17 0.28 -
RBS 0.30 0.34 0.19 0.29 0.30 0.20 -
GS 0.25 0.28 0.13 0.19 0.26 0.16 0.18 -
BARC 0.44 0.45 0.35 0.28 0.43 0.36 0.38 0.24 -
UBSN 0.41 0.42 0.39 0.41 0.17 0.41 0.43 0.37 0.52 -
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Appendix A.3.4: Example of Computing Weights among Lead Arrangers
This appendix shows how weights among lead arrangers in our bank-level interconnectedness measure
are computed by an illustrative example. We use three kinds of weighting schemes: First, we assign
equal weights to all other lead arrangers (“equal-weighted interconnectedness”). Second, we weight by size
using a ratio of lagged total assets of lead arranger k over the sum of lagged total assets by all other lead
arrangers (“size-weighted interconnectedness”). Third, we weight by contractual relationships based on the
number of collaborative relationships of lead arranger i and lead arranger k relative to the total number of
relationships of lead arranger i with all other lead arrangers (“relationship-weighted interconnectedness”).
We show below an illustrative example comprising of three lead arrangers and two syndicated loans. Lead
arranger 1 and 2 are leads in loan 1, which has a loan amount of $100mio. Lead arranger 1 and 3 are
leads in loan 2, which has a loan amount of $200mio. In addition, lead arranger 2 is participant in loan 2.
Lagged total assets for each lead arranger are in parenthesis.
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The computations of lead arranger 1’s weights (xଵ,ଶ,୲ and xଵ,ଷ,୲) in the computation of bank-level interconnectedness 
according to formula 2 (also shown below) are as follows: 
Interconnectedness୧,୲ ൌ ൫1 െ ∑ x୧,୩,୲ ∙ Distance୧,୩,୲୩ஷ୧ ൯ ൈ 100        (2) 
    xଵ,ଶ,୲     xଵ,ଷ,୲ 
Equal-weighted:   ½ (= 1/N, with N=2 )    ½ (= 1/N, with N=2 )  
Size-weighted:    ¼  (= $250bn/($250bn+$750bn))   ¾ (= $750bn/($250bn+$750bn)) 
Relationship-weighted:   2/3 (=2/(2+1))    1/3 (=1/(2+1)) 
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How do banks become
interconnected? Evolution of
syndicated loan structures and
effects on loan pricing
4.1 Introduction
Over the last two decades, banks have become increasingly interconnected partly because
of corporations’ growing funding needs, both in size and complexity. The banking indus-
try, however, is competitive by nature. As a result, banks face a fundamental question:
Whom should they collaborate with while competing with the rest? If banks differentiate
competitors by how similar they are in terms of lending expertise, i.e. our distance mea-
sure, the question translates into the following: Should banks collaborate with close or
distant competitors? Our paper seeks to investigate this question by relating banks’ lend-
ing expertise to the organizational form of loan syndicates and analyzes the implications
for price collusion. More precisely, we study how banks form loan syndicates and analyze
their implications on price collusion by addressing the following questions:1 How do banks
structure loan syndicates?2 Whom do they choose as syndicate partners, and how are loan
shares allocated? How does the organizational form of loan syndicates affect loan pricing,
in particular price collusion? And, how does market concentration affect price collusion?
We focus on the effects of similarity in lending expertise among banks on syndicate for-
mation, and loan pricing. Cai et al. (2018) provide a comprehensive look at the similarity
1Loan syndicates are ideal for the purpose of our paper. A syndicate consists of: (i) one or multiple lead
arrangers that are delegated to screen/monitor the borrower and administer the loan/syndicate, and (ii)
participant lenders whose main role is often just funding part of the loan. Lead arrangers choose whom to
invite to join the syndicated loan and may delegate certain tasks to the senior members of the syndicate,
e.g., co-leads, and co-agents. Thus, loan syndicates provide rich content about the interrelationships among
lenders.
2We use “banks” to broadly refer to all types of financial institutions that are involved in the syndicated
loan market, including commercial banks, investment banks, institutional investors, etc.
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of two banks’ loan portfolios by their distance measure between two banks. We extend
their distance measure to the syndicated loan level (our novel lender distance measure) to
capture the similarity in lending expertise of all lenders within a syndicate. We refer to
syndicates with high similarity in lending expertise among lenders as "close" syndicates,
and call syndicates "distant", if syndicate lenders’ similarity in their lending expertise is
low. Our lender distance measure therefore properly assesses the similarity, or closeness
in lending expertise of lenders within a syndicated loan.
We hypothesize that lenders with higher similarity in lending expertise have lower pro-
duction costs to produce borrower-specific information (Boot (2000)). Borrowers might
benefit from improved screening and monitoring abilities of closer syndicates, if lead ar-
rangers pass on some of these savings to the borrower. These cost savings might be
particularly pronounced for loans with higher information asymmetries between the bor-
rower and the lenders. We conjecture, that closer syndicates might reduce loan pricing for
borrowers.
An alternative hypothesis is that improved information gathering by syndicates with
higher similarity in lending expertise might enable lenders to “hold-up” borrowers due to
higher information asymmetries between the borrower and outside lenders (Sharpe (1990),
Rajan (1992)). Besides lower production costs resulting from higher similarity in their
lending expertise, lenders often already possess borrower-specific and reusable information
(Chan et al. (1986)). Also, these lenders with similar lending expertise might include
alternative lead arrangers from the perspective of the borrower, potentially strengthening
the “lock-in” effect. Consequently, we hypothesize that closer syndicates might collude on
loan pricing to extract rents from the borrower.
We further hypothesize, that price collusion might be more pronounced during periods of
low market concentration. As theoretically shown by Hatfield et al. (2017), in markets with
syndication there exists a certain level of market concentration below which the scope for
price collusion increases with reductions in market concentration. This mechanism results
from an in-period punishment of lead arrangers, in that “price collusion can be sustained
by a strategy in which firms [lead arrangers] refuse to join the syndicate of any firm [lender]
that deviates from the collusive price.” In the syndicated loan market, lead arrangers use
confidential blacklists to exclude certain banks from syndicates.3 We first investigate this
hypothesis on a stand alone basis. Then, based on our "hold-up" hypothesis of close
syndicates, we conjecture that price collusion during low market concentration might be
particularly pronounced for close syndicates.
To investigate how lender distance affects the organizational form of loan syndicates
and loan pricing, we empirically analyze the U.S. syndicated loan market, using Thomson
Reuters LPC DealScan’s loan origination data. We utilize a distance measure between
pairs of banks to compute our distance measure on the similarity in lending expertise of
lenders within a syndicated loan. We then compute measures of syndicate formation and
3According to anecdotal evidence, these blacklists are wide-spread in the U.S. syndicated loan market
and regularly used by lead arrangers to punish lenders.
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market concentration in the U.S. syndicated loan market.
First, we examine how lead banks structure syndicates. If lead arrangers structure a
syndicate based on how similar lenders’ lending expertise in the syndicate should be, the
question translates into how lender distance affects the syndicate structure. We find that
close syndicates are associated with smaller and more concentrated syndicates. That is,
close syndicates consist of fewer lead arrangers, co-agents, and participants and have higher
syndicate concentration (as measured by the Herfindahl index) compared to syndicates
with higher lender distance. As discussed above, these closer syndicates might reinforce
lenders ability for both improved screening and price collusion.
Second, we analyze how lead arrangers distribute the loan among syndicate lenders.
That is, whom lead arrangers choose as members of the syndicate, and how lead arrangers
allocate loan shares among the members. While choosing lenders with higher similarity
in lending expertise into the syndicate might result in benefits from improved screening
or price collusion, it might also increase competition for future syndicated loans from the
borrower. Consistent with these trade-offs, we find that lead arrangers are more likely
to choose either very close or very distant lenders for more senior roles (co-leads, co-
agents) of the syndicate. In contrast, lead arrangers choice of participants becomes more
likely with closer distance in lender expertise. Also, except for very distant syndicates,
lead arrangers allocate higher loan shares to syndicate members across all loan roles once
distance in lender expertise reduces. Consistent with lead arrangers reduced need to signal
credit quality, or mitigate moral hazard, we find that lead arrangers do not retain higher
loan shares in syndicates with high information asymmetries of the borrower once the
syndicate distance is close. Consequently, similarity in lending expertise is an important
factor determining the formation of loan syndication structures.
Third, we investigate how lenders similarity in lending expertise affects loan pricing. As
discussed above, there exist potentially two opposing effects on loan pricing from syndicates
with higher similarity in lenders’ lending expertise. On the one hand, borrowers might
benefit from lenders’ improved screening and monitoring, as lead arrangers can pass on
some of the cost savings to borrowers. On the other hand, hold-up of the borrower might
lead to collusive loan pricing. Analyzing the net effect of these two opposing forces, we
find that closer lender distance resulted in cheaper loan pricing until 2009 (consistent with
improved screening), and more expensive loan pricing since 2010 (consistent with price
collusion). Disentangling those opposite effects, we find strong evidence consistent with
improved screening in close syndicates over the entire sample period, while price collusion
only occurred since 2010.
Fourth and finally, we investigate the effect of market concentration on loan pricing.
As discussed above, lower market concentration might enable lenders to collude on loan
pricing. We first test the stand-alone effect of market concentration on loan pricing, and
then interact our lender distance measure with different levels of market concentration to
investigate their joint effect. We find that a reduction of market concentration below a
certain level results in higher loan pricing. Further, when interacting market concentra-
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tion with lender distance, we find that during periods of low market concentration price
collusion only occurs for close syndicates.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.1.1 provides a brief literature review and
summarizes the contribution of our paper. In Section 4.2, we describe the institutional
setup, and theoretical framework. In addition, we develop our syndicated loan distance
measure. Data are described in Section 4.3 with summary statistics for our sample of
syndicated loan facilities and the syndicated loan distance measure. Section 4.4 shows
the empirical results of tests on our hypotheses on both of syndicate formation and loan
pricing. Section 4.5 is conclusion.
4.1.1 Related Literature
We make several contributions to the existing literature. First, our paper is related to
the growing literature on loan syndication. Among others, Chowdhry and Nanda (1996),
Pichler and Wilhelm (2001), and Tykvova (2007) theoretically analyze the rationale for
syndication and find that syndicates are formed for reasons such as risk sharing, knowledge
transfer, and circumventing regulation. Empirical papers on syndicated loans have exam-
ined syndicate structure from the perspectives of information asymmetries (e.g., Lee and
Mullineaux (2004), Jones et al. (2005), and Sufi (2007)), lenders’ reputation (e.g., Dennis
and Mullineaux (2000) and Gopalan et al. (2011)), corporate governance (e.g., Ferreira and
Matos (2012)), and liquidity management (e.g., Gatev and Strahan (2009)). While this
line of research has usually taken the organizational form of syndicates as given, recently
member choice in loan syndicates has been studied (e.g. Sufi (2007), Cai (2010), Altun-
bas and Kara (2011)). This paper, to the best of our knowledge, is the first to examine
syndicate structures from the perspective of the similarity in lending expertise among syn-
dicate lenders and to study syndicate formation more broadly (beyond syndicate member
choice).
Our paper is also related to the literature on syndicated loan pricing. Empirical papers
have examined syndicated loan pricing from the perspectives of information asymmetry
(e.g., Ivashina (2009), Cai (2010), Bharath et al. (2009)), liquidity (e.g., Gupta et al.
(2008)), syndicated loan composition (e.g., Lim et al. (2014)), business cycle (e.g. San-
tos and Winton (2008), Santos (2010)), corporate governance (e.g., Ferreira and Matos
(2012)), and pipeline risk (Bruche et al. (2017)). Our paper contributes to this literature
by analyzing the effects of similarity in lending expertise among syndicate lenders and
market concentration on loan pricing.
Finally, this paper is also related to studies in the industrial organization literature
examining collusion. Among others, Nocke and White (2007) and Hatfield et al. (2017)
theoretically analyze collusion in repeated extensive form games and show that under
certain circumstances collusion can exist. For example, Hatfield et al. (2017) develop a
model of syndicated markets with repeated interaction of lenders, in which low market
concentration facilitates collusion. This resembles our result that price collusion of close
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syndicates occurs only during periods of low market concentration.
Also, collusion in syndicates has been widely discussed in the IPO market (e.g., Chen
and Ritter (2000), Hansen (2001), and Abrahamson et al. (2011)). Our work provides
empirical evidence of collusion in the syndicated loan market.
4.2 Setting, Theoretical Framework and Distance Measure
In this section, we first describe the institutional setup of syndicated bank lending. Then,
we discuss the theoretical framework. Finally, we develop our new syndicated loan lender
distance measure.
4.2.1 Institutional Setup
In this sub-section, we first provide a brief overview of the syndicated loan market. Then,
we describe the syndication process. Finally, we highlight the key dimensions in which
lead arrangers can affect the syndicate structure and the loan distribution to other banks.4
Syndicated Loan Market In a syndication two or more banks provide a loan to a
borrower. Compared to bilateral loans, syndicated loans are usually more efficient to
administer and cheaper. Consequently, annual total issuance volume in the U.S. market
increased from $177bn in 1990 to $2,017bn in 2007, and quickly recovered from a drop
during the Global financial crisis to $2,121bn in 2016. Also, almost all publicly listed
firms in the U.S. use syndicated loans to borrow (e.g. Sufi (2007)), and with a median
loan amount of $116mn individual syndicated loans are also large. Borrowing volumes from
syndicated loans are larger than from public debt and equity issuance combined (Drucker
and Puri (2007)). For banks, loan syndication is sizable too, with annual originated
syndicated loan volume being 9.6% of total assets (Cai et al. (2018)).
While institutional investors engage in syndicated loans primarily based on risk-return
considerations, banks consider the overall profitability of the borrower-creditor relation-
ship. Moreover, lead arrangers also focus on the profitability of their creditor-creditor
relationships. Specifically, in the syndication process lead arrangers possess a high leeway
in structuring the syndicate and distributing the loan to other lenders, which might ben-
eficially serve their own relationship to these creditors.
Syndication Process The syndication process follows two main stages. In the first
stage, the issuer awards the mandate for the syndicated loan to a lead arranger. Mostly,
borrowers invite their relationship banks and other banks to bid on the syndicate by
outlining their pricing and syndication strategy. To determine loan pricing, each lead
arranger performs an independent credit analysis of the borrower and creditors make bids.
The issuer chooses the lead by awarding the mandate.
4The following discussion of syndicate formation maily follows Esty (2001) and Standard & Poor’s A
Syndicated Loan Primer (April 2016).
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In the second stage, the lead arranger prepares an “information memorandum” describ-
ing the issuer and terms of the transaction for marketing the loan to other lenders. The
document also contains information on compensation for lenders at different tiers (see
below on details on different tiers), which come in the form of a spread over a base rate
(e.g. LIBOR), and usually different kinds of fees (e.g. commitment fee, upfront fee).
Using the “information memorandum”, the lead arranger starts “book running” by con-
tacting other banks and asking them for commitments to join the syndicate (see below on
a discussion on the involved trade-offs). If total demand, in form of commitments, equals
the target issue amount, the deal is “fully subscribed” and can be closed. If the total
commitments are higher or lower than the target amount, the deal is “oversubscribed”
or “undersubscribed”, with syndicated loans being predominantly “oversubscribed”. The
lead arranger possesses different options to proceed, such as scaling back commitments,
re-initiating to ask for commitments, scaling back the loan amount, and retaining a larger
share itself in the loan. Once the lead arranger decides on the allocation of commitments,
the syndication closes, lenders sign the final loan document, and funds are transferred to
the borrower.
Consequently, lead arrangers possess significantly leeway during the syndication process
to affect both the syndicate structure as well as loan shares to other syndicate lenders.
Syndicate Structure With respect to syndicate structure, lead arrangers can decide
whether to allocate monitoring and administrative tasks to other banks, or to structure,
administer, and distribute the loan itself. For example, an ‘administrative agent’ monitors
the loan and handles interest and principal payments, or a ‘documentation agent’ chooses
a law firm and handles documentation. These “joint mandates” usually also increase
the chance of a successful syndication, as lenders in more senior roles often commit to
larger loan shares and might support loan distribution. Successful syndication might
consequently also be a motive by the borrower to request “joint syndication” himself.
In addition, lead arrangers face an important trade-off when deciding on the size of
the syndicate. On the one hand, smaller syndicates provide benefits to the borrower in
the form of greater confidentiality, concentrated voting control, and administrative conve-
nience. For lenders, smaller syndicates result in greater revenues, and increased influence
to modify loan terms over the life of the loan. On the other hand, larger syndicates provide
benefits to the borrower as competition usually increases among bidding lenders, which
can reduce loan pricing and increase the chance of successful syndication. The lead ar-
ranger might benefit due to higher underwriting fees from other lenders to compensate his
increased syndication efforts, and from not having to disappoint otherwise excluded bid-
ding lenders. Participating lenders might benefit in meeting their diversification objective
and by receiving easier approval in the lender’s internal credit application process.
Loan Distribution With respect to loan distribution, lead arrangers also possess high
leeway to decide, which banks join the syndicate and at which tiers. Lead arrangers usually
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allocate more senior roles in the syndicate to its own relationship banks to strengthen their
relationship by rewarding them with higher fee compensation. Also, lenders in more senior
roles are selected based on lenders experience in lending to specific industries or regions.
Finally, lead arrangers might follow borrowers request to reward other of the borrower’s
relationship banks to more senior roles. Otherwise, lenders obtain the status of participant
lenders, whose main role is often just funding part of the loan.
Finally, lead arrangers also possess leeway in the allocation of loan shares. Allocating
higher loan shares to lenders in more senior roles can also reward lead arrangers relation-
ship banks by increasing their revenues from interest payments and fees. Also, borrowers
might also ask the lead arranger to invite other borrower relationship banks into the syn-
dicate. Lead arrangers might want to reduce their loan shares for more risky loans, which
might however conflict with agency considerations. Specifically, lead arrangers can miti-
gate adverse selection by holding a larger loan share to credibly signal the loan quality.
In addition, a larger loan share also incentivizes lead arrangers ex-post monitoring of the
loan, which can mitigate the impact of moral hazard. Allocating a higher loan share to
lenders in more senior roles in the syndicate can similarly mitigate agency considerations,
and increase incentives to pool borrower screening and monitoring expertise of more senior
lenders.
4.2.2 Theoretical Framework
In this sub-section, we outline the theoretical framework for analyzing the role of syndi-
cated loan lender distance and market concentration on loan pricing. First, we describe
the economic mechanisms underlying loan pricing. Second, analyzing this framework we
provide a number of testable hypotheses.
Effects of Close Syndicates: Improved Borrower Screening
The theoretical literature on banking relationships views borrower-lender relationships as
a mechanism, in which lenders produce borrower-specific information that is durable and
reusable over time (Boot (2000)). Close syndicates consist of lenders with higher similarity
in their lending expertise (compared to lenders in more distant syndicates). Collectively,
lenders in close syndicates might thus more effectively produce borrower-specific infor-
mation, both during the due diligence and monitoring phases of evaluating a borrower.
Also, lenders often syndicated loans to the same borrower, so that lenders already possess
borrower-specific and reusable information (Chan et al. (1986)). Close syndicates are also
more likely to pool information. Further, lead arrangers might pass on some of the benefits
from improved screening and monitoring to the borrower, thereby lowering loan pricing.
This leads to the following hypothesis on the effect of lender distance on loan pricing:
Hypothesis 1: Lenders are more likely to reduce loan pricing if syndicates become closer.
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Effects of Close Syndicates: Price Collusion
An alternative hypothesis is that improved information gathering by close syndicates, bor-
rowers might be more inclined to be “locked-in” into such syndicates (see Sharpe (1990),
and Rajan (1992)). If borrowers are locked-in, lenders will be more likely to extract rents.
This leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Lenders are more likely to increase loan pricing if syndicates become closer.
Importantly, hypotheses 1 and 2 are not mutually exclusive. Close syndicates might
be able to have lower production costs for borrower screening and monitoring, but at the
same time also increase loan pricing due to hold-up of the borrower. In our empirical
analysis, we first test the net effect of hypotheses 1 and 2, and then try to separate these
two opposing effects.
Low Market Concentration: Higher Scope for Price Collusion
The theoretical literature on loan pricing in syndicates shows that lower market con-
centration fosters price collusion (Hatfield et al. (2017)).5 Specifically, in markets with
syndication there exists a certain level of market concentration below which the scope for
price collusion increases with reductions in market concentration. This mechanism results
from an in-period punishment of lead arrangers, in that “price collusion can be sustained
by a strategy in which firms [lead arrangers] refuse to join the syndicate of any firm [lender]
that deviates from the collusive price.” The authors show that this punishment strategy
becomes more forceful in markets with lower market concentration.6 This leads to the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Below a certain level of market concentration, price collusion increases
with reductions in market concentration.
Taken together, our two hypotheses 2 and 3 predict that price collusion should be most
pronounced during periods of low market concentration for loans originated by closer
syndicates. In our empirical analysis, we first test hypothesis 3 on a stand alone basis,
and then test for the joint effect of hypotheses 2 and 3.
4.2.3 Lender Distance Measure
In this sub-section, we develop our key explanatory variable to measure the similarity,
or closeness in lending expertise of lenders within a syndicated loan, namely our lender
5Hatfield et al. (2017) motivate their theory by observations of investment banking fees for initial public
offerings (IPOs), which are also syndicated.
6According to anecdotal evidence, lead arrangers in the syndicated loan market regularly punish banks
by adding them to confidential blacklists that exclude them from syndicates.
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distance measure.
4.2.3.1 Distance between two lenders
The key intermediate measure to compute our lender distance measure, is the distance
between two lenders measure developed in Cai et al. (2018). This measure captures the
similarity in the syndicated loan portfolios of two lenders, which we use as a measure for
the similarity in lending expertise between these two lenders.
To compute the syndicated loan portfolio of an individual lender in a given month,
we compute each lead arranger’s total originated loan facility amount during the prior 12
months.7 Next, we compute each lead arranger’s portfolio weights in lending specialization
related to borrower industry, using the 2-digit borrower SIC-industry.8 Let ws,j,t be the
weight (share) that lead arranger s invests in industry j during the 12 months prior to
month t.9
Using these lending specializations, the distance between two lenders is computed as the
Euclidean distance between those two lenders in the J-dimensional space as
distances,k,t =
1√
2
√√√√ J∑
j=1
(ws,j,t − wk,j,t)2 (4.1)
where distances,k,t is the distance in lending specialization between lender s and lender
k in month t, with s 6= k. The distance measure ranges between zero and unity, with a
smaller distance indicating a higher similarity in the two lenders’ lending expertise.
4.2.3.2 Syndicated loan lender distance
Next, we compute our syndicated loan lender distance measure. Suppose in syndicate
i are Ni pairs of lead arranger(s) and other syndicate members. The syndicated loan
lender distance is the average distance of these Ni pairs of lead arranger-lender in the 12
months prior to the loan origination month t. Let Distancei,t denote the lender distance
in syndicate i that is arranged in month t. Then
Distancei,t =
1
Ni
·
Ni∑
n=1
distancesn,kn,t (4.2)
where distancesn,kn,t denotes the distance between the nth pair of lead arranger sn and
syndicate member kn in month t, where sn 6= kn.
Note that the lender distance measure centers on the similarity in lending expertise from
the viewpoint of the lead arranger(s), and thus excludes distance pairs among non-lead
syndicate members. Thus, for syndicates with more than two lenders, lender distance can
7Loan amounts are split equally across all lead arrangers in the loan, if a loan has multiple leads.
8Also, we examine lending specialization related to borrower region (using 3-digit borrower zip code),
and obtain very similar results.
9Industry weights across J industries for each lead arranger i sum up to unity (
∑J
j=1 ws,j,t = 1 ∀t).
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differ even within the same set of lenders in the same originating month. Also, note that
the lender distance measure captures the similarity in lending expertise during the prior
12 months to the loan origination month t. Consequently, the same syndicate structure
can exhibit varying distances over time, depending on the evolution of the similarity in
lending expertise of the lenders in the syndicate.
In Appendix Table A.4.2, we show a computational example of the syndicated loan
lender distance.
4.3 Data and Summary Statistics
In this section, we first briefly describe our data. Then, we describe the classification of
lender roles and provide summary statistics regarding lenders, borrowers, and syndicated
loan facilities. Finally, we discuss our new loan lender distance measure.
4.3.1 Data
Our primary data source is a sample of syndicated loans from Thomson Reuters LPC
Dealscan, which contains information on loan contract terms, borrower characteristics,
lender roles, syndicate structure, and loan distribution. Dealscan contains a fairly complete
coverage of syndicated loans, especially for the U.S. market. Our original data set contains
127,040 syndicated loans to 31,927 firms originated from a total of 1,299 lead arrangers
during January 1988 to March 2017. To focus our analysis and make the computation
of our loan lender distance measure manageable, we follow the literature and restrict our
sample to larger lead arrangers so that on average lead arrangers in our sample annually
originate one percent of syndicated loans in the market.10 Our final sample contains
123,752 syndicated loans to 30,722 U.S. firms from January 1988 to March 2017 that were
originated by 223 lead arrangers.
Importantly, these 223 lead arrangers also frequently obtain less senior roles in the syn-
dicate so that 95.2% of the syndicate’s co-agents and 77.2% of the syndicate’s participants
are covered in the sample.11 These high coverages are consistent with lead arrangers in
the syndicated loan market regularly engaging in reciprocal lending arrangements as doc-
umented by Cai (2010). That is, lead arrangers also regularly serve in less senior roles
in syndicates, where their participant lenders led the syndicate. The non-covered partic-
ipants in our sample are mostly foreign banks, or smaller domestic financial institutions
that do not (or at most sporadically) originate syndicated loans in the U.S. market. Con-
sequently, our sample contains a fairly high coverage of lenders across different lender roles
to investigate syndicate formation.
We show in this paper that the average lender distance in a syndicated loan is much
smaller than the average lender distance between two randomly selected lenders. In other
10For consistency of the distance measure, the selection of lead arrangers follows Cai et al. (2018).
11In Appendix A.4.3 we provide details on the classification of lender roles.
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words, lead arrangers actively choose lenders that have similar lending expertise as them-
selves. Thus, participants covered in our sample represent those that are also more likely
to be selected into syndicates.
To obtain richer financial information on individual borrowing firms, we link our syndi-
cated loan data to Compustat using matchings from Chava and Roberts (2008), Schwert
(2017), and Cai et al. (2018). Through this matching, we retrieve borrower financial data
for up to 48,317 syndicated loans (39% of the sample).
4.3.2 Summary Statistics
Table 4.1 shows summary statistics. Panel A of Table 4.1 presents lead arranger charac-
teristics. The sample contains 33,861 unique lead arranger-months. On average, a lead
arranger has a market share of 1% during the prior 12 months, in which 65 syndicated
loans with a total volume of $11.3 billion were arranged. Four out of five lead arrangers
(82%) are banks (as opposed to finance companies, institutional investors, etc.) and hence
are considered having expertise in screening, monitoring, and relationship lending. Con-
sequently, most lenders in the syndicated loan market constitute competitors for a lead
arranger, when deciding on syndicate formation.
Panel B of Table 4.1 presents borrower characteristics, which are reported based on the
time of loan origination. An average borrowing firm in our sample has sales of $3.54 billion
at loan closing. 38% of loans are first syndicated loans of the borrower in the syndicated
loan market in our sample period, while the average number of previous syndicated loans
is 4.1. Among borrowers whose firm type is known, 64% are identified as private firms, and
36% as public firms. Among the borrowers with Compustat data, the average book value
of total assets is $12.3 billion, the average book leverage ratio is 37%, the average earnings
to asset ratio is 6%, 56% have an S&P debt rating, and 29% have an S&P investment-grade
debt rating.
Panel C of Table 4.1 reports loan characteristics. The average syndicated loan facility
is $271 million, with a loan maturity of 50 months. About one-third (34%) of loans are
classified as term loans. The average interest rate spread on drawn funds is 252 basis points
over LIBOR. The most common loan purpose is working capital and corporate purposes
(72%), followed by acquisitions (22%), refinancing (18%), and backup lines (5%), where a
loan facility can have multiple loan purposes.
Importantly for our analysis, DealScan provides rich information on the syndicate struc-
ture and loan distribution. On average, a syndicated loan has 6.0 lenders, splitting into
1.6 lead arrangers, 1.3 co-agents, and 3.2 participants. To measure the concentration of a
syndicate, we compute the Herfindahl index as the sum of squared individual loan shares of
syndicate lenders.12 We also report summary statistics of loan shares, which are computed
as the average among the lender group if there is more than one in the syndicate. On
average, lead arranger(s) retain 31.4% of the loan, 14.7% are held by co-agents, and 14.7%
12The Herfindahl index ranges between zero and one, where one being most concentrated (a single lender
holding 100% of the syndicated loan).
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are also held by participants. Importantly for our analysis on syndicate formation, these
variables on syndicate structure and loan distribution show a high degree of variation.
Compared to the summary statistics on syndicate structure reported by Sufi (2007) for
the period from 1992 to 2003, on average, the total number of lenders in the syndicate has
shrunk, loan shares of lead arrangers increased, and consequently syndicate concentration
also increased.
Finally, Panel D of Table 4.1 reports summary statistics of the market concentration of
the syndicated loan market. On average, the Herfindahl index of market concentration
is 0.11, which indicates an “unconcentrated market” based on the definition of the U.S.
Department of Justice.13 As shown in Figure 4.2, the market concentration varied over
time, with about a tenth of months constituting a “moderately concentrated” market
(greater or equal than 0.15) and also a moderate degree of variation in the “unconcentrated
market” range.
In Appendix Table A.4.1, we list the variable definitions.
4.3.3 Lender Distance Measure
For the sub-sample where we are able to compute lender distant pairs, we construct our
new syndicated loan lender distance measure. As discussed above, this measure captures
the similarity in lending expertise of the lead with the lenders in the syndicate, and ranges
between zero and one. Figure 4.1 shows that lender distance declined over time, indicating
that the similarity in lending expertise of lenders within a syndicate increased over time.
In other words, on average lenders in syndicates became closer competitors to the lead
arranger over time. To ensure that this time-trend does not affect our results, we carefully
control for year fixed effects in our regressions.14 As shown in Panel C of Table 4.1, on
average, the lender distance of a syndicated loan is 0.29, which is less than half of any
randomly selected lender pair of 0.61 (see Panel A of Table 4.1).15 This finding provides
indicative evidence that similarity in lending expertise might be an important factor in
syndicate formation. Finally, the lender distance measure has a standard deviation of
0.14, implying that there is sufficient variation in the data for the empirical analyses.
Table 4.2 lists the top three lead arrangers for close, mid, and distant syndicates from
2014 to 2016 by classifying lender distance into the lowest, middle, and highest one-
third of the originating month of the syndicate. The top three lead arrangers (Bank of
America, JPMorgan Chase, and Wells Fargo) are identical across close, mid, and distant
syndicates, even in their ranking. This provides evidence that a lead arranger regularly
forms syndicates with different lender distances, indicating that lead arrangers can actively
decide on the similarity in lending expertise of the lenders it chooses to include in a
13See https://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-guidelines-08192010
14In our analysis on ‘loan pricing and market concentration’ (Table 4.9), we include three-year fixed
effects as otherwise most of the variation in the market concentration measure would be absorbed by year
fixed effects.
15Note that the computation of the distance between two lenders measure is completely identical as in
Cai et al. (2018). Consequently, also summary statistics in our longer sample period are very similar.
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syndicate. Also, concentration of lead arrangers is most pronounced for close syndicates,
with the top three lead arranger arranging 43% of close syndicates (compared to 32% for
distant syndicates, and 17% for mid syndicates).
4.4 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we first analyze how distance among lender pairs and syndicated loan lender
distance affects syndicate formation. Next, we show how borrower and loan characteristics
differ across different degrees of syndicated loan lender distance and show their syndicate
formation characteristics. Finally, we test our hypotheses by investigating how syndicated
loan lender distance and market concentration affects loan pricing.
4.4.1 Distance and Syndicate Formation
In this sub-section, we examine how lead banks structure syndicates. If lead arrangers
structure a syndicate based on how close or distant competitors are who it wants to join
the syndicate, the question translates into the following: How does lender distance affect
the syndicate structure? As outlined in the introduction and the institutional setting,
choosing close competitors can have both positive effects (e.g., improved screening) and
negative effects (e.g., price collusion among lenders) to the borrower. Syndicate structure
might influence the magnitude of these effects. Smaller and more concentrated syndicates
increase lenders stake in the loan, which should reduces moral hazard and align incentives
among lenders for better screening and monitoring. However, smaller and more concen-
trated syndicates might also reduce price competition among lenders, and foster price
collusion. In addition, assigning lenders into more senior syndicate roles might also rein-
force these effects, as it mitigates lenders moral hazard and gives lenders a larger share in
the proceeds from the syndicate.
We seek to find supporting evidence consistent either with hypothesis 1 or 2. The general
regression specification we test is
Syndi,t = α+ β1 ·Distancei,t + β2 ·Distance2i,t + γ ·Xi,t + εi,t (4.3)
where the dependent variable Syndi,t are different measures of syndicate structure, such as
the number of lenders, the number of lead arrangers, the number of co-agents, the number
of participants, and the concentration of the syndicate (Herfindahl). The key right-hand-
side variables Distancei,t and Distance2i,t measure the (squared) syndicated loan lender
distance of syndicate i originated in month t. We allow ex-ante for a non-linear relationship
of Distancei,t to capture the possibly non-linear net effect from the following two opposing
forces. On the one hand, choosing lenders with higher similarity, or closeness in lending
expertise into the syndicate might reduce production costs due to improved screening, or
increase revenues from price collusion. On the other hand, choosing closer competitors into
the syndicate might increase competition for future syndicated loans from the borrower.
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Either of these two forces might dominate the net effect at different levels of lender distance.
The control variables (Xi,t) are consistent to the ones used in the literature (such as in
Sufi (2007)), and include various borrower characteristics, loan characteristics as well as
year, industry, state, loan purpose, and interest type fixed effects. Standard errors are
heteroscedasticity robust and clustered by borrower 2-digit SIC industry.
Table 4.3 reports the results. While we think of lead arrangers having an intention
to form closer or more distant syndicates, we only observe the ex-post realized distance
in loan syndicates. Consequently, our results on syndicate formation display correlations
between our lender distance measure and the syndicate structure. In all regressions on the
number of lenders, leads, co-agents, and participants, the estimated coefficients reveal a
concave relationship of our distance measure that is significant at the 1% level. Consistent
with our conjecture of the above discussed opposing forces, we find that the number
of syndicate lenders (and the number of lenders across all roles) slightly reduces for very
distant syndicates and strongly reduces for mid and close syndicates (see Figure 4.3 (a)).16
These effects are also economically significant. For example, as reported in column (1), a
syndicate with a loan lender distance being one standard deviation lower than the median
is associated with on average 5 fewer lenders in the syndicate (or -83% at a mean of 6.04
lenders). Consistent with the importance of more senior roles for improved screening and
price collusion, the economically strongest difference in the number of syndicate members
results from fewer participants.
Analyzing the effect of lender distance on syndicate concentration (Herfindahl) shows
similar results (column (5)), with lender distance having a convex effect on syndicate
concentration (see Figure 4.3 (b)). That is, while syndicate concentration reduces for
closer lender distance in very distant syndicates, syndicate concentration increases for
closer lender distance in mid and close syndicates. In terms of magnitude, a syndicate with
a one standard deviation lower lender distance than the median syndicate is associated
with a higher concentration of the syndicate by 0.05 (or 20% at a mean Herfindahl of
0.27).
4.4.2 Distance and Loan Distribution
Next, we analyze how lead arrangers distribute loans to other syndicate lenders. As
discussed in the institutional setting above, loan distribution consists of choosing syndicate
members and allocating loan shares. That is, we address the questions of whom lead
arrangers choose to let into the syndicate? And, among those chosen syndicate members,
how do lead arrangers allocate loan shares?
4.4.2.1 Syndicate Member Choice
First, we examine lead arrangers choice of syndicate members. We seek to find supporting
evidence consistent with hypotheses 1 or 2, in that lead arrangers might choose lenders
16Note, median (mean) lender distance is 0.26 (0.29), and the centered 80% interval ranges from 0.15 to
0.47. One standard deviation of lender distance is 0.14.
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with similar lending expertise to either delegate screening and monitoring responsibilities
within the syndicate, or collude on loan pricing. Utilizing the distance measure between
two banks, we measure the degree of similarity in lending expertise between the lead
arranger and potential syndicate members. We separately investigate lead arrangers choice
of co-lead arrangers, co-agents, and participants. The general regression specification we
test is
Members,k,i,t = αi + β1 · distances,k,t + β2 · distance2s,k,t
+ γ1 ·RELLs,k,t + γ2 ·RELBk,i + γ3 ·MSk,t + εs,k,i,t (4.4)
where the dependent variableMembers,k,i,t are different indicator variables that equal one
if lead arranger s chooses lender k in a specific role in loan syndicate i that is originated
in month t. Lender roles are co-lead arranger, co-agent, and participant. Linking this
analysis to our previous investigation on syndicate structure above, we exclude syndicates
in which lead arrangers decided not to assign lenders into these roles.17 Also, as lead
arrangers usually start by assigning lenders to more senior roles, we exclude lenders that
are chosen in more senior roles from the choice set of loan membership for less senior roles
such as participants.18
The key independent variable is distances,k,t (and distance2s,k,t), measuring the (squared)
distance between lead arranger s and lender k in the 12 months prior to month t. Thus,
distances,k,t measures whether lead arrangers choose lenders with close or distant similarity
in lending expertise into the syndicate. Consistent with the discussions above, we also allow
for a non-linear relationship of distances,k,t on syndicate member choice. We control
for loan facility fixed effects, to rule out any facility-specific effects, such as borrower
characteristics, lead arranger characteristics, time-specific effects, and loan characteristics.
In addition, we also control for the effects of prior relationships between the lead arranger
and lender as well as prior relationships between the potential syndicate member and
the borrower. Specifically, RELLs,k,t is an indicator variable for whether lead arranger s
syndicated a loan with lender k prior to month t (no matter what roles the two lenders
took). RELBk,i is an indicator variable for whether lender k syndicated a loan to the
syndicate’s borrower prior the originating month of syndicate i (no matter what role it
took). In addition, we include the market share of lender k in the 12 months prior to month
t (MSk,t) to proxy for lender k’s reputation, market size, lending capacity, or power in
the syndicated loan market. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust and clustered
by lead arranger.
Table 4.4 reports the results. In all regressions, the estimated coefficients on the distance
measure show a convex relationship that is significant at the 1%-level. Consistent with our
hypotheses on improved screening and price collusion of close syndicates, the propensity
to be chosen as syndicate member increases for closer (compared to mid) syndication. At
17E.g., syndicates without a co-lead arranger are excluded in the regression for co-lead arranger choice
18Our results are very similar without restricted choice sets.
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the same time, the likelihood of being selected as syndicate member increases for distant
(compared to mid) syndicates, consistent to our conjecture of lead arrangers avoiding
future competition for the same borrower. However, there is an important difference
between these convex relationships across different lender roles. For the selection of co-
leads (column (1)), lead arrangers are much more likely to choose more distant (compared
to mid) competitors, and to some degree also very close competitors (see Figure 4.4 (a)).19
Lenders with a one standard deviation higher distance between the lead arranger and the
lender compared to the median are associated with a higher likelihood of being chosen
as co-lead by 3.0%-points. In comparison, lenders at the 25th-percentile (compared to
the 10th-percentile) of distance between the lead arranger and the lender have a higher
likelihood of being chosen by 1.0%-point. The results on the selection of co-agents are
very similar (column (2)). These findings on the selection of co-leads and co-agents are
consistent with the trade-off between the benefits of lower production costs and price
collusion of selecting close lenders, and the benefit of reduced future competition when
selecting distant lenders.
In contrast to the results for co-leads and co-agents, lead arrangers predominantly prefer
to choose participant lenders with more similar lending expertise (see column (3) and
Figure 4.4 (b)). Consequently, lead arrangers select participant lenders that reinforce
improved screening and price collusion. The estimated control variables provide consistent
results.
4.4.2.2 Allocation of Loan Shares
Next, we investigate how the lead arranger allocates loan shares among the lenders in
the syndicate. Again, we aim to investigate whether lead arrangers allocate higher loan
shares to closer syndicates to align incentives for improved screening or price collusion
(hypothesis 1 or 2), or allocate higher loan shares in more distant syndicates to reduce
future competition. Specifically, we analyze how the allocation of loan shares to lenders
with different roles (lead, co-agent, and participant) varies across syndicates. As multiple
lenders with the same role in a syndicate cannot be considered as independent observations,
we compute the average loan share for each role across possibly multiple lenders of that
role to avoid understating standard errors.20 To investigate the allocation of loan shares
across syndicates, we estimate regression specification (4.3) as discussed above, except for
using loan share as dependent variable.
Table 4.5 reports the regression results. In all regressions, the estimated coefficients
reveal a convex relationship of our lender distance measure and all coefficient estimates
are significant at the 1%-level. Consistent to our findings from syndicate member choice,
we find that lead arrangers prefer to allocate higher loan shares in both close syndicates
19Note, median (mean) distance between two lenders is 0.63 (0.61), and the centered 80% interval ranges
from 0.29 to 0.88. One standard deviation of distance between two lenders is 0.23.
20All results continue to hold once we take each individual lenders’ loan share as observations for the
regressions.
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and distant syndicates (compared to mid syndicates). For close and mid syndicates, for
example, a smaller lender distance is associated with higher loan shares across all loan
roles (see Figure 4.5). This effect is most pronounced for lead arrangers (and co-agents)
compared to participants. For example, on average the loan share for lead arrangers of
syndicates with a lender distance being one standard deviation smaller than the median
syndicate lender distance have a 5.4%-points (or 17% at a mean of 31.4%-points) higher
loan share. In contrast, the lower sensitivity of the loan share of participants to variations
in syndicate lender distance is consistent to a higher average number of participants in
loan syndicates. Overall, these findings are consistent to our results on syndicate structure
from Table 4.3 above and show that lead arrangers form more concentrated syndicates by
allocating higher loan shares for both close and distant (compared to mid) syndicates.
Analyzing the allocation of loan shares among lenders of the same role within the syn-
dicate also provides consistent results. As shown in Appendix Table A.4.4, lead arrangers
allocate higher loan shares to lenders across all loan roles once the distance between the
lead arranger and the lender reduces. These effects are all statistically significant, and
the economic magnitude is most pronounced for participant lenders. Consequently, lead
arrangers also discriminate in the allocation of loans shares among lenders within a syn-
dicate.
When investigating the retained loan share by lead arrangers across loans with different
degrees of information asymmetries, we find additional evidence consistent with improved
screening and monitoring abilities of close syndicates (hypothesis 1). The literature on
information asymmetries in syndicated loans has shown that if informational asymme-
tries are severe, lead arrangers retain a higher loan shares (e.g., Sufi (2007)). However,
if screening and monitoring expertise is indeed higher in close syndicates, lead arrangers
might not have to signal credit quality, or mitigate moral hazard by retaining larger loan
shares for those loans with higher informational asymmetries. Consistent with this conjec-
ture, we show that lead arrangers do not retain higher loan shares in syndicates with high
information asymmetries of borrowers once the syndicate distance is close (see Appendix
Table A.4.5). In comparison, for syndicates with mid and distant lender distance, lead
arrangers retain higher loan shares. Also, analyses for the concentration of syndicates
(Herfindahl) show consistent results.
4.4.3 Close versus Mid versus Distant Syndicates
The above tests provide important insights into how lead arrangers structure loan syndi-
cates, choose syndicate partners, and allocate loan shares. The question of who benefits
from these different types of syndicate formation remains to be answered. To address this
question, and summarize our results on how syndicate formation differs across syndicated
loan lender distance, we analyze how syndicates differ across lender distance.
We use the syndicated loan lender distance (as defined in equation (2)) to group our
sample of syndicated loans into terciles, i.e. close, mid, and distant syndicates.21 The sub-
21We choose three groups to reflect the non-linearity of our results above.
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sample of close syndicates consist of syndicates, in which lender distance is below the lowest
one-third lender distance in the originating month. The sub-sample of mid syndicates
are syndicates with lender distance above the lowest one-third and below the lower two-
thirds of lender distance in the originating month, whereas distant syndicates consist of
the reaming syndicates, i.e. those with lender distance above the lowest two-thirds in
the originating month. We then look into differences in borrower characteristics, loan
characteristics, syndicate structure, and loan distribution across close, mid, and distant
syndicates.
Table 4.6 reports the mean values for these three sub-samples (columns (1) to (3)).
Also, in columns (4) to (5) the table reports the mean differences between close and mid
syndicates (µClose - µMid), as well as distant and mid syndicates (µDistant – µMid), which
are all statistically significant. We find that on average borrowers in mid syndicates are
most likely to be public firms, more likely to be rated (and more likely to be investment-
grade rated), have borrowed previously most often from the syndicated loan market (and
are least likely to be first time borrowers in the syndicated loan market), and show higher
sales at closing. In addition, mid syndicates have on average larger loan sizes, tend to
have longer maturities, have fewer term loans, and lower interest spreads on drawn funds
over LIBOR. In terms of syndicate formation, mid syndicates have on average the largest
number of lenders (also, across all lender roles), lenders hold smaller loan shares (also
across all lender roles), and syndicates are consequently least concentrated. In other
words, mid syndicates seem to have safer borrowers and safer loans, which is reflected in
less concentrated syndicates (compared to close, and distant syndicates). These results are
consistent to previous findings that loans with intermediate lender distance form larger and
less concentrated syndicates, also because of lower information asymmetries. In contrast,
distant syndicates lend on average to riskier borrowers, lend smaller loan amounts, and
charge higher interest spreads on drawn funds over LIBOR. Syndicates consist on average
of fewer lenders, lenders retain higher loan shares, and loans are more concentrated.
Close syndicates lend on average to somewhat riskier borrowers than mid syndicates
(but much safer than distant syndicates), and lend smaller loan amounts with somewhat
shorter maturities. Consistent with slightly riskier borrowers, but safer loans than mid
syndicates, interest spreads on drawn funds over LIBOR are a bit higher than for mid
syndicates. However, syndicate formation differs considerably. Close syndicates consist of
on average only five lenders (compared to 9 lenders for mid syndicates), with fewer lenders
across all lender roles (leads, co-agents, and participants). Consequently, loan shares are
higher across all lender roles, with a lead arranger retaining on average about one-third
of the loan (compared to about one-fifth for mid syndicates). Correspondingly, syndicate
concentration is highest.
These findings resemble our previous results that lead arrangers form small and con-
centrated syndicates consisting of lenders with higher similarity in their lending expertise
that might enable those lenders to perform improved screening and monitoring (Hypoth-
esis 1), and/or collude on loan pricing (Hypothesis 2). At this stage, it remains unclear
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who benefits from these close syndicates.
In the following sub-sections, we address this question and investigate the effects of
syndicated loan lender distance and market concentration on loan pricing.
4.4.4 Distance and Loan Pricing
As discussed in the theoretical framework, there are potentially two opposing effects on
loan pricing from close syndicates with high similarity in lenders lending expertise. On
the one hand, borrowers might benefit from improved screening and monitoring, because
lead arrangers can pass on some of these savings to borrowers (Hypothesis 1). On the
other hand, borrowers might be "locked-in" into close syndicates so that lenders would be
more likely to extract rents (Hypothesis 2). We first examine the net effect of these two
opposing forces by estimating the following regression model
Spreadi,t = α+ β1 ·Distancei,t + β2 ·Distance2i,t + γ ·Xi,t + εi,t (4.5)
where the dependent variable Spreadi,t is the interest spread over LIBOR on drawn funds
of syndicate i originated in month t. The key right-hand-side variables Distancei,t (and
Distance2i,t) measure the (squared) syndicated loan lender distance of lenders in syndicate
i in the 12 months prior to month t. We allow ex-ante for a non-linear relationship of
Distancei,t on loan pricing, because (i) the stand alone effects of closer lender distance
might neither linearly reduce loan pricing due to lower production costs of borrower-
specific information, nor linearly increase loan pricing due to borrower "hold-up"; and (ii)
the net effect might be dominated by either of the two opposing effects across different
levels of lender distance. We separately test for whether the net effect of lender distance
on loan pricing is linearly, or non-linearly. If lender distance reduces loan pricing for
closer syndicates, the improved screening and monitoring effect dominates (Hypothesis 1).
If lender distance increases loan pricing for closer syndicates, the price collusion effect
dominates (Hypothesis 2). In addition, besides analyzing the effect of lender distance on
loan pricing across the entire sample period, we also investigate the time-variation of this
effect. Specifically, we test whether the effect of lender distance on loan pricing changed
after the Global financial crisis (since 2010). The control variables, fixed effects, and
standard errors specification is identical to Table 4.3.
Table 4.7 reports the regression results. Columns (1) and (2) report results for the entire
sample period, and show that a reduction in lender distance monotonically reduces loan
pricing (see Figure 4.6 (a)). In the linear specification, loan lender distance is statistically
significant at the 1%-level, while at the non-linear specification only the squared lender
distance is statistically significant. In terms of magnitude, a reduction of lender distance by
one standard deviation from the median reduces loan pricing by 5bps (or 2.0% at a mean of
252bps) in the linear specification and by 1.5bps (or 0.6%) in the non-linear specification.
Consequently, these results provide mixed evidence on the net effect of close syndicates on
loan pricing. While significant economic reductions in the linear specification is consistent
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with improved screening and monitoring (Hypothesis 1), the marginal economic effect in
the non-linear specification might indicate collusive loan pricing (Hypothesis 2).
The results on the time-variation of lender distance on loan pricing are reported in
columns (3) to (6). Lender distance has a positive and linear effect on loan pricing from
1989 to 2009, while the effect is convex from 2010 to 2017 (see Figure 4.6 (b)). These
coefficient estimates are all statistically significant at the 1%-level. In terms of magnitude,
a reduction of lender distance by one standard deviation from the median reduces loan
pricing by 5bps (or 2.0% at a mean of 252bps) until 2009, while increases loan pricing by
10bps (or 4%) since 2010. This implies that the effect of close syndicates on loan pricing
significantly changed after the Global financial crisis. Consequently, in close syndicates
the net effect of lender distance on loan pricing is dominated by improved screening and
monitoring (Hypothesis 1) until 2009, while it is dominated by collusive pricing (Hypoth-
esis 2) since 2010. At this stage it remains unclear, why loan pricing increased for close
syndicates since 2010. To answer this question, we next disentangle the two opposing
effects of improved screening/monitoring and price collusion.
4.4.5 Improved Screening versus Price Collusion
To disentangle the opposing effects of improved screening/monitoring and price collusion,
we utilize the cross-sectional variation in the degree of informational asymmetries of the
borrower. That is, we split borrowers into “opaque” and “non-opaque” firms, with loans
to opaque borrowers having a higher degree of information asymmetry. If price collusion is
identical across opaque and non-opaque borrowers, the difference between loan pricing for
opaque and non-opaque borrowers quantifies a lower bound for the stand alone effect of
improved screening/monitoring.22 Consequently, the stand alone effect of price collusion
is bounded above by the overall net pricing effect minus the upper bound of the improved
screening/monitoring effect. Also, the stand alone effect of price collusion is bounded
below by zero.
We disentangle the stand alone effects of improved screening/monitoring and price col-
lusion separately for each of the two sub-periods discussed above. This approach also
allows us to investigate the change magnitude of the stand alone effects over time, thus
providing insights why loan pricing increased for close syndicates since 2010. We estimate
the following regression model
Spreadi,t = α+ β1 ·Distancei,t + β2 ·Distance2i,t
+ β3 ·Distancei,t ·Opaquei + β4 ·Distance2i,t ·Opaquei
+ γ ·Xi,t + εi,t (4.6)
22The difference captures a lower bound, as lenders in closer syndicates might also mitigate some degree
of information asymmetry in loans to non-opaque borrowers. Also, if lenders collude more in loan pricing
to opaque borrowers than to non-opaque borrowers (e.g., because the hold-up problem of non-opaque
borrowers is more severe), our findings would continue to represent a lower bound.
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where the variables Spreadi,t and (squared) Distancei,t are defined as in the regression
model (4.5). For the same reasons as discussed above, we again allow ex-ante for a possi-
ble non-linear relationship of Distancei,t on loan pricing. Opaquei is an indicator variable
for whether syndicated loan i is taken by an opaque borrower, with “opaque” borrowers
being defined as unrated firms, or small firms.23 The key right-hand-side variables are
the interaction terms of Distancei,t (and Distance2i,t) with Opaquei. That is, whether
the effect of lender distance on loan pricing differs for opaque (compared to non-opaque)
borrowers. The control variables, fixed effects, and standard error specifications are iden-
tical to regression model (4.5) above, besides that we include a base line effect for opaque
borrower (instead of unrated borrower).
Table 4.8 presents the estimates. Consistent with Table 4.7, the coefficient estimates re-
veal a linear relationship between lender distance and loan pricing until 2009 (see columns
(1) and (2) and Figure 4.7 (a)). However, the effect is only statistically significant for
loans with high informational asymmetries. In terms of magnitude, a reduction of lender
distance by one standard deviation reduces loan pricing for opaque borrowers (compared
to non-opaque borrowers) by 5bps (or 2% at a mean of 252bps). This is our estimated
effect for the lower bound of the improved screening and monitoring effect of close syn-
dicates until 2009. Given our estimates of the net effect of close syndicates of 5bps from
Table 7, our estimate for the price collusion effect until 2009 is zero. In sum, we find
evidence consistent with improved screening and monitoring of close syndicates until 2009
(Hypothesis 1), but no evidence on price collusion (Hypothesis 2).
Columns (3) and (4) report the estimates for the sub-period from 2010 to 2017. Con-
sistent with Table 4.7, the coefficient estimates reveal a non-linear relationship between
lender distance and loan pricing since 2010. In terms of statistical significance, the stand-
alone effect of (squared) lender distance and the interaction terms of (squared) lender
distance with opaque borrowers are all statistically significant at least at the 5%-level.
Despite statistical significance, loan pricing remains unchanged for close syndicates once
lender distance reduces (see Figure 4.7 (b)). However, for non-opaque borrowers smaller
lender distance increases loan pricing for close syndicates (see Figure 4.7 (b)). In terms
of magnitude, in loans to non-opaque borrowers a reduction in lender distance by one
standard deviation from the median increases loan pricing by 18bps (or7% at a mean of
252bps). This negative net effect of loan pricing for loans to non-opaque borrowers is con-
sistent with price collusion in close syndicates (Hypothesis 2). We thus quantify the lower
bound for the improved screening and monitoring effect of close syndicates since 2010 as
18bps. Consequently, we find evidence for both improved screening and monitoring (Hy-
pothesis 1) as well as price collusion (Hypothesis 2) in close syndicates since 2010. While
the magnitude of the improved screening and monitoring effect increased over time, the
opposing price collusion effect increased in higher magnitude dominating the net effect of
23Small firms are defined as the smallest one-third of borrowing firms in the sample by sales at closing
at the time of loan origination. Our results continue to hold if we define “opaque” borrowers solely by
unrated borrowers.
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loan pricing since 2010. The question of why lenders in syndicates started to collude on
loan pricing remains to be answered.
4.4.6 Market Concentration and Loan Pricing
A possible explanation for the occurrence of price collusion since 2010 as show above
might be low market concentration. As stated in hypothesis 3, below a certain level of
market concentration, price collusion might increase with further reductions in market
concentration. While market concentration declined since the early 2000s, only since 2010
did the syndicated loan market reach low levels of market concentration (see Figure 4.2).
Next, we first test hypothesis 3 on a stand alone basis, and then test for the joint effect
of hypothesis 2 (price collusion in close syndicates) and 3.
To investigate the effect of market concentration on loan pricing, we add a linear and
squared term of market concentration as additional explanatory variables to our regression
model (4.5) above. Consistent with our theoretical hypothesis 3, we also allow for a
non-linear relationship of market concentration on loan pricing to be able to capture
increases in loan pricing for reductions of market concentration below a certain level. We
measure market concentration in the syndicated loan market by the Herfindahl index in
the 12 months prior to the syndicate origination month. The remaining control variables,
fixed effects, and standard error specifications remain identical to regression model (4.5)
above, besides that we replace year fixed effects by three-year fixed effects to allow for an
identification of the market concentration effect.
To investigate the joint effect of close lender distance and market concentration on loan
pricing, we interact our (squared) lender distance measure with indicator variables for
different levels of market concentration. We estimate the following regression model
Spreadi,t = α+ β1 ·Distancei,t + β2 ·Distance2i,t
+ β3 ·Distancei,t ·MarketConcLow + β4 ·Distance2i,t ·MarketConcLow
+ β5 ·Distancei,t ·MarketConcHigh+ β6 ·Distance2i,t ·MarketConcHigh
+ γ ·Xi,t + εi,t (4.7)
where the variables Spreadi,t and (squared) Distancei,t are defined as above.
MarketConcLowt and MarketConcHight are indicator variables for whether the mar-
ket concentration in the 12 months prior to month t is low, or high, respectively (with
intermediate market concentration is the omitted group). Specifically, we split market
concentration into terciles, with low market concentration being the lowest one-third of
observations in our sample period and high market concentration as the highest one-third
(and intermediate market concentration the remaining one-third). Splitting market con-
centration across terciles again might allow us to capture a non-monotonic effect of market
concentration on loan pricing as predicted in hypothesis 3. The key independent variables
are the interaction terms of Distancei,t (and Distance2i,t) with MarketConcLowt and
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MarketConcHight. The remaining control variables, fixed effects, and standard error
specifications are identical to the specification for the stand alone effect of market concen-
tration, besides that we additionally include indicator variables for low and high market
concentration.
Column (2) in Table 4.9 reports the regression results for the stand alone effect of mar-
ket concentration. We find a statistically significant and convex relationship of market
concentration on loan pricing. Consistent with hypothesis 3, reductions in market con-
centration first reduce loan pricing, but below a certain level loan pricing increases with
further reductions in market concentration (see Figure 4.8 (a)). In terms of magnitude,
a reduction of lender distance by one standard deviation from the median increases loan
pricing by 2bps (or 1% at a mean of 252bps). While small in economic magnitude, this
effect might be more pronounced for close syndicates.
Column (3) reports coefficient estimates for the joint test of hypothesis 2 and 3. We
find that the interaction terms of (squared) lender distance with low and high market con-
centration are statistically significant at least at the 5%-level (with intermediate market
concentration being the omitted group). Consistent with standard industrial organization
intuition that lower market concentration increases competition, a reduction in market
concentration from high to intermediate levels reduces loan pricing across all levels of
lender distance (see Figure 4.8 (b)). Consistent with collusive pricing in markets with
syndication during periods of low market concentration (hypothesis 3), however, once
market concentration declines from intermediate to low levels, loan pricing does not con-
tinue to reduce across all levels of lender distance. Specifically, while loan pricing further
reduces (or remains unchanged) for mid and distant syndicates, consistent with our hy-
pothesis on price collusion in closer syndicates (hypothesis 2) loan pricing increases for
close syndicates (see Figure 4.8 (c)). In terms of magnitude, a reduction of market con-
centration from intermediate to low increases loan pricing for close syndicates by 8bps (or
3% at a mean of 252bps) at the 25th-percentile of lender distance, and 13bps (or 5%) at
the 10th-percentile, respectively. This finding is consistent with the joint effect of hypoth-
esis 2 and 3, namely that during periods of low market concentration only close syndicates
engage in collusive loan pricing. This result implies that the net pricing effect of close
syndicates is dominated by improved screening and monitoring during periods of high and
intermediate market concentration, while it is dominated by price collusion during periods
of low market concentration.
4.4.7 Robustness
One concern might be that our results on the time-variation of loan pricing are affected
by low levels of market concentration since 2010. To rule out this concern, we re-estimate
our results on the time-variation of loan pricing restricting the first sub-period to an
(equivalently long) period of low market concentration, namely 1989-1996:q1. As reported
in Appendix Table A.4.6, this robustness check confirms our previous results. That is,
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consistent to hypothesis 1, closer lender distance linearly reduces loan pricing prior to
2010. Our findings thus indicate that despite low levels of market concentration, lenders
in close syndicates did not collude on loan pricing prior to 2010. Consequently, these
findings also imply that price collusion in the syndicate loan market since 2010 might be
an active choice of lenders.
4.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the formation of loan syndicates and their effects on loan
pricing. Consistent with our hypotheses of smaller and more concentrated syndicates
magnifying close syndicates’ improved screening/monitoring and price collusion abilities,
we find that lead arrangers form close and concentrated syndicates by choosing lenders
with similar lending expertise and allocating these lenders higher loan shares. Analyzing
the effects of close syndicates on loan pricing, we find evidence of both improved screen-
ing/monitoring abilities and price collusion. However, while close syndicates resulted in
improved screening/monitoring throughout the entire sample period, close syndicates only
engaged in price collusion since 2010. Analyzing the effects of market concentration on
loan pricing shows that below a certain level of market concentration, price collusion in-
creases with reductions in market concentration. Investigating the joint effect of close
syndicated and market concentration shows that close syndicates engage in price collusion
only during periods of low market concentration. Overall, our findings imply that both
the organizational form of loan syndicates and the level of market concentration affects
price collusion.
Our empirical findings have two important implications. First, to our knowledge we are
the first to provide evidence of price collusion in markets with syndication beyond the
well-documented price collusion in IPO markets. We are also the first to show that both
the organizational form of loan syndicates and the level of market concentration affects
price collusion. Thereby, we provide empirical evidence consistent with the theory of price
collusion in syndicate markets from Hatfield et al. (2017), which contradicts standard
industrial organization intuitions.
Second, our work also highlights an important channel of how banks become intercon-
nected in the financial system. As discussed above, borrowing volumes from syndicated
loans are larger than from public debt and equity issuance combined, so that banks inter-
connectedness through syndicated loans is relevant. Banks increase their portfolio overlap
with close competitors by forming close and concentrated loan syndicates. As shown in
Cai et al. (2018), higher interconnectedness of banks through similarity in their syndicated
lending elevates systemic risk during recession periods. We document a new channel of
how banks become interconnected, namely through the formation of close and concen-
trated loan syndicates.
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4.6 Figures
Figure 4.1: Mean Syndicated Loan Lender Distance Across Time
This figure shows the annual mean lender distance of syndicated loans from 1989 to 2016. Lender distance
of the syndicated loan is the average distance between the lead arranger(s) and all the other syndicate
members in the previous 12 months based on lender specialization by borrower 2-digit SIC industry.
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Figure 4.2: Market Concentration of the U.S. Syndicated Loan Market Across Time
This figure shows the market concentration of the U.S. syndicated loan market from 1989 to 2016. Market
concentration is the Herfindahl index based on the market share of each bank based on the originated loan
amount as lead arranger during the year.
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4.7 Tables
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics for Syndicated Loan Facilities
This table presents summary statistics for the sample of syndicated loan facilities made to U.S. firms
between January 1989 and March 2017. Panel A reports lead arranger characteristics based on 33,861
unique lead arranger-months. Panels B and C report borrower and loan characteristics, respectively, based
on 123,752 loan facilities. Panel D reports market characteristics based on 339 months.
(a) Lead Arranger Characteristics
(Based on 33,861 lead arranger-months, and 3,346,592 lender pair-months)
N Mean SD 10th 50th 90th
Market share (%), previous 12 months 33,861 1.00 3.14 0.00 0.08 1.97
# of loans as lead arranger 33,861 65.05 174.91 1 10 155
$ of loans as lead arranger ($mm) 33,861 11,288 40,244 43 703 21,792
Bank indicator 33,861 0.82 0.39 0 1 1
All lender pairs:
Distance between two lenders 3,346,592 0.61 0.23 0.29 0.63 0.88
(b) Borrower Characteristics
(Based on 123,752 loan facilities)
N Mean SD 10th 50th 90th
All borrowers:
Sales at closing ($mm) 69,357 3,541 18,683 59 500 6,881
# of previous syndicated loans 123,752 4.13 6.35 0 2 12
First borrower loan indicator 123,752 0.38 0.49 0 0 1
Private borrower indicator 106,976 0.64 0.48 0 1 1
Public borrower indicator 106,976 0.36 0.48 0 0 1
Borrowers with Compustat data:
Total book assets ($mm) 46,533 12,317 71,769 107 1,158 17,643
Book leverage ratio 46,297 0.37 0.27 0.05 0.34 0.68
Earnings to asset ratio 44,022 0.06 0.24 -0.01 0.07 0.16
Debt rating indicator 48,317 0.56 0.50 0 1 1
Investment-grade rating ind. 48,317 0.29 0.45 0 0 1
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics for Syndicated Loan Facilities
(continued)
(c) Loan Characteristics
(Based on 123,752 loan facilities)
N Mean SD 10th 50th 90th
Syndicated loan characteristics:
Facility amount ($mm) 123,752 271 683 14 95 600
Maturity (months) 112,647 50 25 12 60 80
Spread on drawn funds (bps) 104,950 252 164 63 225 450
Term loan indicator 123,752 0.34 0.47 0 0 1
Purpose of loan indicators:
Working capital/corporate 123,752 0.72 0.45 0 1 1
Refinancing 123,752 0.18 0.38 0 0 1
Acquisitions 123,752 0.22 0.42 0 0 1
Backup lines 123,752 0.05 0.22 0 0 0
Syndicate structure:
Total number of lenders 123,752 6.04 6.83 1 4 13
Total number of lead arrangers 123,752 1.55 1.24 1 1 3
Total number of co-agents 123,752 1.30 2.56 0 0 4
Total number of participants 123,752 3.16 5.42 0 1 8
Concentration of syndicate (Herfindahl) 23,194 0.27 0.24 0.06 0.19 0.55
Loan distribution:
% kept by lead arranger 23,633 31.37 23.94 8.10 24.00 64.00
% held by co-agents 11,679 14.68 10.77 5.18 11.55 28.45
% held by participants 20,847 14.70 13.39 3.23 10.00 33.33
Syndicated loan lender distance:
Lender distance 100,015 0.29 0.14 0.15 0.26 0.47
(d) Market Characteristics
(Based on 339 months)
N Mean SD 10th 50th 90th
Market concentration 339 0.11 0.03 0.08 0.10 0.15
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Table 4.2: Top Lead Arrangers, by Loan Lender Distance
This table shows the top five lead arranger (by number of arranged loans) for close, mid, and distant syndicates in the sample from 2014 to 2016. The
sub-sample of close, mid, and distant syndicates consist of syndicates, in which the lender distance is in the lowest, middle, and highest one-third of the
originating month, respectively. Lender distance at the syndicated loan facility level is defined as the average distance between the lead arranger(s) and all
other syndicate members in the previous 12 months based on lender specialization in borrower 2-digit SIC industry.
(1) (2) (3)
Close Syndicates Mid Syndicates Distant Syndicates
Lead arrangers
# loans # loans # loans
Bank of America 2,054 Bank of America 827 Bank of America 1,912
JPMorgan Chase 1,794 JPMorgan Chase 667 JPMorgan Chase 1,682
Wells Fargo 1,544 Wells Fargo 490 Wells Fargo 1,327
Citigroup 823 KeyCorporation 476 Citigroup 835
Deutsche Bank 659 Bank of Montreal 389 Barclays 620
Total number of lead arrangers 12,583 Total number of lead arrangers 11,720 Total number of lead arrangers 15,563
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Table 4.3: Syndicate Structure
This table reports coefficient estimates from regressions relating syndicate structure to lender distance of
the syndicated loan. The dependent variables are the number of lenders, leads, co-agents, and participants
in a syndicated loan, and the concentration of the loan syndicate (Herfindahl). Concentration of the loan
syndicate is computed as the sum of the squared loan share of each individual syndicate member, and can
range between zero and one, with larger values indicating a higher concentration. Lender distance of the
syndicated loan is the average distance between the lead arranger(s) and all the other syndicate members
in the previous 12 months based on lender specialization by borrower 2-digit SIC industry. All regressions
include year, loan purpose, interest rate type, borrower 2-digit SIC industry, and borrower state fixed
effects. Robust standard errors allowing for clustering by borrower 2-digit SIC industry are in parentheses.
* indicates that the estimated coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10% level, ** at the 5%
level, and *** at the 1% level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
# Lenders # Leads # Co-Agents # Participants Herfindahl
Lender distance 61.902∗∗∗ 1.024∗∗ 9.288∗∗∗ 51.455∗∗∗ -0.732∗∗∗
(3.932) (0.406) (0.967) (3.073) (0.065)
Lender distance2 -64.948∗∗∗ -0.813∗∗ -10.330∗∗∗ -53.687∗∗∗ 0.834∗∗∗
(4.404) (0.405) (1.052) (3.418) (0.075)
Private borrower indicator 0.020 0.069∗∗∗ -0.163∗∗∗ 0.115 -0.006
(0.128) (0.022) (0.051) (0.118) (0.004)
Unrated borrower indicator -0.324∗ -0.123∗∗∗ 0.043 -0.248 0.020∗∗∗
(0.189) (0.025) (0.065) (0.162) (0.005)
Investment-grade borrower ind. 0.567∗ -0.093∗∗ 0.239∗∗ 0.423∗ -0.002
(0.301) (0.046) (0.118) (0.215) (0.005)
First borrower loan indicator -0.653∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ -0.040 -0.703∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
(0.133) (0.011) (0.043) (0.139) (0.005)
Ln[borrower’s sales at closing] 1.011∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ 0.649∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.016) (0.037) (0.065) (0.002)
Ln[loan facility amount] 2.387∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.831∗∗∗ 1.460∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗
(0.113) (0.014) (0.042) (0.080) (0.003)
Ln[loan maturity in days] 1.019∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗ 0.655∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.024) (0.045) (0.097) (0.003)
Term loan indicator 0.906∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ -0.041 0.839∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(0.172) (0.025) (0.061) (0.124) (0.006)
N = 33,709 33,709 33,709 33,709 12,113
Adjusted R2 0.3555 0.4352 0.2429 0.2438 0.4151
Figure 4.3: Visualization of Coefficient Estimates from Table 4.3
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Table 4.4: Loan Distribution: Choice of Syndicate Members
This table reports coefficient estimates from regressions relating the likelihood of a potential lender being
chosen as a syndicate member by the lead arranger to the distance between the potential lender and the
lead arranger. Lenders can be chosen into different loan roles, namely co-leads, co-agents, or participants.
The dependent variable is an indicator variable for whether the potential lender is chosen as a member
into these syndicate roles (0 if no and 1 if yes). Chosen co-leads (and co-agents) are excluded from the
choice set in subsequent regressions for less senior syndicate membership roles. The independent variable
of interest is the distance between the syndicates lead arranger(s) and the potential lender in the previous
12 months based on lender specializations in borrower 2-digit SIC industry. All regressions include loan
facility fixed effects. Robust standard errors allowing for clustering by lead arranger are in parentheses. *
indicates that the estimated coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10% level, ** at the 5%
level, and *** at the 1% level.
(1) (2) (3)
Syndicate Syndicate Syndicate
Co-Lead Co-Agent Participant
Indicator Indicator Indicator
Distance from lead arranger -0.264∗∗∗ -0.264∗∗∗ -0.192∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.018) (0.012)
Distance from lead arranger2 0.267∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.020) (0.012)
Previous relationships with lead -0.001 0.004∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Previous relationships with borrower 0.125∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.004) (0.007)
Market share (%), previous 12 months 0.014∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Loan facility fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
N = 9,838,197 8,168,392 12,388,715
Adjusted R2 0.1882 0.1328 0.1612
Figure 4.4: Visualization of Coefficient Estimates from Table 4.4
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Table 4.5: Loan Distribution: Allocation of Loan Shares
This table reports coefficient estimates from regressions relating loan distribution to lender distance of the
syndicated loan. The dependent variables are the share of the loan in percentage taken by lead arrangers,
co-agents, and participants, respectively. Lender distance of the syndicated loan is the average distance
between the lead arranger(s) and all the other syndicate members in the previous 12 months based on
lender specialization by borrower 2-digit SIC industry. Loan shares are computed as the average loan
share of lenders with the same loan role within the syndicate. All regressions include control variables as
in Table 4.3 as well as year, loan purpose, interest rate type, borrower 2-digit SIC industry, and borrower
state fixed effects. Robust standard errors allowing for clustering by borrower 2-digit SIC industry are in
parentheses. * indicates that the estimated coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10% level,
** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
(1) (2) (3)
% Held by % Held by % Held by
Lead Co-Agent Participant
Lender distance -72.503∗∗∗ -66.652∗∗∗ -33.152∗∗∗
(6.922) (8.090) (4.725)
Lender distance2 83.559∗∗∗ 81.215∗∗∗ 41.165∗∗∗
(8.371) (9.163) (5.423)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes
N = 12,272 7,463 11,474
Adjusted R2 0.4160 0.4205 0.4886
Figure 4.5: Visualization of Coefficient Estimates from Table 4.5
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Table 4.6: Close vs. Mid vs. Distant Syndicates
This table reports the means of close, mid, and distant syndicates on various borrower, loan characteristics,
syndicate structure, and loan distribution, and the mean differences between close and mid as well as distant
and mid syndicates. That is, the mean of close syndicates, minus the mean of mid syndicates (µClose –
µMid), and the mean of close syndicates, minus the mean of mid syndicates (µDistant – µMid),
respectively. The sample of 123,752 syndicated loan facilities is split into three sub-samples based
on the monthly one-third, and two-thirds of the lender distance of the syndicated loan. The sub-
sample of close syndicates consists of syndicates in which lender distance is up to the one-third
of the originating month, the sub-sample of mid syndicates consist of syndicates in which lender
distance is above the one-third and up to the two-third of the originating month, whereas the
sub-sample of distant syndicates consists of the remaining syndicates. Lender distance at the
syndicated loan facility level is defined as the average distance between the lead arranger(s) and all
the other syndicate members in the previous 12 months based on lender specialization in borrower
2-digit SIC industry. * indicates that the mean difference is significantly different from zero at the
10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
Syndicate Distance Differences
Close Mid Distant Close-Mid Distant-Mid
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Borrower characteristics:
Public borrower indicator 0.359 0.406 0.306 -0.047∗∗∗ -0.100∗∗∗
Debt rating indicator 0.627 0.667 0.521 -0.041∗∗∗ -0.146∗∗∗
Investment-grade rating indicator 0.325 0.373 0.252 -0.048∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗∗
# of previous syndicated loans 4.907 5.383 3.502 -0.477∗∗∗ -1.881∗∗∗
First borrower loan indicator 0.299 0.281 0.418 0.018∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗
Sales at closing ($mm) 3,893 4,921 3,025 -1,028∗∗∗ -1,895∗∗∗
Syndicated loan characteristics:
Facility amount ($mm) 312 399 221 -87∗∗∗ -178∗∗∗
Maturity (months) 48.627 50.940 51.294 -2.314∗∗∗ 0.354∗
Term loan indicator 0.322 0.314 0.364 0.008∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗
Spread on drawn funds (bps) 236 231 266 5∗∗∗ 35∗∗∗
Syndicate structure:
Total number of lenders 5.202 9.130 6.781 -3.928∗∗∗ -2.349∗∗∗
Total number of lead arrangers 1.659 1.821 1.556 -0.162∗∗∗ -0.264∗∗∗
Total number of co-agents 1.256 2.149 1.363 -0.892∗∗∗ -0.786∗∗∗
Total number of participant lenders 2.273 5.138 3.810 -2.865∗∗∗ -1.328∗∗∗
Concentration of syndicate (HHI) 0.270 0.171 0.250 0.098∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗
Loan distribution:
% kept by lead arranger 31.437 21.316 29.776 10.121∗∗∗ 8.460∗∗∗
% held by co-agent lender 17.661 12.124 15.531 5.537∗∗∗ 3.407∗∗∗
% held by participant lender 16.479 10.200 15.578 6.279∗∗∗ 5.378∗∗∗
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Table 4.7: Loan Pricing and Time-Variation in Loan Pricing
This table reports coefficient estimates from regressions relating loan pricing to the lender distance at
the syndicated loan facility level, over the entire sample period and a split of the sample period. The
sample period is split into a first sub-period from 1989 to 1996:q1, and a second sub-period from 2010
to 2017:q1. The dependent variable is the interest spread over LIBOR on drawn funds measured in basis
points. The independent variables of interest is the (squared) lender distance of the syndicated loan, which
is the average distance between the lead arranger(s) and all the other syndicate members in the previous
12 months based on borrower 2-digit SIC industry. All regressions include control variables as in Table 4.3
as well as year, loan purpose, interest rate type, borrower 2-digit SIC industry, and borrower state fixed
effects. Robust standard errors allowing for clustering by borrower 2-digit SIC industry are in parentheses.
* indicates that the estimated coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10% level, ** at the 5%
level, and *** at the 1% level.
Spread on Drawn Funds (bps)
Full Sample 1989-2009 2010-2017
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lender distance 35.66∗∗∗ -13.19 38.33∗∗∗ 32.31 -17.94 -224.44∗∗∗
(8.56) (22.75) (8.82) (27.93) (23.32) (53.04)
Lender distance2 62.00∗∗ 7.44 382.46∗∗∗
(29.38) (34.13) (82.51)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N = 31,024 31,024 25,774 25,774 5,250 5,250
Adjusted R2 0.4544 0.4545 0.4578 0.4578 0.4492 0.4509
Figure 4.6: Visualization of Coefficient Estimates from Table 4.7
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Table 4.8: Improved Screening versus Price Collusion
This table reports coefficient estimates from regressions relating loan pricing to the lender distance at the
syndicated loan facility level and information asymmetry of the borrower, separate for two sub-periods.
An “opaque” borrower is an unrated firm, or a small firm (defined as the smallest one-third of borrowing
firms in the sample by sales at closing at the time of loan origination). The first sub-period spans from
1989 to 2009, and the second sub-period from 2010 to 2017. The dependent variable is the interest spread
over LIBOR on drawn funds measured in basis points. The independent variables of interest are the
(squared) lender distance of the syndicated loan, which is the average distance between the lead arranger(s)
and all the other syndicate members in the previous 12 months based on borrower 2-digit SIC industry,
and interactions of these variables with “opaque” borrower, respectively. All regressions include control
variables as in Table 4.3 (besides including an opaque borrower indicator instead of unrated borrower)
as well as year, loan purpose, interest rate type, borrower 2-digit SIC industry, and borrower state fixed
effects. Robust standard errors allowing for clustering by borrower 2-digit SIC industry are in parentheses.
* indicates that the estimated coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10% level, ** at the 5%
level, and *** at the 1% level.
Spread on Drawn Funds (bps)
1989-2009 2010-2017
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lender distance 11.51 -5.41 -66.72∗ -417.59∗∗∗
(12.32) (38.57) (39.54) (124.03)
Lender distance2 23.47 731.38∗∗∗
(47.68) (216.10)
Lender distance x Opaque 39.07∗∗ 100.79∗ 90.01∗ 368.37∗∗
(17.73) (54.09) (50.65) (168.04)
Lender distance2 x Opaque -75.94 -610.45∗∗
(61.26) (283.09)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
N = 25,774 25,774 5,250 5,250
Adjusted R2 0.4532 0.4532 0.4447 0.4465
Figure 4.7: Visualization of Coefficient Estimates from Table 4.8
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Table 4.9: Loan Pricing and Market Concentration
This table reports coefficient estimates from regressions relating loan pricing to the lender distance at the
syndicated loan facility level and market concentration. The dependent variable is the interest spread over
LIBOR on drawn funds measured in basis points. Market concentration is the Herfindahl index based on
the market share of each bank based on the originated loan amount as lead arranger during the previous 12
months. Lender distance of the syndicated loan is the average distance between the lead arranger(s) and all
the other syndicate members in the previous 12 months based on lender specialization by borrower 2-digit
SIC industry. The independent variables of interest are market concentration (squared) and the interaction
of lender distance (squared) with low and high market concentration, whereas low market concentration
is an indicator variable for the lowest one-third of market concentration in the sample period, and high
market concentration is an indicator variable for the highest one-third of market concentration in the sample
period. All regressions include control variables as in Table 4.3 (and column (3) additionally indicators
for low and high market concentration) as well as three-year, loan purpose, interest rate type, borrower
2-digit SIC industry, and borrower state fixed effects. Robust standard errors allowing for clustering by
borrower 2-digit SIC industry are in parentheses. * indicates that the estimated coefficient is significantly
different from zero at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
Spread on Drawn Funds (bps)
(1) (2) (3)
Lender distance 67.66∗∗∗ 66.60∗∗∗ 152.74∗∗∗
(22.99) (22.66) (37.64)
Lender distance2 -14.06 -12.70 -112.22∗∗
(30.36) (29.89) (48.19)
Market concentration -646.04∗
(364.09)
Market concentration2 3746.33∗∗
(1565.41)
Lender distance x Low market concentration -170.73∗∗∗
(56.01)
Lender distance2 x Low market concentration 183.74∗∗∗
(65.69)
Lender distance x High market concentration -103.31∗∗
(48.61)
Lender distance2 x High market concentration 128.58∗∗
(58.46)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes
N = 31,024 31,024 31,024
Adjusted R2 0.4343 0.4354 0.4346
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Figure 4.8: Visualization of Coefficient Estimates from Table 4.9
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4.8 Appendix
Table A.4.1: Variable Definitions
This Appendix lists the variables used in the empirical analysis and their definitions.
Variable Description
Panel A: Lead Arranger Characteristics
Market share (%), previous 12
months
Market share of a lender in the U.S. syndicated loan
market based on the total loan amount the lender
originated during the previous 12 months
# of loans as lead arranger Number of loans arranged as lead arranger in the U.S.
syndicated loan market during the previous 12 months
$ of loans as lead arranger ($mm) Amount of loans arranged by a lender in the U.S.
syndicated loan market in USD million based on the total
loan amount the lender originated during the previous 12
months
Bank indicator An indicator variable for whether the lender is a bank (as
opposed to finance companies, institutional investors, etc.)
Lender’s previous relationships An indicator variable for whether a lender pre-
with lead viously syndicated a loan with the lead arranger (no
matter what roles the two lenders took)
Lender’s previous relationships with
borrower
An indicator variable for whether a lender previously
syndicated a loan to the borrower (no matter what role
the lender took)
Distance between two lenders The distance in lending specializations between two
lenders in the U.S. syndicated loan market during the
previous 12 months
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Variable Definitions (continued)
Panel B: Borrower Characteristics
All borrowers:
Sales at closing ($mm) Borrower’s sales at closing in USD million at the time of
loan origination
# of previous syndicated loans The number of syndicated loans that the bor-
rower took prior to the time of loan origination
First borrower loan indicator An indicator variable for whether the borrower’s
syndicated loan is the first syndicated loan
Private firm indicator An indicator variable for whether the borrower is a
private firm at the time of loan origination
Public firm indicator An indicator variable for whether the borrower is a public
firm at the time of loan origination
Borrowers with Compustat data:
Total book assets ($mm) Total assets of a borrower (book value) in USD million at
time of loan origination
Book leverage ratio Book leverage ratio of a borrower at the time of loan
origination, computed as (Longterm Debt+
Current Liabilities)/Total Book Assets
Earnings to asset ratio Earnings to asset ratio of a borrower at the time of loan
origination, computed as
(Depreciation+ Income before extraordinary items)
/ Total Book Assets
Debt rating indicator An indicator variable for whether the borrower has a
long-term S&P debt rating at the time of loan origination
Investment-grade rating indicator An indicator variable for whether the borrower has a
long-term S&P investment-grade rating at the time of
loan origination
Unrated borrower indicator An indicator variable for whether the borrower is unrated
by S&P (no long-term debt rating) at the time of loan
origination
Opaque borrower An indicator variable for whether the borrower is either
an unrated firm or a small firm (defined as the smallest
one-third of borrowing firms in the sample by sales at
closing at the time of loan origination)
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Variable Definitions (continued)
Panel C: Loan Characteristics
Syndicated loan characteristics:
Facility amount ($mm) Facility amount of the syndicated loan in USD million
Maturity (months) Maturity of the syndicated loan in months
Spread on drawn funds (bps) Loan interest rate spread over LIBOR on drawn funds
measured in basis points
Term loan indicator An indicator variable for whether the syndicated loan is a
term loan
Purpose of loan indicators:
Working capital/corporate An indicator variable for whether the purpose of the
syndicated loan is either working capital, or corporate
Refinancing An indicator variable for whether the purpose of the
syndicated loan is refinancing
Acquisitions An indicator variable for whether the purpose of the
syndicated loan is aquisitions
Backup lines An indicator variable for whether the purpose of the
syndicated loan is backup lines
Syndicate structure:
Total number of lenders Total number of lenders in the syndicate
Total number of lead arrangers Total number of lead arrangers in the syndicate
Total number of co-agents Total number of co-agents in the syndicate
Total number of participants Total number of participants in the syndicate
Concentration of syndicate
(Herfindahl)
Syndicate concentration as measured by the Herfindahl
index (the sum of squared loan share by individual
lenders)
Loan distribution:
% kept by lead arranger* Loan share retained by lead arranger(s)
% held by co-agent lender* Loan share held by co-agent(s)
% held by participant lender* Loan share held by participant(s)
Syndicated loan lender distance:
Lender distance The average distance in lending specializations between
the lead arranger(s) and other syndicate members of the
syndicated loan in the U.S. syndicated loan market during
the previous 12 months
Panel D: Market Characteristics
Market concentration Market concentration in the U.S. syndicated loan market
as measured by the Herfindahl index (sum of the squared
lenders market share during the previous 12 months)
* Represents the average loan share of lead arrangers/co-agents/participants if there is more than one
lead arranger/co-agent/participant in the syndicate.
140 Chapter 4
Table A.4.2: Example of Computing the Syndicated Loan Lender Distance
This appendix shows how the syndicated loan lender distance is computed using a real example of a
syndicate classified as “close”. Specifically, it uses a syndicated loan to Stancorp Financial Group Inc.
originated on June 16, 2014 (DealScan facilityid 324171), which displays syndicated loan characteristics
similar to the average close syndicate (loan amount: $250 million; loan maturity: 48 months; term loan
indicator: zero; spread on drawn funds: 137.5bps). The syndicate also shows a very similar syndicate
structure than the average close syndicate in the sample. It consists of five lenders, led by a large lender
in the syndicated loan market (Wells Fargo), has two co-agents (JPMorgan Chase, and U.S. Bancorp) and
two participants (Barclays, and Goldman Sachs). First, we show the distance between two lenders for each
pair of lenders at the loan origination month. Second, we compute the syndicated loan lender distance as
the average distance of all pairs of lead arranger-lender at the time of loan origination. Consequently, only
the lender distance pairs from Wells Fargo with the other four lenders (JPMorgan Chase, U.S. Bancorp,
Barclays, and Goldman Sachs) enter the computation.
Distance between two Lenders
Wells Fargo JPMorgan Chase U.S. Bancorp Barclays Goldman Sachs
(Lead) (Co-Agent) (Co-Agent) (Participant) (Participant)
Wells Fargo -
JPMorgan Chase 0.097 -
U.S. Bancorp 0.113 0.103 -
Barclays 0.162 0.104 0.154 -
Goldman Sachs 0.151 0.124 0.132 0.167 -
Computation of Syndicated Loan Lender Distance
Distances,t =
1
Ns
Ns∑
n=1
distancein ,kn ,t
= 14 (DistanceWF, JPMC, t +DistanceWF,USB, t +DistanceWF,Barc, t +DistanceWF,GS, t)
= 14 × (0.097 + 0.113 + 0.162 + 0.151) = 0.131
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Appendix A.4.3: Classification of Lender Roles
We classify lenders into three categories based on the seniority of their role in the
syndicate, namely: (i) lead arranger, (ii) co-agent, and (iii) participant lender. Using
lender roles from DealScan, we classify a lender as a lead arranger if its "LenderRole"
falls into the following: administrative agent, agent, arranger, bookrunner, coordinating
arranger, lead arranger, lead bank, lead manager, and mandated arranger. If no lead
arranger or multiple lead arrangers are identified, we then cross-check the information
with another field named "LeadArrangerCredit". For a lender to be a lead, this field needs
to equal "Yes." If two or more lead arrangers are still identified, they are then co-leads.
We identify a lender as a co-agent if it is not in a lead position and its "LenderRole"
falls into the following: co-agent, co-arranger, co-lead arranger, co-lead manager, co-lead
underwriter, collateral agent, co-manager, co-syndications agent, documentation agent,
joint arranger, joint lead manager, managing agent, senior co-arranger, senior co-lead
manager, senior co-manager, and syndications agent.
Lenders with neither lead nor co-agent roles are classified as participant lenders.
See Standard & Poor’s (2016) for descriptions of lender roles.
142 Chapter 4
Table A.4.4: Loan Distribution: Allocation of Loan Shares within Syndicates
This table reports coefficient estimates from regressions relating loan distribution to lender distance of the
syndicated loan. The dependent variables are the share of the loan in percentage taken by lead arrangers,
co-agents, and participants, respectively. Lender distance of the syndicated loan is the average distance
between the lead arranger(s) and all the other syndicate members in the previous 12 months based on
lender specialization by borrower 2-digit SIC industry. Loan shares are identified through within syndicate
variation and loan shares are lender-specific. Regressions on the loan share for lead arrangers are restricted
to loans with at least three lead arrangers. Regressions on the loan share for co-agents and participants
are restricted to syndicates with one lead arranger. All regressions include control variables as in Table 4.4
as well as loan facility fixed effects. Robust standard errors allowing for clustering by lead arranger are in
parentheses. * indicates that the estimated coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10% level,
** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
(1) (2) (3)
% Held by % Held by % Held by
Lead Co-Agent Participant
Distance from lead arranger -0.341∗ -1.449∗∗∗ -2.241∗∗∗
(0.176) (0.247) (0.157)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes
Loan facility fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
N = 53,216 25,546 62,918
Adjusted R2 0.8797 0.9463 0.8963
Figure A.4.1: Visualization of Coefficient Estimates from Table A.4.4
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Table A.4.5: Syndicate Formation and Information Asymmetry
This table reports coefficient estimates from regressions relating syndicate formation to lender distance of
the syndicated loan and information asymmetry of the borrower. Lender distance of the syndicated loan
is the average distance between the lead arranger(s) and all the other syndicate members in the previous
12 months based on lender specialization by borrower 2-digit SIC industry. An “opaque” borrower is an
unrated firm, or a small firm (defined as the smallest one-third of borrowing firms in the sample by sales
at closing at the time of loan origination). A “first” loan is the first syndicated loan the borrower has
taken in the syndicated loan market in our sample period. All regressions include control variables as in
Table 4.3 (besides including an opaque borrower indicator instead of unrated borrower) as well as year,
loan purpose, interest rate type, borrower 2-digit SIC industry, and borrower state fixed effects. Robust
standard errors allowing for clustering by borrower 2-digit SIC industry are in parentheses. * indicates
that the estimated coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and
*** at the 1% level.
% Held by Lead Herfindahl
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lender distance -72.975∗∗∗ -104.936∗∗∗ -82.393∗∗∗ -0.735∗∗∗ -1.015∗∗∗ -0.807∗∗∗
(6.978) (10.963) (8.005) (0.066) (0.104) (0.071)
Lender distance2 84.306∗∗∗ 123.289∗∗∗ 95.817∗∗∗ 0.838∗∗∗ 1.156∗∗∗ 0.923∗∗∗
(8.428) (13.852) (10.269) (0.076) (0.134) (0.087)
Lender distance x Opaque 47.985∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗
(14.734) (0.135)
Lender distance2 x Opaque -56.142∗∗∗ -0.481∗∗∗
(17.031) (0.155)
Lender distance x First loan 35.215∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗
(11.476) (0.092)
Lender distance2 x First loan -37.967∗∗∗ -0.299∗∗∗
(12.514) (0.098)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N = 12,272 12,272 12,272 12,113 12,113 12,113
Adjusted R2 0.4155 0.4170 0.4161 0.4151 0.4166 0.4155
Figure A.4.2: Visualization of Coefficient Estimates from Table A.4.5
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Table A.4.6: Loan Pricing during Periods of Low Market Concentration
This table reports coefficient estimates from regressions relating loan pricing to the lender distance at
the syndicated loan facility level, separately across two sub-periods. The sub-period span from 1989 to
1996:q1, and from 2010 to 2017:q1, respectively. The dependent variable is the interest spread over LIBOR
on drawn funds measured in basis points. The independent variables of interest is the (squared) lender
distance of the syndicated loan, which is the average distance between the lead arranger(s) and all the
other syndicate members in the previous 12 months based on borrower 2-digit SIC industry. All regressions
include control variables as in Table 4.3 as well as year, loan purpose, interest rate type, borrower 2-digit
SIC industry, and borrower state fixed effects. Robust standard errors allowing for clustering by borrower
2-digit SIC industry are in parentheses. * indicates that the estimated coefficient is significantly different
from zero at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
Spread on Drawn Funds (bps)
1989-1996:q1 2010-2017:q1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lender distance 47.63∗∗∗ 106.15 -17.94 -224.44∗∗∗
(16.78) (66.92) (23.32) (53.04)
Lender distance2 -59.67 382.46∗∗∗
(64.56) (82.51)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
N = 4,872 4,872 5,250 5,250
Adjusted R2 0.4221 0.4222 0.4492 0.4509
Figure A.4.3: Visualization of Coefficient Estimates from Table A.4.6
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